I CAN'T BE SILENT. AN EXTRAORDINARY MARCO PERFETTI BETWEEN CONFIDENT CANON LAW AND «SCANDAL IN THE SUN»: THE DECEASED AUGUST SAID THAT HOMOSEXUALITY IS A SIN
We can only thank the creator of the blog I cannot be silent, whose interventions, sometimes characterized by an argumentative ease that raises more questions than certainties, they constitute a healthy exercise for us. They remind us that the task of the priest and the theologian is not to chase media coverage, but distinguish, clarify and faithfully safeguard the order of truth, to then defend it from error and pass it on.
This video from three years ago continues to circulate online - which I discovered and listened to only a few days ago - but which retains its relevance not due to the solidity of the theses supported, but for the persistence of the ambiguities on which they are based. It often happens that argumentative constructions erected on well-packaged misunderstandings survive longer than structurally based analyses..
Every time a Pontiff gives an interview, a small media ritual is now taking place: a sentence is extracted, it is isolated from the context, clarifications are lightened, it is stripped of all distinctions and relaunched as if it were a doctrinal earthquake. This time the title is already a manifesto: “Homosexuality is a sin”. Segue, with studied gravity, the subtitle: "We're going back".
First of all, it would be interesting to understand what happened. To the constant doctrine of the Church? To the Catechism promulgated in 1992 and definitively edited in 1998? To the moral tradition that distinguishes - with that conceptual finesse that today seems to have become a rare commodity, especially among certain young people who have improvised as keyboard lawyers - between people, inclination and act? The problem is not the "going back" indignation, but the ease with which one handles categories that would demand, even before passion, competence combined with solid intellectual maturity, doctrinal and legal.
When the Roman Pontiff states that homosexuality It's not a crime but it's a sin, it neither introduces anything new nor inaugurates a regression. It makes an elementary distinction between the penal order and the moral order, between crime and sin, between the external hole and the internal hole. A distinction that belongs to the very structure of Catholic thought and which precedes today's controversies by centuries. It would be enough to have a minimal familiarity with the law - the real one, not the one evoked by hearsay - before claiming to impart lessons or using it as a polemical cudgel, sometimes with effects that are more revealing than convincing.
However, if you are unaware of what "sin" means in Catholic moral theology and the judgment on the act is confused with an ontological judgment on the person, then every word becomes material for the tabloid headline and every clarification is dismissed as a reverse. Theology is not done through titles: it is done by distinguishing. And the right, for its part, demands even greater precision, especially the one structured on a Roman basis, less elastic than common lawbut precisely for this reason less inclined to those ambiguities that, in inexperienced hands, they risk transforming a distinction into an accusation and a clarification into a regression.
Here the real sophistry emerges, as simple as it is effective on a media level. The author states in this video: «Acts of homosexuality are intrinsically disordered: the acts". As if the word "acts", marked with particular emphasis, was sufficient to resolve the problem and protect against any moral evaluation of the person. The question that consequently follows is therefore elementary: who carries out the acts? Given that the acts are not entities suspended in the air, they are not atmospheric phenomena, they are not metaphysical accidents that are produced by self-combustion, It is obvious: the moral act is always a human act. It is posed by a free subject, endowed with intellect and will, of freedom and free will. If we talk about an "act"", we are necessarily talking about an action performed by someone. And that “someone” is man.
Catholic moral theology — and here it would be enough to open a serious manual, not an offhand comment on social— accurately distinguishes between inclination, personal condition and freely posed act. But distinguishing does not mean ontologically separating what is united in reality. The act belongs to the person; the person is the subject of the act. Denying this to save a formula means slipping into a moral nominalism that dissolves responsibility in the lexicon and ends up arousing a certain tenderness towards sorcerer's apprentices convinced that with a terminological device they can resolve structural issues that are evidently bigger than them. St. Augustine, before I can say «I can not remain silent» — I cannot remain silent —, from Aurelius of Tagaste as he still was, he listened to that voice that whispered to him «Great doctor» — take and read. Implied: studies. Aurelius became Augustine because he listened, lessons, he studied and learned.
First of all, it is necessary to recover the category of the moral object. According to the constant doctrine, taken up with clear clarity by Saint John Paul II in the encyclical The Splendor of Truth, the human act is morally qualified on the basis of three elements: object, purpose and circumstances. The object is not the subjective intention, nor the psychological condition of the subject; it is that towards which the act is ordered in itself. When Tradition states that "acts of homosexuality are intrinsically disordered", he is not making a judgment on the dignity of the person, but on the objective structure of the act in relation to the natural law and the specific purpose of sexuality. This means intrinsically evil: that the object of the act is such that it cannot be ordered to the good under any circumstances or intention. It's technical language, not moral slogan. Confusing the judgment on the moral object with an ontological judgment on the person means not having understood the metaphysics of the act, the grammar of Catholic morality e, sometimes, not even that right that one sometimes presumes to want to teach even to others (see, who).
At this point it is best to read the text for what it is, not what you would like it to be. The N. 2357 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church states:
«Homosexuality refers to relationships between men or women who experience sexual attraction, exclusive or predominant, towards people of the same sex. […] Tradition has always declared that "acts of homosexuality are intrinsically disordered". […] Under no circumstances can they be approved.".
It is not an improvised text, nor a marginal note. It is a systematic exposition that clearly distinguishes between inclination and act, between personal condition and morally qualified behavior. The Catechism does not state that the person "is disordered". It does not formulate an ontological judgment on the dignity of the subject. He talks about acts and qualifies them in relation to the natural law and the teleological structure of sexuality.
This distinction does not arise from a disciplinary whim, but from a precise anthropological framework: sexuality, in the Catholic vision, it is ordered to the complementarity between man and woman and to openness to life. If the act is structurally closed for this purpose, the moral object is judged disordered. Not because it was decided in some obscure Roman office by presumed custodians of trembling prejudices, but because the act is evaluated according to a conception of human nature that the Church considers to be inscribed in the order of creation.
One can dispute this anthropology? Certainly and legitimately. But you can't ridicule it by pretending not to understand it, in the hope that others will stop understanding it. The same goes for the inconsistency of the accusation of "going backwards". The text of the Catechism is from 1992, with typical editionthe 1998. It was promulgated under Saint John Paul II and drafted under the supervision of then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. We are not faced with a sudden doctrinal regression of 2023 - as claimed by those who repeatedly accuse the Supreme Pontiff of having defined homosexuality as a sin - but to the simple repetition of a constant doctrine. Talking about "backsliding" means ignoring thirty years of Magisterium or pretending that it does not exist. The problem, so, it's not that the Holy Father Francis has said anything new, but that someone has decided to discover today what the Church has never hidden.
If you then really want to understand what "sin" means in Catholic language, it would be enough to remember a formula that every believer hears - or should hear - in the liturgy: «I have sinned a lot in thoughts, words, works and omissions'. Sin is not a sociological label, it is not an identity, it is not a permanent ontological condition, but a morally qualified human act, something that is accomplished, or that you fail to do. So thoughts, words, works and omissions are four ways in which freedom is exercised. E, practicing, it can be ordered towards the good or be disordered with respect to it.
Saying that an act is a sin means to say that, in that concrete choice, man has posed an action contrary to the objective moral order. It does not mean stating that the person is reducible to his act. It does not mean denying its dignity. It does not mean transforming an existential condition into a permanent guilt. The distinction between person and act is not a modern attenuation: it is the very grammar of Catholic morality. Therefore, when the Supreme Pontiff states that homosexuality is not a crime but a sin, he is simply placing the issue in the moral sphere and not in the criminal sphere. He is recalling that the Church does not invoke civil sanctions, but formulates an ethical judgment on the acts. It's a huge difference, which anyone with only an elementary notion of law should be able to recognise.
Sin belongs to the forum of conscience and the relationship with God, crime belongs to the legal system and the public sphere. Confusing the two levels means understanding neither moral theology nor the general theory of law. And it is precisely here that the controversy shows all its fragility. Why accuse the Holy Father of "backtracking" for having reiterated that a morally disordered act - in this specific case the practice of homosexuality - is a sin, equivalent, in reality, to reproach the Church for continuing to be what it is: that means, simply, itself.
At this point a further node emerges, more delicate and more serious. Because behind the media controversy there is not only a problem of distinction between sin and crime, but an ecclesiological question: l'Idea, more or less explicit, that acceptance must necessarily translate into moral approval. And here we need to be extremely clear: the Church is mother, welcomes everyone, always and without preconditions. He did it towards the adulteress - «I don't condemn you either; go and from now on don't sin anymore " (GV 8,11) — of the publican — «O God, be merciful to me a sinner! ' (LC 18,13) — of the persecutor transformed into an apostle — «Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?» (At 9,4) — of the manifest sinner sitting at table with the Master — «It is not the healthy who need the doctor, and in sickness» (MC 2,17). He never asked for a moral certification upon entry. But hospitality has never been synonymous with legitimization of the act. Nor has mercy ever been equated with the normalization of disorder.
To the number of the Catechism mentioned above (cf.. n. 2357) the one immediately following follows with precise calls to respect and welcome homosexual people:
«A non-negligible number of men and women have deeply rooted homosexual tendencies. This inclination, objectively disordered, constitutes a test for most of them. Therefore they must be welcomed with respect, compassion, delicacy. In their regard, any sign of unfair discrimination will be avoided. Such people are called to carry out God's will in their life, e, if they are Christian, to unite the difficulties they may encounter as a result of their condition to the sacrifice of the Lord's cross " (CCC n. 2358).
The point, however, is precisely this: there are subjects who do not ask for hospitality - which the Church already offers - but for moral recognition of the practice, of the exercise of moral disorder. They don't ask to be welcomed as people, but that the act is removed from moral judgment and normalized. And here we are no longer in the pastoral sphere, but in the doctrinal one. If you intend, in other words, that the Church modifies its anthropology to adapt to a dominant cultural paradigm. Who rereads his own morality in the light of contemporary identity issues. May he bless what until yesterday he defined as intrinsically disordered, without changing the theological structure of reference. Now, everything can be discussed, but the Church cannot be asked to cease being itself without openly declaring it.
The topic is usually presented in a more suggestive rather than rigorous way: inclusion is evoked, we talk about rights, the specter of discrimination is raised, to the point of manipulating the objective data by openly reproaching the Holy Father who, calling homosexuality a sin, it would offer legitimacy to the Islamist regimes that prosecute it criminally. But here what is at stake is not the dignity of the person - which the Church forcefully affirms - but rather the moral qualification of the act. And confusing the two dimensions is a suggestive rhetorical device, but theologically inconsistent and juridically cumbersome.
The truth is that someone would like to let you into the Church what we might call a rainbow Trojan horse: not the person, but the entire ideological package that claims to redefine anthropological categories, moral and sacramental. The Church does not reject people, but he cannot accept that hospitality becomes the tool to undermine his own vision of human nature. The mother hugs, but it does not rewrite the moral law to make the embrace more culturally acceptable to those who would like to transform sin into a right. Whoever asks the Church to declare what it is morally good, in the light of his own theological anthropology, considers it objectively disordered, he is not asking for a pastoral act, but a doctrinal revision. And a doctrinal revision is not achieved through media pressure, nor for effective titles, nor for personal needs, nor through reckless denunciations that alter the level of confrontation.
It is necessary to thank the creator of the blog I cannot be silent, whose interventions, sometimes characterized by an argumentative ease that raises more questions than certainties, they constitute a healthy exercise for us. They remind us of the priest's task, of the theologian and the true jurist is not chasing media coverage, but distinguish, clarify and faithfully safeguard the order of truth, to then transmit it and defend it from those ideological Trojan horses that, with rainbow hues and seductive language, they try to introduce into the Church what does not belong to it, to the point of considering the Supreme Pontiff's words about sin a real scandal in the sun.
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Padre-Ariel-foto-2025-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-28 10:32:182026-02-28 10:43:35“I cannot be silent”. An extraordinary Marco Perfetti between casual Canon Law and «Scandal in the Sun»: the deceased Augustus said that homosexuality is a sin
Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple sandwich with mortadella than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros a kilo. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has transformed. Abstinence remains a sign, but the sign risks becoming empty if its profound meaning is not understood.
Not out of biting Florentine irony, but truth: I have sometimes wondered, with sincere curiosity - what Lenten penances can be proposed to vegetarians and vegans if they don't already eat meat themselves. Maybe abstinence from soy? Or from the organic salad? The question can make you smile, but it hides another one, much more serious: what it really means to do penance?
Abstinence from meat it does not arise from an ecclesiastical dietetics nor from an ancient theological distrust towards steak. It has its roots in an ascetic tradition that has always understood the symbolic and pedagogical value of food. In ancient societies, meat was not an ordinary food, but a sign of celebration, of abundance, of joy. Giving it up meant voluntarily taking away what was perceived as precious. It wasn't about mortifying the body, but to educate desire.
The Church has safeguarded this discipline not as an end in itself, but as a concrete sign of an interior attitude: the conversion. As Saint Leo the Great remembered, «Lenten fasting does not only consist of abstinence from food, but above all in moving away from sin" (The word is39, 2). Christian penance has never been a punitive exercise, but a path of freedom. You give up something lawful to remind yourself that not everything that is lawful is necessary, and that happiness does not depend on possession but on the order of the heart.
With the changing times, however, perceptions also change. Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple sandwich with mortadella than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros a kilo. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has transformed. Abstinence remains a sign, but the sign risks becoming empty if its profound meaning is not understood.
The point is not the meat: it is freedom. Penance does not consist in changing the menu, but in changing size. It is not deprivation as an end in itself, nor an exercise in ascetic voluntarism. It is an orderly renunciation of a good to acquire a greater good. It is taking something away from consumption to return it to faith, to hope and charity. Because «where is your treasure, your heart will also be there" (Mt 6,21): penance moves the treasure to reorient the heart. And maybe, in our time, the most difficult penances do not necessarily pass by the plate. Giving up steak can be relatively simple; giving up the screen on for hours can be much less. Turn off your phone, limit the use of social media, avoid entertainment as an end in itself, preserve silence in a world that lives on continuous noise: these are deprivations that touch raw nerves.
For most, it's harder to refrain from notifications and comments that gives a bloody Florentine steak. but yet, if penance has the aim of educating desire and strengthening inner freedom, that's exactly where the challenge takes place. Saint Paul expressed it with athletic images:
«I treat my body harshly and reduce it to slavery, because when you, after preaching to others, I myself will be disqualified" (1 Color 9,27).
The Pauline one is not contempt for the body, but discipline of freedom. Christian penance is not impoverishment, but an investment. It does not produce sterility, but fruitfulness. Giving up something for the love of God means creating space for God to act. It is a gesture that reduces the superfluous to bring out the essential. And the essential, for the Christian, it is not the sacrifice itself, but communion with Christ.
Lent is precisely this: a penitential journey that culminates in Holy Week and opens to the joy of the Resurrection. It is not a period of ritual sadness, but a time of preparation. We cross the desert to reach Easter. We give up something temporary to remind ourselves that we are destined for the eternal.
Abstinence from meat, At that time, it is not a disciplinary relic nor a food formalism. It's a sign. And like every sign, asks to be understood. If it remains an external gesture, it is reduced to empty practice. If it becomes a conscious act, it turns into a school of freedom. Whether it's meat, of screens or other ingrained habits, the question remains the same: I am the master of my desires or I am governed by them? Penance serves to answer this question with a concrete act. Because true mortification is not giving up what costs us nothing, but learning to say "no" to what dominates us, to be able to say a greater “yes” to God. And that "yes" does not end in forty days. It is the anticipation of an Easter that will never end.
Florence, 23 February 2026
.
HOW EASY IS ABSTINENCE FROM MEAT AS A PENITENTIAL PRACTICE
Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros per kilogram. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence remains a sign, yet the sign risks becoming empty if it is not understood in its deeper meaning.
— Liturgical pastoral —
.
Author Simone Pifizzi
.
Not out of sharp Florentine irony, but in truth: at times I have wondered, with sincere curiosity, what Lenten penances might be proposed to vegetarians and vegans if they already do not eat meat. Perhaps abstinence from soy? Or from organic salad? The question may provoke a smile, but it conceals another, far more serious one: what does it truly mean to do penance?
Abstinence from meat does not arise from ecclesiastical dietetics nor from some ancient theological suspicion toward steak. It is rooted in an ascetical tradition that has always understood the symbolic and pedagogical value of food. In ancient societies, meat was not an ordinary food but a sign of celebration, abundance, and joy. To renounce it meant voluntarily refraining from what was perceived as precious. It was not about mortifying the body, but about educating desire.
The Church has preserved this discipline not as an end in itself, but as a concrete sign of an interior disposition: conversion. As Saint Leo the Great recalled, “Lenten fasting does not consist only in abstinence from food, but above all in turning away from sin” (The word is39, 2). Christian penance has never been a punitive exercise, but a path to freedom. One renounces something lawful in order to remind oneself that not everything lawful is necessary, and that happiness does not depend on possession but on the order of the heart.
With the passing of time, however, perceptions also change. Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros per kilogram. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence remains a sign, yet the sign risks becoming empty if it is not understood in its deeper meaning.
The point is not meat; it is freedom. Penance does not consist in changing the menu, but in changing the measure. It is not deprivation for its own sake, nor an exercise in ascetical voluntarism. It is an ordered renunciation of a good in order to acquire a greater good. It is withdrawing something from consumption in order to restore it to faith, hope, and charity. For “where your treasure is, there your heart will be also” (Mt 6:21): penance shifts the treasure so as to reorient the heart. And perhaps, in our own time, the more difficult penances do not necessarily pass through the plate. Renouncing a steak may prove relatively simple; renouncing a screen left on for hours may be far more difficult. Turning off the phone, limiting the use of social media, abstaining from entertainment for its own sake, preserving silence in a world that lives in constant noise: these are privations that touch exposed nerves.
For many — perhaps for most — it is more arduous to abstain from notifications and comments than from a rare Florentine steak. Yet if penance aims to educate desire and strengthen interior freedom, it is precisely there that the challenge lies. Saint Paul expressed it with athletic imagery:
“I discipline my body and keep it under control, lest after preaching to others I myself should be disqualified” (1 Color 9:27).
Paul’s words do not express contempt for the body, but discipline of freedom. Christian penance is not impoverishment, but investment. It does not produce sterility, but fruitfulness. To renounce something for love of God means creating space for God to act. It is a gesture that reduces the superfluous in order to bring forth the essential. And for the Christian, the essential is not sacrifice in itself, but communion with Christ.
Lent is precisely this: a penitential journey that culminates in Holy Week and opens onto the joy of the Resurrection. It is not a season of ritual sadness, but a time of preparation. One crosses the desert in order to reach Easter. One renounces something temporary in order to remember that we are destined for eternity.
Abstinence from meat, then, is neither a disciplinary relic nor a dietary formalism. It is a sign. And like every sign, it asks to be understood. If it remains an exterior gesture, it becomes an empty practice. If it becomes a conscious act, it turns into a school of freedom. Whether it concerns meat, screens, or other entrenched habits, the question remains the same: am I master of my desires, or am I governed by them? Penance helps us answer that question with a concrete act. For true mortification is not renouncing what costs us nothing, but learning to say “no” to what dominates us, in order to say a greater “yes” to God. And that “yes” does not end after forty days. It is the anticipation of an Easter that will know no sunset.
Florence, 23 February 2026
.
HOW EASY IS ABSTINENCE FROM MEAT AS PENANCE
Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass that costs eighty euros per kilo. Not because church discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence is still a sign, but the sign runs the risk of becoming empty if it is not understood in its deepest meaning.
— Liturgical pastoral care —
.
Author Simone Pifizzi
.
Not because of sharp Florentine irony, but in truth: sometimes I have wondered, with sincere curiosity, What Lenten penances can be proposed to vegetarians and vegans if they do not already eat meat?. Maybe soy withdrawal? Or organic salad? The question can bring a smile, but it contains another much more serious: What does it really mean to do penance??
Abstinence from meat is not born from an ecclesiastical diet nor from an ancient theological distrust of steak. It has its roots in an ascetic tradition that has always understood the symbolic and pedagogical value of food. In ancient societies, meat was not an ordinary food, but a party sign, of abundance and joy. Giving it up meant voluntarily withdrawing from what was perceived as precious.. It was not about mortifying the body, but to educate the desire.
The Church has preserved this discipline not as an end in itself, but as a concrete sign of an inner disposition: the conversion. As Saint Leo the Great remembered, «Lenten fasting does not consist only of abstinence from food, but above all in turning away from sin." (The word is39, 2). Christian penance has never been a punitive exercise, but a path of freedom. You give up something lawful to remind yourself that not everything lawful is necessary., and that happiness does not depend on possession, but of the order of the heart.
With the passage of time, however, perceptions also change. Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass that costs eighty euros per kilo. Not because church discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence is still a sign, but the sign runs the risk of becoming empty if it is not understood in its deepest meaning.
The point is not the meat: it's freedom. Penance is not about changing the menu, but in changing the measurement. It is not deprivation in and of itself., nor exercise of ascetic voluntarism. It is an ordered renunciation of a good to acquire a greater good.. It is subtracting something from consumption to return it to faith, to hope and charity. Because "where is your treasure?", "Your heart will also be there." (Mt 6,21): Penance moves the treasure to reorient the heart. and maybe, in our time, the most difficult penances do not necessarily go through the plate. Giving up steak can be relatively easy; Giving up a screen on for hours can be much more difficult. Turn off the phone, limit the use of social networks, refrain from empty entertainment, guarding silence in a world that lives in constant noise: These are deprivations that touch sensitive nerves.
For many — perhaps most — It is more difficult to abstain from notifications and comments than from a good Florentine steak. However, If penitence aims to educate desire and strengthen inner freedom, It is precisely there where the challenge is played. Saint Paul expressed it with athletic images:
«I punish my body and enslave it, lest, having preached to others, "I myself was disqualified." (1 Color 9,27).
The Pauline is not contempt for the body, but discipline of freedom. Christian penance is not impoverishment, but investment. Does not produce sterility, but fertility. Giving up something for the love of God means creating space for God to act.. It is a gesture that reduces the superfluous to bring out the essential. and the essential, for the christian, it is not the sacrifice itself, but communion with Christ.
Lent is precisely this: a penitential path that culminates in Holy Week and opens to the joy of the Resurrection. It is not a period of ritual sadness, but a time of preparation. You cross the desert to reach Easter. Something temporary is given up to remember that we are destined for eternity.
Abstinence from meat, so, It is not a disciplinary relic nor a dietary formalism. It's a sign. And like every sign, asks to be understood. If it remains an external gesture, is reduced to an empty practice. If it becomes a conscious act, becomes a school of freedom. Whether it's meat, of screens or other ingrained customs, the question remains the same: Am I master of my desires or am I governed by them?? Penance serves to answer that question with a concrete act. Because true mortification is not giving up what costs us nothing, but learning to say “no” to that which dominates us, to be able to say a bigger “yes” to God. And that “yes” is not exhausted in forty days. It is the preview of an Easter that will never end..
Florence, 23 February 2026
.
.
______________________
Dear Readers, this magazine requires management costs that we have always faced only with your free offers. Those who wish to support our apostolic work can send us their contribution through the convenient and safe way PayPal by clicking below:
Or if you prefer you can use our Bank account in the name of: Editions The island of Patmos n Agency. 59 From Rome – Vatican
Iban code: IT74R0503403259000000301118
For international bank transfers:
Codice SWIFT: BAPPIT21D21
If you make a bank transfer, send an email to the editorial staff, the bank does not provide your email and we will not be able to send you a thank you message: isoladipatmos@gmail.com
We thank you for the support you wish to offer to our apostolic service.
The Fathers of the Island of Patmos
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Padre-Simone-isola-piccola.jpeg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150Father SimoneHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngFather Simone2026-02-24 09:41:032026-03-04 19:43:59How easy is abstinence from meat as penance – How easy is abstinence from meat as a penitential practice – How easy is abstinence from meat as penance
HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Padre-Eneas-De-Camargo-Bete-150X150.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150Eneas De Camargo BeteHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngEneas De Camargo Bete2026-02-23 13:13:212026-02-23 16:03:13Frodo and the responsibility to carry out our duties with sanctity – Frodo and the responsibility of carrying our duties with holiness – Frodo and the responsibility of carrying out our duties with holiness – Frodo and the responsibility to carry our duties with holiness
CONSCIENCE IS NOT A COUNCIL. THE FRATERNITY OF SAINT PIUS
One can remain in full communion by rejecting outright the authority of an Ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Certainly not due to rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretative option.
In the article on the meeting between Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the recently published Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius (see who) we have indicated what constitutes the non-negotiable point of the issue: ecclesial communion is not a feeling nor a self-declaration, but an objective fact based on the recognition of the authority of the Church.
The official letter from the Rev. Davide Pagliarani, Superior General of the Fraternity (see full text, who), repeats exactly the issue that we highlighted in that previous article: not a simple interpretative divergence, but a claim to redefine the very criteria of communion from within. In fact, the Fraternity speaks of a "case of conscience". It would not be, so, question of disciplinary dissent, but of fidelity to Tradition against alleged conciliar deviations. And here we must immediately stop, because we are not faced with a problem of liturgical sensitivity or theological accents, but rather to a structural issue: who judges who in the Church?
Let's start by clarifying a point that does not allow for ambiguity: conscience is not a higher instance than the Magisterium. Catholic doctrine is unequivocal. The authentic Magisterium of the bishops in communion with the Roman Pontiff "requires the religious obsequiousness of the will and intellect" (The light, 25). This is not a psychological option, but of an ecclesial duty that belongs to the very structure of faith. Conscience, in the Catholic tradition, it is not an autonomous source of truth, but a practical judgment that must be formed in the light of objective truth. If conscience is invoked against the Magisterium, the very order of faith is altered and the hierarchy of sources is overturned.
It's here, incidentally — without indulging in gratuitous polemical spirit, but for simple intellectual honesty - it is necessary to observe an element that cannot go unnoticed. For over four decades the environments of this Fraternity have proudly claimed to train their priests according to the most solid principles of logic, of classical scholasticism and Thomism. That's a really challenging statement. However, to the test of the texts and argumentative constructions that are proposed, it is not easy to trace that rational solidity that is proclaimed. In fact, confusing some manual formulas of decadent neo-scholasticism with Aristotelian logic, or with the great speculations of Saint Anselm of Aosta and Saint Thomas Aquinas, it means reducing a very high-level philosophical-theological tradition to a repetitive pattern. Logic is not a password, but rigor in proceeding, internal coherence, respect for the principles of non-contradiction and identity.
When conscience is erected as a superior tribunal with respect to the Magisterium e, at the same time, loyalty to scholasticism is invoked, we fall into an evident methodological contradiction, not to mention gross: we claim to defend the order of reason while undermining it at its roots. It is therefore not a question of theological schools, but of basic coherence. Saint Anselm never opposed his conscience to the authority of the Church; nor did St. Thomas ever build an alternative system to the Magisterium. Their greatness consisted precisely in harmonizing reason and faith within the ecclesial order, not in replacing it. And this is not an abstract statement. None of the great Doctors of the Church would ever have allowed themselves to oppose - even more so with aggressive tones - the ecclesiastical Authority for having clarified and established that the title of "co-redemptrix" cannot be attributed to the Virgin Mary (cf.. Mother of the Faithful People, 17). It can be argued theologically, can be explored further, it can be specified. But to oppose one's position to the legitimate authority of the Church as if it were an abuse to be corrected means crossing a limit that would horrify all the great masters of the scholastic tradition..
If today we intend to invoke Aosta and Aquinas, let it be done with the same intellectual discipline that these two Doctors demanded. Because praising logic while introducing a principle of subjective judgment that claims to evaluate an Ecumenical Council is not an act of fidelity to scholasticism, but a rhetorical operation that does not stand up to rational analysis. The Second Vatican Council states that the authentic interpretation of the Word of God "is entrusted to the living Magisterium of the Church alone" (God's word, 10). Not to the individual, not to a group, not to a Priestly Fraternity.
One further element must be observed: it is not uncommon for theologians of the so-called to be dismissed as "modernist heretics" in certain circles New Theology. It's a convenient simplification, but intellectually fragile. That there are problems in those currents is beyond question, just as there have been in the history of theology in almost all the great authors, including Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church. St. Augustine, converted, baptized and already bishop, he had to work quite a bit on himself to purify residues of Manichaeism; and nobody, because of this, denies his greatness. But let's also take the names that in certain circles are presented as the most dangerous of the theologians of the twentieth century: Karl Rahner and Hans Küng. We can — and in some cases we should — criticize Rahner. One can also radically disagree, but to think that the teaching staff of the Ecône Seminary could have supported a high-level theological discussion, conducted on the terrain of classical Thomism and great scholasticism, with a mind of vast culture like that of Hans Küng, it really means giving in to an overestimation that has no basis in reality.
Incidentally, a personal memory:Brunero Gherardini, theologian certainly not suspected of being pro-modernism, defined Leonard Boff as "one of the most brilliant ecclesiologists of the twentieth century". One may not agree with his conclusions, but to deny his intellectual stature would simply be to deny the evidence. What is at stake here is not adherence to the theses of these authors but a principle of intellectual honesty. Controversy does not replace argumentation nor does label replace refutation. The proclamation of orthodoxy is not equivalent to rational solidity. If scholasticism is invoked, really practice it: with logical rigor, with distinction of floors, with respect for ecclesial authority and with that discipline of reason that does not fear confrontation, but he faces it without caricature.
When it is declared that the Council and the post-conciliar Magisterium they would be breaking with Tradition and that such judgment would derive from an obligation of conscience, a leap is made that is not theological but structurally arbitrary: one attributes to one's conscience the power to review the authority that Christ established to safeguard the faith. That's the point, It's not a question of good or bad faith, but of an ecclesial order.
Placing Tradition against Magisterium it is an impossible construction, illogical. Yet the Fraternity speaks of fidelity to Tradition against the "fundamental orientations" of the Council, a contrast that is in and of itself theologically unsustainable. Tradition is not an archaeological deposit to be contrasted with the living Magisterium. It is the living transmission of the faith under the guidance of apostolic authority. The Council of Trent already taught that revelation is contained «in written books and unwritten traditions» (DS 1501), but always preserved and interpreted by the Church. Separating Tradition from the authority that safeguards it means transforming it into an ideological and illogical principle.
Theologian Joseph Ratzinger, well before becoming Pontiff, he remembered that Tradition is not an immobile block, but a living reality that grows in the understanding of faith, without breaking but also without fossilization. In particular, in the famous speech to the Roman Curia of 22 December 2005, he spoke of "hermeneutics of reform in the continuity of the single subject-Church" as opposed to a "hermeneutics of discontinuity and rupture" (in Speech to the Roman Curia, 22 December 2005). Rejecting an Ecumenical Council as such is not an exercise in discernment; it is the denial of an act of the universal Magisterium. A hermeneutic can be discussed, but authority cannot be suspended.
The letter from the Rev. Davide Pagliarani expresses availability for a theological comparison, but at the same time contests the conditions set by the competent authority by staging a form of dialogue that denies the hierarchical principle. And here the problem is not diplomatic, it's logical again. An ecclesial dialogue takes place within a hierarchical structure. If the legitimacy of those who convene and direct the discussion is not recognised, dialogue becomes a confrontation between equals that does not exist in the constitution of the Church, which is not a federation of autonomous interpretations but an ordered body. Demanding dialogue without recognizing the authority that establishes the criteria is equivalent to asking for recognition while maintaining one's own regulatory self-sufficiency.
In the previous article we wrote that communion is not a negotiable point (see who). We reiterate it, specifying what ecclesial communion implies: the recognition of the Roman Pontiff, of the Magisterium of the bishops in communion with him and the acceptance of the ecumenical Councils as acts of the universal Magisterium. It is not enough to declare yourself Catholic, because to be one it is necessary to accept the Catholic order. It is therefore easy to say: when a group exercises the sacred ministry, train the clergy, administers the Sacraments e, at the same time, suspends membership in an Ecumenical Council and in the subsequent Magisterium, an objective tension is created that cannot be normalized with rhetorical formulas. Communion is not self-definable, nor can it be reduced to self-certification; it is mutual recognition within a hierarchical order received from Christ. And it then comes naturally to ask whether some zealous followers of Aristotelian logic, who also declare that they base their school education on it, have not sometimes confused Aristotle with the sophists. Because classical logic is based on the principle of non-contradiction; sophistication, instead, on the art of making sustainable what remains contradictory.
The most problematic core it then lies in the risk of self-authorization. When one's ecclesial identity is built on the systematic contestation of authority, you enter into a dynamic that, historically, it has always produced fractures. It's not about accusing, but to note the structure that the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius. If in fact the ultimate criterion becomes: “our conscience judges the Council”, then the hierarchy of sources is totally overturned through what the Greeks called παράδοξος, from which the term paradox derives.
The Church is not founded on individual conscience, but on apostolic authority. Conscience is called to obey the truth guarded by the Church, not to replace it. The question, so, it's not whether there are questionable aspects in the post-conciliar period. The Church has always known tensions, clarifications, developments, starting from the First Council of Nicaea, which was not sufficient to draft the Symbol of Faith entirely, to the point that the subsequent First Council of Constantinople had to intervene, so that, the I believe, It is certainly not called the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Symbol by chance (see my latest work, who). The question is another: one can remain in full communion by rejecting outright the authority of an Ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Certainly not due to rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretative option.
This Fraternity it was dedicated by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to Saint Pius, the same Pontiff who condemned the modernists for maintaining that «the authority of the Church, whether he teaches or governs, must be submitted to the judgment of private conscience"; but like this, he warned, «the order established by God is overturned» (Feeding of Dominic's Sheep, 8 September 1907). Paradoxically, It is precisely here that the irony of the story is consummated: the most insidious modernists are not those who declare themselves as such, but those who, while condemning modernism, they assume the methodological principle, elevating one's conscience to the criterion of judgment of ecclesial authority.
CONSCIENCE IS NOT A COUNCIL. THE SOCIETY OF SAINT PIUS X AND THE SOPHISM OF SELF-AUTHORIZATION
Can one remain in full communion while rejecting wholesale the authority of an Ecumenical Council and of the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Not out of rigidity, but out of coherence. Subjective conscience is not a Council, and communion is not an interpretative option.
In the recent article on the relationship between Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Society of Saint Pius X (see here), we indicated what constitutes the non-negotiable point of the matter: ecclesial communion is neither a sentiment nor a self-declaration, but an objective reality grounded in the recognition of the Church’s authority.
The official letter of Rev. Davide Pagliarani, Superior General of the Fraternitas (full text, here), reproposes precisely the very knot we had highlighted in that previous article: not a simple interpretative divergence, but a claim to redefine from within the very criteria of communion itself. The Society speaks, in fact, of a «case of conscience». It would therefore not be a matter of disciplinary dissent, but of fidelity to Tradition against alleged conciliar deviations. And here one must pause immediately, for we are not facing a question of liturgical sensitivity or theological nuances, but a structural issue: who judges whom in the Church?
Let us begin by clarifying a point that admits of no ambiguity: conscience is not an instance superior to the Magisterium. Catholic doctrine is unequivocal. The authentic Magisterium of the bishops in communion with the Roman Pontiff «requires religious submission of will and intellect» (The light, 25). This is not a psychological option, but an ecclesial duty belonging to the very structure of faith. Conscience, in the Catholic tradition, is not an autonomous source of truth, but a practical judgment that must be formed in the light of objective truth. If conscience is invoked against the Magisterium, the very order of faith is altered and the hierarchy of sources overturned.
And here, by way of aside — without indulging in gratuitous polemics, but out of simple intellectual honesty — one must observe an element that cannot pass unnoticed. For more than four decades the circles of this Society have proudly claimed to form their priests according to the most solid principles of logic, classical scholasticism, and Thomism. It is a demanding claim indeed. Yet, when tested against the texts and argumentative constructions proposed, it is not easy to discern the rational solidity that is proclaimed. To confuse certain manualistic formulas of a decadent neo-scholasticism with Aristotelian logic, or with the great speculative syntheses of Saint Anselm of Aosta and Saint Thomas Aquinas, is to reduce a philosophical-theological tradition of the highest order to a repetitive schema. Logic is not a slogan, but rigor in reasoning, internal coherence, and respect for the principles of non-contradiction and identity.
When conscience is erected as a tribunal superior to the Magisterium and, at the same time, fidelity to scholasticism is invoked, one falls into an evident — not to say gross — methodological contradiction: one claims to defend the order of reason while undermining it at its root. This is therefore not a matter of theological schools, but of elementary coherence. Saint Anselm never opposed his own conscience to the authority of the Church; nor did Saint Thomas ever construct a system alternative to the Magisterium. Their greatness consisted precisely in harmonizing reason and faith within the ecclesial order, not in substituting themselves for it. Nor is this an abstract affirmation. None of the great Doctors of the Church would ever have presumed to oppose — all the more so with aggressive tones — ecclesiastical Authority for having clarified and established that the title «co-redemptrix» cannot be attributed to the Virgin Mary (cf. Mother of the Faithful People, 17). One may discuss theologically, one may deepen and refine; but to oppose one’s own position to the legitimate authority of the Church as though correcting an abuse is to cross a boundary that would have appalled all the great masters of the scholastic tradition.
If today one wishes to invoke the Aostan and the Angelic Doctor, let it be done with the same intellectual discipline those two Doctors demanded. For to extol logic while introducing a subjective principle of judgment that claims to evaluate an Ecumenical Council is not an act of fidelity to scholasticism, but a rhetorical operation that does not withstand rational analysis. The Second Vatican Council affirms that the authentic interpretation of the Word of God «has been entrusted to the living Magisterium of the Church alone» (God's word, 10). Not to the individual, not to a group, not to a Priestly Society.
And again, by way of aside — but in earnest — another element must be noted. It is not uncommon in certain circles to dismiss the theologians of the so-called Nouvelle Théologie as «modernist heretics». Such simplification is convenient, but intellectually fragile. That problematic elements may be found in those currents is beyond dispute, just as they have been present throughout the history of theology in nearly all the great authors, including the Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Saint Augustine, converted, baptized, and already a bishop, had to labor considerably upon himself to purge residual Manichaean tendencies; yet no one, for that reason, denies his greatness. Let us take, however, the names that in certain environments are presented as the most dangerous among twentieth-century theologians: Karl Rahner and Hans Küng. One may — and in certain cases must — criticize Rahner. One may also dissent radically; but to imagine that the faculty of the Seminary of Ecône could have sustained a high-level theological confrontation, conducted on the terrain of classical Thomism and the great scholastic tradition, with a mind of the vast culture of Hans Küng, is truly to indulge in an overestimation that finds no support in reality.
By way of personal recollection: Brunero Gherardini, a theologian certainly not suspect of modernist leanings, described Leonard Boff as «one of the most brilliant ecclesiologists of the twentieth century». One may disagree with his conclusions, but to deny his intellectual stature would simply be to deny the evidence. What is at stake here is not adherence to the theses of these authors, but a principle of intellectual honesty. Polemic does not replace argument, nor does labeling replace refutation. The proclamation of orthodoxy does not equate to rational solidity. If scholasticism is invoked, let it be practiced truly: with logical rigor, distinction of levels, respect for ecclesial authority, and that discipline of reason which does not fear confrontation, but engages it without caricature.
When it is declared that the Council and the post-conciliar Magisterium stand in rupture with Tradition, and that such judgment derives from an obligation of conscience, a leap is made that is not theological but structurally arbitrary: one attributes to one’s own conscience the power to sit in judgment over the authority that Christ constituted to safeguard the faith. This is the point. It is not a matter of good or bad faith, but of ecclesial order.
To set Tradition against the Magisterium is an impossible and illogical construction. Yet the Society speaks of fidelity to Tradition against the “fundamental orientations” of the Council — a contrast that is in itself and of itself theologically untenable. Tradition is not an archaeological deposit to be set against the living Magisterium. It is the living transmission of the faith under the guidance of apostolic authority. The Council of Trent already taught that revelation is contained «in written books and unwritten traditions» (DS 1501), yet always safeguarded and interpreted by the Church. To separate Tradition from the authority that guards it is to transform it into an ideological and illogical principle.
The theologian Joseph Ratzinger, long before becoming Pontiff, recalled that Tradition is not an immobile block, but a living reality that grows in the understanding of the faith, without rupture yet without fossilization. In his well-known address to the Roman Curia of 22 December 2005, he spoke of an «hermeneutic of reform in continuity of the one subject-Church» as opposed to an «hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture» (Address to the Roman Curia, 22 December 2005). To reject an Ecumenical Council as such is not an exercise of discernment; it is the denial of an act of the universal Magisterium. One may debate an hermeneutic, but one may not suspend authority.
The letter of Rev. Davide Pagliarani expresses willingness for theological dialogue, yet at the same time contests the conditions set by the competent authority, thereby staging a form of dialogue that denies the hierarchical principle. And here the problem is not diplomatic; it is once again logical. Ecclesial dialogue takes place within a hierarchical structure. If the legitimacy of those who convoke and guide the discussion is not recognized, dialogue becomes a confrontation among equals — something that does not exist in the constitution of the Church, which is not a federation of autonomous interpretations but an ordered body. To demand dialogue without recognizing the authority that establishes its criteria amounts to seeking recognition while maintaining one’s own normative self-sufficiency.
In the previous article we wrote that communion is not a negotiable point (see here). We reiterate this, specifying that ecclesial communion implies: recognition of the Roman Pontiff, of the Magisterium of the bishops in communion with him, and acceptance of the Ecumenical Councils as acts of the universal Magisterium. It is not enough to declare oneself Catholic; to be so, one must accept the Catholic order. It follows, then, that when a group exercises sacred ministry, forms clergy, administers the sacraments and, at the same time, suspends adherence to an Ecumenical Council and to the subsequent Magisterium, an objective tension arises that cannot be normalized by rhetorical formulas. Communion is not self-definable, nor can it be reduced to self-certification; it is reciprocal recognition within a hierarchical order received from Christ. One is then led to wonder whether certain zealous cultivators of Aristotelian logic, who declare that they ground their formation upon it, may at times have confused Aristotle with the sophists. For classical logic rests upon the principle of non-contradiction; sophistry, by contrast, upon the art of rendering sustainable what remains contradictory.
The most problematic nucleus lies in the risk of self-authorization. When one’s ecclesial identity is constructed upon systematic contestation of authority, one enters into a dynamic that historically has always produced fractures. This is not an accusation, but an observation of structure — the structure the Society of Saint Pius X has given itself. If the ultimate criterion becomes: “our conscience judges the Council,” then the hierarchy of sources is entirely overturned through what the Greeks called παράδοξος, from which the term “paradox” derives.
The Church is not founded upon individual conscience, but upon apostolic authority. Conscience is called to obey the truth safeguarded by the Church, not to replace it. The issue, therefore, is not whether there may be debatable aspects in the post-conciliar period. The Church has always known tensions, clarifications, developments — beginning with the First Council of Nicaea, which was not sufficient to formulate the Symbol of Faith in its entirety, so that the subsequent First Council of Constantinople had to intervene; hence the Creed is not by chance called the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol (see my latest work, here). The issue is another: can one remain in full communion while rejecting wholesale the authority of an Ecumenical Council and of the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Not out of rigidity, but out of coherence. Subjective conscience is not a Council, and communion is not an interpretative option.
This Society was dedicated by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to Saint Pius X, the same Pontiff who condemned the modernists for maintaining that «the authority of the Church, whether teaching or governing, must be subjected to the judgment of private conscience»; yet thus, he warned, «the order established by God is overthrown» (Feeding of Dominic's Sheep, 8 September 1907). Paradoxically, it is precisely here that the irony of history unfolds: the most insidious modernists are not those who declare themselves such, but those who, while condemning modernism, unconsciously adopt its principle, elevating their own conscience to a criterion for judging ecclesial authority.
From the Island of Patmos, 20 February 2026
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CONSCIENCE IS NOT A COUNCIL. THE FRATERNITY OF SAINT PIO X AND THE SOPHISM OF SELF-AUTHORIZATION
Can we remain in full communion by rejecting en bloc the authority of an ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium?? The Catholic answer is no.. Not because of rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretive option.
In the recent article about the relationship between Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius (see here) We indicate what constitutes the non-negotiable point of the issue: ecclesial communion is neither a feeling nor a self-declaration, but an objective fact founded on the recognition of the authority of the Church.
The official letter of the Rev. Davide Pagliarani, Superior General of the Fraternitas (full text, here), exactly rethinks the knot that we had pointed out in that previous article: not a simple interpretative divergence, but the attempt to redefine from within the very criteria of communion. The Brotherhood speaks, indeed, of "case of conscience". would not be treated, therefore, of a disciplinary dissent, but of fidelity to Tradition in the face of alleged conciliar deviations. And here it is necessary to stop immediately, because we are not facing a problem of liturgical sensitivity or theological nuances, but before a structural issue: Who judges who in the Church?
Let's start by clarifying a point that does not allow ambiguity.: conscience is not a superior authority to the Magisterium. Catholic doctrine is unequivocal. The authentic Magisterium of the bishops in communion with the Roman Pontiff "requires the religious gift of will and understanding" (The light, 25). This is not a psychological choice, but of an ecclesial duty that belongs to the very structure of faith. The conscience, in the Catholic tradition, is not an autonomous source of truth, but a practical judgment that must be formed in the light of objective truth. If conscience is invoked against the Magisterium, the very order of faith is altered and the hierarchy of sources is inverted.
and here, by the way — without incurring a gratuitous polemical spirit, but for simple intellectual honesty — it is worth pointing out an element that cannot go unnoticed. For more than four decades, the circles of this Fraternitas have proudly claimed to train their priests according to the most solid principles of logic., of classical scholasticism and Thomism. It is a truly demanding statement.. However, to the testing of the texts and the argumentative constructions that are proposed, It is not easy to find that rational solidity that is proclaimed. Confusing certain manualistic formulas of a decadent neo-scholasticism with Aristotelian logic, or with the great speculations of Saint Anselm of Aosta and Saint Thomas Aquinas, It means reducing a very high level philosophical-theological tradition to a repetitive scheme. Logic is not a slogan, but rigor in the procedure, internal coherence and respect for the principles of non-contradiction and identity.
When conscience is erected as a court superior to the Magisterium and, at the same time, fidelity to scholasticism is invoked, falls into an obvious methodological contradiction, not to say rude: it is intended to defend the order of reason while undermining it at its roots. It is not about, therefore, of theological schools, but of basic coherence. Saint Anselm never opposed his own conscience to the authority of the Church; Not even Saint Thomas ever built an alternative system to the Magisterium. Its greatness consisted precisely in harmonizing reason and faith within the ecclesial order, not to replace it. And this is not an abstract statement.. None of the great Doctors of the Church would have allowed themselves to oppose – much less in aggressive tones – the ecclesiastical Authority for having clarified and established that the title of “co-redeemer” cannot be attributed to the Virgin Mary. (cf. Mother of the Faithful People, 17). It can be discussed theologically, can be deepened, can be specified. But to oppose one's own position to the legitimate authority of the Church as if it were an abuse that to correct means crossing a limit that would have scandalized all the great teachers of the scholastic tradition..
If today we intend to invoke Aostano and Aquinas, that it be done with the same intellectual discipline that these two Doctors demanded. Because praising logic while introducing a principle of subjective judgment that seeks to evaluate an ecumenical Council is not an act of fidelity to scholasticism., but a rhetorical operation that does not resist rational analysis. The Second Vatican Council affirms that the authentic interpretation of the Word of God "has been entrusted solely to the living Magisterium of the Church" (God's word, 10). Not to the individual, not to a group, not to a Priestly Fraternity.
Y, also in passing — but seriously — it is worth observing another element. It is not uncommon for the theologians of the so-called Nouvelle Théologie to be dismissed as "modernist heretics" in certain circles.. It's a convenient simplification., but intellectually fragile. That there are problems in these currents is indisputable, just as there have been in the history of theology in almost all the great authors, including Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Saint Augustine, converted, baptized and already bishop, he had to work a lot on himself to purify residues of Manichaeism; and nobody, for it, denies his greatness. Let's take, however, the names that in certain environments are presented as the most dangerous among the theologians of the 20th century: Karl Rahner and Hans Küng. One can — and in certain cases one should — criticize Rahner. One can even radically disagree; but to think that the teaching staff of the Ecône Seminary would have been able to sustain a high-level theological confrontation, developed in the field of classical Thomism and great scholasticism, with a mind of vast culture like that of Hans Küng, It means giving in to an overvaluation that finds no support in reality..
A personal memory,by the way: Brunero Gherardini, theologian certainly not suspected of philo-modernism, He defined Leonard Boff as "one of the most brilliant ecclesiologists of the 20th century". You can not share your conclusions, but to deny his intellectual stature would simply be to deny the evidence. Adherence to the theses of these authors is not at stake here., but a principle of intellectual honesty. Controversy does not replace argumentation nor does label replace refutation.. The proclamation of orthodoxy does not equate to rational solidity. If scholasticism is invoked, that it be truly practiced: with logical rigor, with distinction of plans, with respect for ecclesial authority and with that discipline of reason that does not fear debate, but he faces it without caricatures.
When it is declared that the Council and the post-conciliar Magisterium would be in breach with Tradition and that such a judgment would derive from an obligation of conscience, a leap is made that is not theological but structurally arbitrary: the power to judge the authority that Christ has established to guard the faith is attributed to one's own conscience. This is the point. It's not about good or bad faith, but of ecclesial order.
Poner Tradition and Magisterium is an impossible and illogical construction. Y, however, The Fraternity speaks of fidelity to Tradition in the face of the "fundamental guidelines" of the Council, a contrast in itself theologically unsustainable. Tradition is not an archaeological deposit that should be opposed to the living Magisterium. It is the living transmission of faith under the guidance of apostolic authority. Ya el Concilio de Trento taught that the revelation is contained "in written books and unwritten traditions" (DS 1501), but always guarded and interpreted by the Church. Separating Tradition from the authority that it safeguards means transforming it into an ideological and illogical principle..
Theologist Joseph Ratzinger, long before becoming Pontiff, remembered that Tradition is not an immobile block, but a living reality that grows in the understanding of faith, without rupture but also without fossilization. In his famous speech to the Roman Curia of the 22 December 2005 spoke of "hermeneutics of reform in the continuity of the single subject-Church" versus a "hermeneutics of discontinuity and rupture" (Speech at the Roman Curia, 22 December 2005). Rejecting an ecumenical Council as such is not an exercise in discernment; It is a denial of an act of the universal Magisterium. A hermeneutics can be discussed, but authority cannot be suspended.
The letter of the Rev. Davide Pagliarani expresses availability for a theological dialogue, but at the same time challenges the conditions established by the competent authority, staging a form of dialogue that denies the hierarchical principle. And here the problem is not diplomatic; It's logical again.. Ecclesial dialogue takes place within a hierarchical structure. If the legitimacy of the person who convenes and guides the debate is not recognized, Dialogue becomes a confrontation between equals that does not exist in the constitution of the Church, which is not a federation of autonomous interpretations, but an ordered body. Pretending dialogue without recognizing the authority that establishes its criteria is equivalent to demanding recognition while maintaining one's own normative self-sufficiency..
In the previous article we write that communion is not a negotiable point (see here). We reiterate it, specifying that ecclesial communion implies: the recognition of the Roman Pontiff, of the Magisterium of the bishops in communion with him and the acceptance of the ecumenical Councils as acts of the universal Magisterium. It is not enough to declare yourself Catholic, because to be so it is necessary to accept the Catholic order. Is, therefore, obvious: when a group exercises the sacred ministry, trains the clergy, administers the sacraments and, at the same time, suspends accession to an ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium, an objective tension is created that cannot be normalized through rhetorical formulas. Communion is not self-defining, nor can it be reduced to self-certification; it is reciprocal recognition within a hierarchical order received from Christ. And then the question spontaneously arises as to whether some zealous cultivators of Aristotelian logic, who declare that they founded their scholastic formation on it, They will not have ever confused Aristotle with the sophists. Because classical logic is based on the principle of non-contradiction; the sophistry, instead, in the art of making sustainable what remains contradictory.
The most problematic core lies in the risk of self-authorization. When one's own ecclesial identity is built on the systematic contestation of authority, you enter into a dynamic that, historically, has always produced fractures. It's not about accusing, but to verify the structure that the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius. If the last criterion becomes: "our conscience judges the Council", then the hierarchy of the sources is completely inverted through what the Greeks called παράδοξος, Where does the term “paradox” come from?.
The Church is not founded on individual conscience, but about apostolic authority. The conscience is called to obey the truth guarded by the Church, not to replace it. The question, therefore, It is not whether there are debatable aspects in the post-council. The Church has always known tensions, clarifications and developments, beginning with the First Council of Nicaea, which was not enough to completely write the Symbol of Faith, to the point that the later First Council of Constantinople had to intervene; hence the Creed is called, not by chance, With the Nicene-Constantinopolitan symbol (see my latest work, here). The question is another: Can we remain in full communion by rejecting en bloc the authority of an ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium?? The Catholic answer is no.. Not because of rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretive option.
This Fraternity was dedicated by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to Saint Pius, the same Pontiff who condemned the modernists for maintaining that "the authority of the Church, whether teaching or governing, "must be submitted to the judgment of private conscience"; But in this way — he warned — “the order established by God is disrupted.” (Feeding of Dominic's Sheep, 8 September of 1907). Paradoxically, It is precisely here where the irony of history is consummated: The most insidious modernists are not those who declare themselves as such., but who, even condemning modernism, they assume their methodological principle, raising his own conscience at the discretion of the ecclesial authority.
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Padre-Ariel-foto-2025-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-20 12:39:162026-02-20 15:40:02Conscience is not a council. The fraternity of Saint Pius – Conscience is not a council. The Society of Saint Pius X and the sophism of self-authorization – Conscience is not a council. The Society of Saint Pius X and the sophistry of self-authorization –
CONDOLENCE FOR THE DEATH OF ABABOT UGO GIANLUIGI TAGNI
The Most Rev. Dom Ugo Gianluigi Tagni has returned to the house of the Father, of the Cistercian Order, Abbot emeritus of Casamari Abbey
– The briefs of the Fathers of the Isle of Patmos –
Author Editors of The Island of Patmos
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The Fathers of the Island of Patmos join in fraternal condolences to the family of Cistercian Monks for the death of the Most Rev. Dom Ugo Gianluigi Tagni, Abbot emeritus of Casamari Abbey, man of human and spiritual qualities as great as they are rare.
The funeral obsequies they will take place tomorrow, 17 February, at 15:00, in the abbey church of Casamari.
(In the picture: Abbot Ugo Gianluigi Tagni and Father Ariel S. Levi di Gualdo)
We entrust his soul to the Intercession of Mater Dei with the Prayer of Saint Bernard to the Blessed Virgin Mary.
Rome, 16 February 2026
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The Fathers of the Island of Patmos
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/faviconbianco150.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-16 22:41:242026-02-17 09:19:54Condolences for the death of Abbot Ugo Gianluigi Tagni
DONNE, LAW AND THEOLOGY USED AS SLOGANS BY THE BLOG I CAN'T BE SILENT
When a theological or legal argument does not stand up to a full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is sufficient to trace it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes the comparison with them is already in itself the most severe of responses.
A necessary premise is necessary. the blog I can not remain silentit has never aroused particular appreciation among the editors of this magazine, not out of prejudice, but by method.
Our mission is not to fuel controversy, but rather to recall the theological and juridical truth when this is exposed in an imprecise way, approximate or ideologically oriented. The problem is not criticism - which is legitimate and sometimes necessary in the Church - but the quality of criticism. When texts of an ecclesiological and canonical nature are disseminated with peremptory tones, selective quotes and arguments that seem solid only until they are subjected to scrutiny, it becomes necessary to intervene. Not so much for professionals, who possess the tools to discern, as for those priests in good faith and for those Catholic faithful who are not adequately prepared, which risk taking as rigorous analyzes what often turns out to be a rhetorical and emotional construction rather than theological and juridical one.
The last article «Women who evaluate bishops? The results of this tokenism are there for all to see" (see who), represents an emblematic example of this approach. In several places the text borders on invective; in legal and theological citations, then, the authenticity sometimes appears similar to that of a zircon presented as a pure diamond: shiny on the surface, but lacking the structural consistency that only rigorous analysis can guarantee. For this reason - and for this reason alone -, it is appropriate to go into detail.
«The power of government is an unresolved issue» constitutes the main topic of the article, solemn in form yet fragile in substance. It is stated that the power of government, being sacramentally rooted in Holy Orders, cannot be "normalized" nor exercised according to administrative logic that involves non-ordained faithful. The reference to Benedict XVI - in particular to the catechesis on governing officethe 26 May 2010 — it's suggestive, but markedly selective. And above all theologically imprecise. Not for academic subtlety, but due to an evident confusion between sacramental ownership of the gift and legal cooperation in the exercise of authority.
The text uses correct formulas — «sacramental structure», «sacred origin of authority», "bond with the Sacrament of Orders" - but isolates them from the overall context of Catholic doctrine, transforming them into apologetic slogans through selective extrapolations. The result is an argument that appears compact only until it is subjected to a complete reading of the sources. It's true: the hierarchy in the Church has a "sacred origin"; ecclesial authority does not arise from a sociological investiture; the giftgoverning it is not comparable to one leadershipcorporate. But, from these premises, what the article claims to demonstrate does not follow at all.
The Code of Canon Law is extremely clear: the can. 129 § 1states that those who have received Holy Orders are eligible for the power of government. Ma he §2, which immediately follows - and here is the point systematically ignored - establishes that «the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of this power, according to law". To cooperate does not mean to usurp, replace or exercise the episcopal office, but participate, according to methods determined by the ecclesial system, to the concrete exercise of functions that are not of a sacramental nature, but administrative, consultative, investigation, management. Denying this principle one should consistently maintain that: lay people operating in ecclesiastical courts exercise a surreptitious episcopate; the lay experts who participated in the Ecumenical Councils participated sacramentally in the the task of teaching; every administrative function of the Curia requires episcopal consecration, to the point of transforming the ecclesial organization into a sort of monolithic exclusively sacramental apparatus. Simply said,: such a conclusion is not only not required by Catholic theology, but it misrepresents the fundamental distinction between sacramental ownership and juridical cooperation.
Following the logic of the authors of the article, at least one titular bishop should be appointed to manage the parking lots of the Vatican City State, so as to prevent a simple administrative official from exercising an "insufficiently sacramental" power in matters of blue lines and time discs, perhaps with appropriate references to sacramental dogmatics. Of course: the absurd is not the irony but the premise. Benedict XVI, in recalling the "sacred origin" of ecclesial authority, he has never maintained that every act of government in the Church ontologically coincides with the exercise of Holy Orders. The distinction between the power of the ordere the power of governmentit is classic in Catholic theology and finds a clear and systematic formulation in canon law. The sacramental origin of the episcopate does not eliminate the institutional and juridical dimension of ecclesial government: the foundation and the structure. Confusing these levels means exchanging the root for the branches. Authority is born sacramentally, but its concrete administration is instead structured according to juridical forms. The two dimensions are not alternatives, but complementary.
When it is stated that an administrative appointment «shifts the center of gravity from the Holy Order to the papal nomination», a false dilemma is constructed. The Roman Pontiff does not create the sacramentality of the episcopate through an administrative act; but he can legitimately confer non-sacramental government roles on those who have not received the Order, provided that it is not the actual exercise of episcopal office. Reducing everything to the category of "sacred origin" to deny any form of lay cooperation is not a defense of theology: it is a rhetorical construction that takes on the language of doctrine to support an identity position. All expressed - and it is a fact that cannot be ignored - by authors who systematically choose anonymity, while they do not hesitate to describe them as "ignorant", «incompetent», "illiterate" or even "wandering clerics thrown out of their dioceses" people who have gained preparation and competence through decades of serious study and ongoing training. The moral authority of criticism is not strengthened with invective, least of all with anonymity.
The section dedicated to the «female gaze» presents itself as a criticism of ideology. Ma, paradoxically, ends up building a mirror-image and inverse ideology. It is stated that the idea of a "peculiar female gaze" is an empty thesis, sentimental, identity. However, to demolish this thesis we resort to the same scheme that we would like to refute: Women are attributed with an emotional predisposition, unstable, incapable of objective discernment. The stereotype cannot be overcome: you turn it upside down. The topic thus slides from a legitimate perplexity about the risk of personalistic criteria to a generalized judgment on the presumed female inclination towards sentimentalism. It is not a theological passage nor a canonical argument, not even a well-founded sociological analysis, it's just a rhetorical device.
If there really was a "feminine criterion" intrinsically unreliable in discernment, one should then conclude — consistently — that women cannot be judges in ecclesiastical courts, nor teachers of moral theology, nor authorized to exercise consultative functions in the canonical field or to manage complex administrative offices. But the Church has never taught anything of the sort. The can. 228 § 1it is unmistakable: suitable lay people are able to assume ecclesiastical offices and tasks for which they are capable. The criterion is not gender, but suitability. The law is clear, it becomes less so when it is read in fragments or bent to a thesis based on prejudice. Attributing to women a natural inclination towards emotional judgment is in fact equivalent to repeating, in a polemical way, the same stereotyped anthropology that it claims to want to fight. We move from the myth of the "naturally welcoming mother" to the myth of the "naturally impressionable woman". Change the sign, not the structure.
At this point a question arises spontaneously — and it doesn't need to be shouted but asked calmly — because critical attention focuses almost exclusively on women? Because you can't read it, with the same vehemence, an analysis of the male power dynamics that have produced clientelism for decades, cross protections, ideological consortiums and networks of influence are not always clear?
The recent history of the Curia was not marked by an excess of the "female gaze", but rather crossed by logics of belonging, sometimes very compact, sometimes surprisingly indulgent towards well-known internal fragilities, as long as they are placed in the right relational network. When we thunder against the female presence as a destabilizing factor, but there is silence about much more structured and deep-rooted protection systems, criticism inevitably loses credibility. Not because the presence of women is untouchable - no ecclesial function is - but because the selectivity of indignation is always a clue. Impetuously stigmatizing the femininity of those who are women by nature and grace, while at the same time overlooking certain "masculine" habits and vices that have nothing evangelically virile about them, it is not doctrinal rigor, it is a polemical asymmetry.
Another point deserves clarification: the consultation process for choosing bishops — governed by cann. 377 e 378 — does not attribute sacramental power to any consultant. It does not confer the episcopal office. The consultation is an investigative tool, non-exercise of governing office. When a lay person - man or woman - expresses an opinion, does not exercise sacramental jurisdiction: contributes to an information process. The decision then remains entirely with the Apostolic See.
Claim that the mere presence of women in a consultative body compromises the sacramentality of the episcopate means confusing distinct levels of the ecclesial order. It is a notable conceptual confusion, not a defense of the doctrine. The real problem, if it exists, it is not the gender of the consultants but the quality of the criteria. If some appointments are questionable, the question is not whether the person expressing an opinion was a man or a woman, but ask yourself: what information was collected? By what method? With what verification? With what final assumption of responsibility? Reducing everything to an identity opposition - "feminine gaze" versus "sacramental governance" - not only oversimplifies reality, but it distorts it. The Church does not need symbolic quotas. But it doesn't even need selective indignation, ready to take action on some profiles and surprisingly silent and protective on other, much more consolidated power dynamics, even when they emerge in a public and seriously scandalous form (cf.. who).
The difference between an ideological presence and a competent presence it doesn't go through gender. Go through eligibility, training, ecclesial maturity, the ability to discern. If you really want to avoid tokenism, the criterion must be competence, always. For men and women. Otherwise we end up fighting one ideology by building another, with the only difference that this time the controversy takes on the face of a theologically selective nostalgia.
The bombastic question: «We want competent bishops or the approval of the media?» constructs a contrast that is as suggestive as it is artificial. No canonical law provides that bishops are chosen to obtain media consensus. The can. 378 § 1 indicates very concrete requirements: intact faith, good morals, compassion, very per le anime, wisdom, prudence, human virtues, good reputation, at least thirty-five years of age, five years of priesthood, doctorate or license in sacred disciplines or at least real expertise in them. The parameter is objective suitability, not journalistic approval. To say that recent appointments are driven by a media obsession may be an opinion; however, transforming it into a total interpretative key becomes a self-sufficient narrative: every choice that is not shared is explained as giving in to the media; every unwanted profile as the result of "tokenism".
It is an effective rhetorical mechanism, but fragile. If the criterion was really the applause of the "popular", how can it be explained that many appointments were contested by the media? How can it be explained that quite a few episcopal choices have generated critical reactions even in the secular world? The argument works only as long as it remains unproven; subjected to verification, loses consistency and reveals itself to have no objective basis. The real problem — and it is a serious problem — is not media approval. It is the quality of the information collected in the consultation process. And this is where the discussion should focus. The procedure foreseen by can. 377 §2-3 it is articulated: common and secret consultation among the bishops; collection of qualified opinions; possible listening to priests and lay people; transmission of a detailed picture to the Apostolic See. The system is not built to replace episcopal judgment with media judgment. It is built to broaden the candidate's knowledge. The investigation does not remove responsibility from the Apostolic See; the qualification.
If some appointments are unfortunate, the problem is not the presence of lay people or women in the consultative process. The problem, eventually, it is the quality of the evaluations, the solidity of the information, the verification of reports and - in times that Scripture would call "lean" - also the objective difficulty of finding profiles of particular depth and value. And here a significant detail emerges: the article denounces emotional criteria, impressionistic, identity. But in doing so he uses equally impressionistic categories: "disaster", "state of desperation", "power games", «unliveable dynamics». Strong terms, but without detailed documentation. We criticize the subjectivity of others by resorting to our own subjectivity. If the problem is the quality of the appointments, the discussion must remain objective, otherwise we remain in the sphere of polemical impression.
Another impressive question it is what is contained in the slogan: «Il giftyou can't improvise", with reference to the need to distinguish "between theology and selective use of law". It is the most theologically challenging part of the article, dedicated to giftepiscopal. And this is where extreme clarity is needed. The the task of teaching, to sanctify and governit belongs to the episcopate (cf.. can. 375). Nobody disputes it. No recent reform has attributed the episcopal officeto non-ordained subjects. No woman exercises the episcopal office. Today no layman, man or woman, governs a diocese by virtue of sacramental power. When, in past eras, distortions occurred in the management of the dioceses — with absent owners, sometimes never residents and administrations de facto delegated to relatives or trustees according to the logic of nepotism - these were historical abuses that the Tridentine reform corrected precisely to bring ecclesial government back to its authentic and pastoral form. Evoking similar scenarios today as if they were re-proposable means superimposing radically different and completely inappropriate historical plans.
The real question is another: who can cooperate in the investigative and administrative processes that precede or accompany the exercise of gift? The legal answer has already been given. It is not an innovation of the current or previous pontificate. The can. 129 §2 provides that the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of the power of government according to law; the can. 228 recognizes suitable lay people the possibility of assuming ecclesiastical offices; the can. 377 §3 it explicitly contemplates the consultation of priests and lay people in the process of episcopal appointment. The fundamental distinction is between sacramental ownership of giftand functional cooperation in the exercise of authority. Confusing the two dimensions means transforming an administrative question into an ontological question. And this is not a defense of theology, but alteration of its categories.
If only to those who sacramentally participate in the gift is given to contribute to the discernment of a candidate, then it should consistently be excluded: lay academics consulted for their theological expertise; non-ordained canonists; lay people included in disciplinary commissions; economic experts in the dioceses. We should even review the consolidated practice of the Roman dicasteries, where doctors, jurists, experts from various disciplines collaborate without exercising any sacramental power. Just think of the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints: the scientific commission is made up of medical specialists who evaluate the alleged miracles according to strictly clinical criteria. No one has ever found it necessary to replace them with clergy without clinical training, just because they are tidy. The Church has never worked like this, not even in the most delicate areas.
The risk, so, it is not the "feminization" of the Curia, but the clericalization of every ecclesial function, as if Holy Orders were a requirement for any administrative or consultative responsibility. Is this, paradoxically, contradicts precisely the criticism directed elsewhere at "clericalism". Recent history offers eloquent examples. Saint John Paul II chose him as Director of the Press Office of the Holy See Joaquín Navarro-Valls, psychiatrist and lay doctor, not because he was tidy - he wasn't - but because of his great competence, Balance, communicative intelligence. Father then succeeded him Federico LombardiS.J., He was also chosen for his high personal and professional qualities. In both cases, the criterion was not the sacramental degree, but suitability for function.
«The episcopal munus cannot be improvised», Certainly, but neither does it improperly extend to functions that do not ontologically belong to it. Defending the sacramentality of the episcopate does not mean transforming every ecclesial collaboration into an appendix of the Holy Orders. Means, on the contrary, preserve the distinctions that theological tradition and Church law have always been able to maintain.
The debate cannot concern the "feminization" of the Curia, nor the obsession with quotas, nor an alleged surrender to sociological modernity. The real point is something else: the quality of discernment and fidelity to the theological structure of the Church. If a woman exercises an administrative role legitimately conferred by the Roman Pontiff, the sacramentality of the episcopate has not been affected. If a religious participates in a consultative process, the ontology of the gift. If a layperson offers a technical opinion, the hierarchy has not been desacralized. The Sacrament of Orders is not a cover for every organizational function, it is the root of the apostolic mission. Confusing the root with every leaf of the institutional tree is not a defense of tradition: it is theological approximation for amateurs.
The most serious risk is not the presence of women in ministries, but the ideological use of theology to transform every administrative choice into an ontological crisis. It's the habit of reading everything as subversion. It is the inability to distinguish between cooperation and substitution, between consultation and ownership, between sacramental structure and juridical organization. And then there is a detail that deserves to be said with sober clarity: one cannot thunder against the "ideology of women" while systematically remaining silent on other power dynamics that pass through much more structured ecclesiastical environments, branched and influential. Selective indignation is not doctrinal rigor: it is a controversial choice. And when severity is exercised only in one direction, becomes suspicious. The Church does not need fears disguised as theology but competence, responsibility, truth and inner freedom. It needs well-educated appointments and solid information. It needs men and women who serve, not of identity narratives that fuel permanent conflicts.
Therefore, if the criterion is competence, this itself must be demonstrated. If the criterion is law, everything should be read anyway, not for fragments and extrapolations. If the criterion is theology, this cannot be reduced to slogans. The sacramentality of ecclesial authority is not in question, but neither is it an argument to be brandished against every form of lay cooperation, otherwise we end up defending the hierarchy so rigidly as to transform it into a grotesque caricature. And the Church is not a caricatural phenomenon, even if some reduce it to a parody. It is a sacramental reality that lives in history, with legal structures, personal responsibilities and concrete decisions. The rest belongs more to the controversy of some blogs than to law or theology.
In this blog there is also anonymity as a moral posture, which deserves sober observation. The harshest criticism — with accusations of incompetence, of authoritarianism, of ideological management — come from subjects who systematically choose anonymity, which may even have legitimate reasons in particular circumstances. But when you make such heavy judgments about people and institutions, remain structurally anonymous while demanding transparency from others, while anonymous complaints and gossip are stigmatized, creates an evident moral asymmetry, not without gravity. Also because Catholic theology is not built on insinuations; canon law is not based on unverifiable impressions; and moral authority requires precise assumptions of responsibility which often require courage, sometimes even real heroism. Criticizing is legitimate; delegitimizing without exposing yourself is much less so. In fact, when the seriousness of sacramentality is invoked, it would be coherent to also invoke the seriousness of personal responsibility, almost absent from the columns of a blog that, setting itself up as a permanent tribunal, However, he systematically avoids taking on the responsibility of appearing as a party. The rest, when a theological or legal argument does not stand up to a full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is sufficient to trace it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes, serious and scientific comparison with them, is already in itself the most severe of replies.
DONNE, LAW, AND THEOLOGY USED AS SLOGANS BY THE BLOG I CAN'T BE SILENT
When a theological or juridical argument cannot withstand an integral reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is enough to bring it back to the sources themselves, because at times the very confrontation with them is already, in itself, the most severe of replies.
A necessary premise is in order. The blog I can not remain silent has never enjoyed particular esteem among the Fathers who edit this journal. Not out of prejudice, but out of method. Our mission is not to fuel polemics, but to recall theological and juridical truth whenever it is presented in an imprecise, approximate, or ideologically slanted manner. The problem is not criticism — which in the Church is legitimate and at times necessary — but the quality of criticism. When ecclesiological and canonical texts are circulated with peremptory tones, selective citations, and arguments that seem solid only so long as they are not subjected to verification, it becomes our duty to intervene. Not so much for specialists, who possess the tools to discern, as for those priests acting in good faith and for those Catholic faithful who are not adequately prepared, and who risk taking as rigorous analysis what often proves to be a rhetorical and emotive construction rather than a theological and juridical one.
The most recent article, “Women who evaluate bishops? The results of this tokenism are plain for all to see” (see here), is an emblematic example of this approach. In more than one place the text borders on invective; and in its juridical and theological citations, its authenticity at times resembles that of a zircon presented as a pure diamond: brilliant on the surface, yet lacking the structural consistency that only rigorous analysis can provide. For this reason — and for this reason alone — it is fitting to enter into the substance of the matter.
“The power of governance:an unresolved knot” constitutes the article’s main argument, solemn in form and yet fragile in substance. It is claimed that the power of governance, being sacramentally rooted in sacred Orders, cannot be “normalized” nor exercised according to administrative logics that involve non-ordained members of the faithful. The appeal to Benedict XVI — particularly to the catechesis on the governing office of 26 May 2010 — is suggestive, but markedly selective, and above all theologically imprecise. Not because of academic subtleties, but because of an evident confusion between the sacramental titularity of the giftand juridical cooperation in the exercise of authority.
The text employs correct formulas — “sacramental structure,” “sacred origin of authority,” “bond with the Sacrament of Orders” — but isolates them from the overall context of Catholic doctrine, turning them into apologetic slogans by means of selective extrapolations. The result is an argument that appears compact only so long as it is not subjected to an integral reading of the sources. It is true: the hierarchy in the Church has a “sacred origin”; ecclesial authority does not arise from a sociological investiture; the governing office is not reducible to corporate leadership. Yet from these premises there follows nothing of what the article claims to prove.
The Code of Canon Law is exceedingly clear: can. 129 §1 states that those who have received sacred Orders are capable of the power of governance. But §2, which follows immediately — and here lies the point that is systematically ignored — adds that “lay members of the Christian faithful can cooperate in the exercise of this power according to the norm of law.” And to cooperate does not mean to usurp, substitute oneself, or exercise the episcopal gift; rather, it means to participate — according to modalities determined by the Church’s legal order — in the concrete exercise of functions that are not sacramental in nature, but administrative, consultative, investigative, and managerial. Denying this principle would require one coherently to maintain that: lay members of ecclesiastical tribunals exercise a surrogate episcopate; lay experts who intervened in Ecumenical Councils participated sacramentally in the the task of teaching; every administrative function of the Roman Curia would require episcopal consecration, turning ecclesial organization into a monolithic apparatus exclusively sacramental. It is quickly said: such a conclusion is not only not required by Catholic theology; it distorts the fundamental distinction between sacramental titularity and juridical cooperation.
Following the logic of the article’s authors, one should then appoint at least a titular bishop to oversee the parking areas of the Vatican City State, lest a mere administrative official exercise an authority “insufficiently sacramental” in matters of blue lines and parking discs — perhaps with suitable references to sacramental dogmatics. To be clear: the absurdity is not the irony, but the premise. Benedict XVI, in recalling the “sacred origin” of ecclesial authority, never maintained that every act of governance in the Church coincides ontologically with the exercise of sacred Orders. The distinction between the power of the order and the power of government is classical in Catholic theology and finds in canon law a clear and systematic formulation. The sacramental origin of the episcopate does not eliminate the institutional and juridical dimension of ecclesial governance: it grounds it and structures it. To confuse these levels is to mistake the root for the branches. Authority arises sacramentally; its concrete administration is articulated through juridical forms. The two dimensions are not alternatives, but complementary.
When it is claimed that an administrative appointment “shifts the center of gravity from sacred Orders to papal appointment,” a false dilemma is constructed. The Roman Pontiff does not create the sacramentality of the episcopate by an administrative act; yet he can legitimately confer non-sacramental offices of governance upon those who have not received Orders, provided that what is at stake is not the proper exercise of the episcopal gift. To reduce everything to the category of “sacred origin” in order to deny every form of lay cooperation is not the defense of theology: it is a rhetorical construction that adopts the language of doctrine to support an identitarian position. All this is advanced — and this is a fact that cannot be ignored — by authors who systematically choose anonymity, while not hesitating to label as “ignorant,” “incompetent,” “illiterate,” or even “wandering clerics cast out of their dioceses” persons who have acquired preparation and competence through decades of serious study and ongoing formation. The moral authority of criticism is not strengthened by invective, least of all by anonymity.
The section devoted to the “female gaze” presents itself as a critique of ideology. Yet, paradoxically, it ends up constructing a specular and inverted ideology. It is asserted that the idea of a peculiarly female “gaze” would be empty, sentimentalistic, identitarian. However, in order to demolish this thesis, the very same schema it would refute is employed: women are attributed an emotional, unstable disposition, incapable of objective discernment. The stereotype is not overcome; it is reversed. The argument thus slips from a legitimate concern about the risk of personalist criteria into a generalized judgment about an alleged female inclination to sentimentalism. This is not a theological passage, nor a canonical argument, nor even a sound sociological analysis: it is a rhetorical device.
If there truly existed an intrinsically unreliable “female criterion” in discernment, one would then have to conclude — consistently — that women could not be judges in ecclesiastical tribunals, nor professors of moral theology, nor competent to exercise consultative functions in canonical matters, nor capable of directing complex administrative offices. But the Church has never taught anything of the sort. Canon 228 §1 is unequivocal: suitably qualified lay persons are capable of assuming ecclesiastical offices and functions for which they are competent. The criterion is not gender, but suitability. The law is clear; it becomes less so only when read in fragments or bent to a thesis rooted in prejudice. To attribute to women a natural inclination to emotional judgment is, in polemical guise, to reproduce the very stereotyped anthropology one claims to combat. One passes from the myth of the “naturally welcoming mother” to the myth of the “naturally impressionable woman.” The sign changes; the structure does not.
At this point a question arises spontaneously — and it need not be shouted, only posed calmly: why does critical attention focus almost exclusively on women? Why does one not read, with the same vehemence, an analysis of male power dynamics which for decades have produced clientelism, mutual protection, ideological factions, and networks of influence not always transparent?
Against Sister Raffaella Petrini, now Governor of the Vatican City State — a title traditionally in use, although juridically it is a presidency — the columns of that blog directed not only criticism but outright personal invective.
The recent history of the Curia has not been marked by an excess of a “female gaze,” but rather by dynamics of belonging — at times very compact, at times surprisingly indulgent toward well-known internal fragilities — provided they are situated within the right relational network. When one thunders against the female presence as a destabilizing factor, yet remains silent about far more structured and deeply rooted systems of protection, criticism inevitably loses credibility. Not because women’s presence is untouchable — no ecclesial function is — but because selective indignation is always a sign. To stigmatize with impetuosity the femininity of those who are women by nature and by grace, while at the same time overlooking certain “male” behaviors that have nothing evangelically virile about them, is not doctrinal rigor; it is polemical asymmetry.
Another point requires clarity: the consultative process for the selection of bishops — governed by cann. 377 and 378 — does not confer sacramental power upon any consultor. It does not grant the episcopal gift. It does not turn an opinion into an act of governance. Consultation is an investigative instrument, not the exercise of the governing office. When a lay person — man or woman — offers an opinion, he does not exercise sacramental jurisdiction; he contributes to an informational process. The decision remains with the Apostolic See.
To claim that the mere presence of women in a consultative body compromises the sacramentality of the episcopate is to confuse distinct levels of the Church’s legal order. This is conceptual confusion, not defense of doctrine. The real problem, if any, is not the consultors’ gender but the quality of the criteria. If certain appointments prove questionable, the issue is not whether the person who offered an opinion was male or female, but: what information was gathered? By what method? With what verification? With what assumption of final responsibility? To reduce everything to an identitarian opposition — “female gaze” versus “sacramental governance” — not only oversimplifies reality; it deforms it. The Church does not need symbolic quotas. Yet she also does not need selective indignations, ready to activate against certain profiles and surprisingly silent about other power dynamics far more consolidated, even when they emerge publicly and scandalously.
The difference between an ideological presence and a competent presence does not pass through gender. It passes through suitability, formation, ecclesial maturity, and the capacity for discernment. If one truly wishes to avoid tokenism, then the criterion must be competence — always, for men and for women. Otherwise one ends up combating one ideology by constructing another, with the only difference that this time polemics assume the guise of a theologically selective nostalgia.
The resounding question, “Do we want competent bishops or the approval of the media?” constructs a contrast as suggestive as it is artificial. No canonical norm provides that bishops are chosen in order to obtain media consensus. Canon 378 §1 indicates very concrete requirements: sound faith, good morals, piety, zeal for souls, wisdom, prudence, human virtues, good reputation, at least thirty-five years of age, five years of priesthood, a doctorate or licentiate in sacred disciplines — or at least true expertise in them. The parameter is objective suitability, not journalistic approval. To claim that recent appointments would be guided by a media obsession may be an opinion; to transform it into a total interpretive key, however, becomes a self-sufficient narrative: every unwelcomed choice is explained as capitulation to the media; every disliked profile as the fruit of “tokenism.”
It is a rhetorically effective mechanism, but a fragile one. If the criterion were truly the applause of the “common folk,” how does one explain that many appointments have been contested precisely by the media? How does one explain that not a few episcopal choices have generated critical reactions even in secular circles? The argument works only so long as it remains unproven; once subjected to verification, it loses consistency and reveals itself without objective foundation. The real problem — and it is a serious one — is not media approval. It is the quality of the information gathered in the consultative process. And it is here that the discussion ought to concentrate. The procedure envisaged by can. 377 §§2–3 is articulated: common and secret consultation among bishops; gathering of qualified opinions; possible listening to priests and laity; transmission of a well-documented dossier to the Apostolic See. The system is not built to replace episcopal judgment with media judgment. It is built to broaden knowledge of the candidate. The investigation does not remove responsibility from the Apostolic See; it qualifies it.
If certain appointments prove unhappy, the problem is not the presence of laity or women in the consultative process. The problem, if anything, is the quality of evaluations, the solidity of information, the verification of reports and — at times when Scripture would speak of “lean years” — also the objective difficulty of finding candidates of particular depth and worth. Here a significant detail emerges. The article denounces emotional, impressionistic, identitarian criteria. Yet in doing so it employs equally impressionistic categories: “disaster,” “a state of despair,” “power games,” “unlivable dynamics.” Strong terms, but lacking detailed documentation. One criticizes the subjectivity of others while resorting to one’s own. If the issue is the quality of appointments, the discussion must remain objective. Otherwise it remains within the sphere of polemical impression.
Another rhetorical question is encapsulated in the slogan, “The giftis not improvised,” along with an appeal to the need to distinguish “between theology and selective use of law.” This is the article’s most theologically demanding portion, devoted to the episcopal gift. Here utmost clarity is required. The the task of teaching, to sanctify and govern is proper to the episcopate (cf. can. 375). No one contests this. No recent reform has attributed the episcopal gift to non-ordained persons. No woman exercises the episcopal gift. Today no lay person, man or woman, governs a diocese by virtue of sacramental power. When, in past epochs, distortions occurred in diocesan governance — with absent titulars, sometimes never resident, and administrations in fact delegated to relatives or trusted persons according to logics of nepotism — these were historical abuses which the Tridentine reform corrected precisely in order to restore ecclesial governance to its authentic pastoral form. To evoke such scenarios today as though they were re-proposable is to superimpose radically different historical planes, wholly out of place.
The real question is another: who may cooperate in the investigative and administrative processes that precede or accompany the exercise of the gift? The answer of the law is already given. This is not an innovation of the current pontificate nor of the preceding one. Canon 129 §2 provides that lay members of the faithful may cooperate in the exercise of the power of governance according to the law; can. 228 recognizes that suitably qualified laity may assume ecclesiastical offices; can. 377 §3 explicitly envisages consultation also of priests and laity in the process of episcopal appointment. The fundamental distinction is between the sacramental titularity of the giftand functional cooperation in the exercise of authority. To confuse the two is to turn an administrative question into an ontological one. And this is not the defense of theology, but an alteration of its categories.
If only those who participate sacramentally in the gift were permitted to contribute to discernment about a candidate, one would coherently have to exclude: lay academics consulted for their theological competence; non-ordained canonists; lay members of disciplinary commissions; economic experts in dioceses. One would even have to revise the consolidated practice of Roman dicasteries, where physicians, jurists, and experts in various disciplines collaborate without exercising any sacramental authority. Consider the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints: its scientific commission is composed of specialist physicians who evaluate alleged miracles according to rigorously clinical criteria. No one has ever thought it necessary to replace them with clerics lacking clinical training simply because they are ordained. The Church has never functioned in this way, not even in the most delicate spheres.
The risk, therefore, is not the “feminization” of the Curia, but the clericalization of every ecclesial function, as though sacred Orders were required for any administrative or consultative responsibility. And this, paradoxically, contradicts precisely the critique elsewhere directed against “clericalism.” Recent history offers eloquent examples. Saint John Paul II chose Joaquín Navarro-Valls, a layman and psychiatrist, as Director of the Holy See Press Office — not because he was ordained (he was not), but because of great competence, balance, and communicative intelligence. He was later succeeded by Fr. Federico Lombardi, S.J., likewise chosen for personal and professional qualities. In both cases the criterion was not sacramental rank, but suitability for the function.
The episcopal gift is not improvised, certainly. Yet neither is it improperly extended to functions that do not belong to it ontologically. To defend the sacramentality of the episcopate does not mean to turn every ecclesial collaboration into an appendage of sacred Orders. It means, on the contrary, to safeguard the distinctions that theological tradition and the Church’s law have always known how to maintain.
The debate cannot concern the “feminization” of the Curia, nor an obsession with quotas, nor an alleged capitulation to sociological modernity. The true point is another: the quality of discernment and fidelity to the Church’s theological structure. If a woman exercises an administrative office legitimately conferred by the Roman Pontiff, the sacramentality of the episcopate has not been compromised. If a religious sister participates in a consultative process, the ontology of the gifthas not been altered. If a lay person offers technical advice, the hierarchy has not been desacralized. The Sacrament of Orders is not a covering for every organizational function; it is the root of the apostolic mission. To confuse the root with every leaf of the institutional tree is not the defense of tradition: it is theological approximation by amateurs.
The more serious risk is not the female presence in dicasteries. It is the ideological use of theology to turn every administrative decision into an ontological crisis. It is the habit of reading everything as subversion. It is the inability to distinguish between cooperation and substitution, between consultation and titularity, between sacramental structure and juridical organization. And there is also a detail that must be stated with sober clarity: one cannot thunder against the “ideology of woman” while systematically remaining silent about other dynamics of power that traverse ecclesial environments far more structured, ramified, and influential. Selective indignation is not doctrinal rigor; it is a polemical choice. And when severity is exercised in only one direction, it becomes suspect. The Church does not need fears disguised as theology, but competence, responsibility, truth, and interior freedom. She needs well-prepared appointments and solid information. She needs men and women who serve, not identitarian narratives that nourish permanent conflicts.
If, then, the criterion is competence, that competence must itself be shown. If the criterion is law, the law must be read in its entirety, not by fragments and extrapolations. If the criterion is theology, theology cannot be reduced to slogans. The sacramentality of ecclesial authority is not in question, but neither is it an argument to be brandished against every form of lay cooperation; otherwise one ends up defending the hierarchy so rigidly as to turn it into a grotesque caricature. And the Church is not a caricatural phenomenon, even if some reduce her to parody. She is a sacramental reality living in history, with juridical structures, personal responsibilities, and concrete decisions. The rest belongs more to the polemics of certain anonymous blogs than to law or theology.
In this blog, moreover, anonymity functions as a moral posture that deserves a sober observation. The harshest critiques — with accusations of incompetence, authoritarianism, ideological governance — come from persons who systematically choose anonymity, which may in certain circumstances even have legitimate reasons. But when one formulates judgments so heavy against persons and institutions, remaining structurally anonymous while demanding transparency from others, while stigmatizing anonymous denunciations and gossip, creates an evident moral asymmetry, not without gravity. For Catholic theology is not built on insinuations; canon law is not founded on unverifiable impressions; and moral authority requires precise assumptions of responsibility which not infrequently demand courage, at times even true heroism. Criticism is legitimate; delegitimizing others without exposing oneself is far less so. When one invokes the seriousness of sacramentality, it would be coherent to invoke also the seriousness of personal responsibility — almost wholly absent from the columns of a blog which, setting itself up as a permanent tribunal, systematically avoids assuming the responsibility of appearing as a party. Moreover, when a theological or juridical argument cannot withstand an integral reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is enough to bring it back to the sources themselves, because at times the very confrontation with them is already, in itself, the most severe of replies.
From the Isle of Patmos, 15 February 2026
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WOMEN, LAW AND THEOLOGY REDUCED TO SLOGAN BY THE BLOG SILERE NON POSSUM
When a theological or legal argument does not withstand the full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: just refer it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes the contrast with them constitutes in itself the most severe of replies.
A necessary premise is imposed. The blog I can not remain silent has never aroused particular appreciation among the Fathers editors of this magazine. Not because of prejudice, but by method. Our mission is not to fuel controversies, but to refer to theological and legal truth when it is presented imprecisely, approximate or ideologically oriented. The problem is not criticism — which in the Church is legitimate and sometimes necessary —, but the quality of the criticism. When texts of an ecclesiological and canonistic nature are disseminated with peremptory tones, selective citations and arguments that appear solid only as long as they are not subjected to verification, it is necessary to intervene. Not so much for the specialists, who possess the instruments to discern, as for those priests of good faith and for those Catholic faithful not adequately prepared, that run the risk of assuming as rigorous analysis what often turns out to be a rhetorical and emotional construction rather than a theological and legal one..
The last article «Women who evaluate bishops? The results of this tokenism are visible to all. (see here) represents an emblematic example of this approach. At several points the text borders on invective.; in legal and theological quotes, besides, authenticity sometimes appears similar to that of a zircon presented as a pure diamond: shiny on the surface, but lacking the structural consistency that only a rigorous analysis can guarantee. For this reason - and only for this reason - it is advisable to go into the background.
«The power of government, an unresolved knot constitutes the supporting argument of the article, as solemn in form as fragile in substance. It is stated that the power of government, being sacramentally rooted in the sacred Order, It cannot be “normalized” or exercised according to administrative logic that involves non-ordained faithful.. The reference to Benedict XVI — in particular to the catechesis on the governing office the 26 May 2010 — is suggestive, but markedly selective. Y, above all, theologically imprecise. Not for academic subtlety, but because of an evident confusion between the sacramental ownership of the giftand legal cooperation in the exercise of power.
The text uses correct formulas — «sacramental structure», "sacred origin of authority", «link with the Sacrament of Orders» —, but it isolates them from the global context of Catholic doctrine, transforming them into apologetic slogans through selective extrapolations. The result is an argument that appears compact only when it is not subjected to a full reading of the sources.. It's true: The hierarchy in the Church has a “sacred origin”; ecclesiastical authority is not born from a sociological investiture; he governing officeIt is not comparable to business leadership. But from these premises it does not follow at all what the article aims to demonstrate..
The Code of Canon Law is extremely clear: the c. 129 §1 states that those who have received Holy Orders are qualified for the power of government. But §2, which immediately follows - and here is the point systematically ignored - establishes that "the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of said power, according to the law. And cooperating does not mean usurping, replace or exercise the episcopal office, but participate, according to modalities determined by the ecclesial order, in the concrete exercise of functions that are not sacramental in nature, but administrative, consultative, training, management. Denying this principle, it would be necessary to coherently maintain that: The lay members of the ecclesiastical courts exercise a de facto episcopate; The lay experts who participated in the ecumenical Councils participated sacramentally in the the task of teaching; Every administrative function of the Curia requires episcopal ordination, until transforming the ecclesial organization into a kind of monolithic exclusively sacramental apparatus. It's easy to say: Such a conclusion is not only not required by Catholic theology., but rather misrepresents his fundamental distinction between sacramental ownership and legal cooperation.
Following the logic of the anonymous authors of the article, At least one titular bishop would then have to be appointed to manage the parking lots of the Vatican City State., in order to prevent a simple administrative official from exercising a power that is “not sufficiently sacramental” in matters of regulated zones and time zones — perhaps with appropriate references to sacramental dogmatics —. Well understood: the absurd is not the irony, but the premise. Benedict XVI, by remembering the "sacred origin" of ecclesial authority, He never maintained that every act of government in the Church ontologically coincides with the exercise of Sacred Orders.. The distinction between the power of the orderandthe power of government It is classic in Catholic theology and finds a clear and systematic formulation in canon law.. The sacramental origin of the episcopate does not eliminate the institutional and legal dimension of ecclesial government: the foundation and the structure. Confusing these levels means confusing the root with the branches.. Authority is born sacramentally; its specific administration is articulated, instead, according to legal forms. The two dimensions are not alternatives, but complementary.
When it is stated that an administrative appointment "shifts the center of gravity from the Holy Orders to the papal appointment", a false dilemma is created. The Roman Pontiff does not create the sacramentality of the episcopate through an administrative act; but can legitimately confer non-sacramental governmental duties on those who have not received Orders., as long as it is not the exercise of the episcopal office. Reducing everything to the category of "sacred origin" to deny all forms of lay cooperation is not a defense of theology: It is a rhetorical construction that assumes the language of doctrine to sustain an identity position.. All of this expressed — and it is a fact that cannot be ignored — by authors who systematically choose anonymity., while they do not hesitate to describe them as "ignorant", “incompetent”, "illiterates" or even "errant clerics expelled from their dioceses" to people who have acquired preparation and competence over decades of serious study and ongoing formation. The moral authority of criticism is not reinforced by invective, and even less with anonymity.
The section dedicated to the "female gaze" It is presented as a critique of ideology. But, paradoxically, ends up building a mirror and inverse ideology. It is stated that the idea of a feminine "peculiar gaze" would be an empty thesis, sentimentalist, identity. However, To demolish this thesis, we resort to the same scheme that we would like to refute.: an emotional predisposition is attributed to women, unstable, incapable of objective discernment. The stereotype is not overcome: it is turned around. The argument thus slips from a legitimate perplexity about the risk of personalistic criteria to a generalized judgment about the alleged feminine inclination to sentimentalism.. It is not a theological passage. It is not a canonical argument. It is not even a founded sociological analysis: It's a rhetorical device.. If there really existed an intrinsically unreliable "feminine criterion" in discernment, It would then be necessary to conclude – coherently – that women cannot be judges in ecclesiastical courts., nor teachers of moral theology, nor authorized to exercise consultative functions at the canonical level or to direct complex administrative offices. But the Church has never taught anything like that.. The c. 228 §1 is unambiguous: Suitable lay people are capable of assuming ecclesiastical offices and assignments for which they are capable.. The criterion is not gender, but the suitability. The law is clear; It is less so when it is read in fragments or adheres to a thesis based on prejudice.. Attributing to women a natural inclination to emotional judgment is equivalent, indeed, to re-propose — in a polemical way — the same stereotypical anthropology that they declare they want to combat. We move from the myth of the “naturally welcoming mother” to the myth of the “naturally impressionable woman.”. change the sign, not the structure. At this point, a question arises spontaneously — and does not need to be shouted, but posed calmly—: Why is critical attention focused almost exclusively on women?? Why not read, with the same vehemence, an analysis of the male power dynamics that for decades have produced clientelism, cross protections, ideological cliques and influence networks not always clean?
Contra la hermana Raffaella Petrini, today Governor of Vatican City State — title traditionally in use, although legally it is a presidency —, From the columns of that blog not only criticism was directed, but real personal invectives.
The recent history of the Curia has not been marked by an excess of the “female gaze”, but rather crossed by logics of belonging, sometimes very compact, sometimes surprisingly forgiving of well-known internal frailties, as long as they were located in the appropriate relational network. When there is thunder against the female presence as a destabilizing factor, but is silent about much more structured and deep-rooted protection systems, criticism inevitably loses credibility. Not because the presence of women is untouchable — no ecclesial function is —, but because the selectivity of indignation is always an indication. Vigorously stigmatize the femininity of someone who is a woman by nature and by grace., and at the same time ignore certain “masculine” behaviors that have nothing evangelically virile about them., It is not doctrinal rigor.: It is a controversial asymmetry.
Another point deserves clarity: the consultation process for the election of bishops — disciplined by the ccs. 377 and 378 — does not attribute sacramental power to any consultant. It does not confer the episcopal office. Does not convert an opinion into an act of government. Consultation is an instrument of instruction, non-exercise governing office. When a layman — man or woman — expresses an opinion, does not exercise sacramental jurisdiction: contributes to an information process. The decision corresponds to the Apostolic See.
Maintain that the simple presence of women in a consultative body it compromises the sacramentality of the episcopate means confusing different levels of the ecclesial order. It's a conceptual confusion, not a defense of the doctrine. The real problem, if it exists, It is not the genre of consultants. It is the quality of the criteria. If some designations are debatable, The question is not to establish whether the person who issued an opinion was a man or a woman., but to wonder: What information has been collected? With what method? With what verification? With what assumption of final responsibility? Reducing everything to an identity contrast — “feminine gaze” versus “sacramental government” — not only oversimplifies reality, but it deforms it. The Church does not need symbolic fees. But it doesn't need selective indignation either., ready to activate on some profiles and surprisingly silent on other much more consolidated power dynamics, even when they emerge publicly and scandalously .
The difference between an ideological presence and a competent presence It doesn't go by gender. Go through suitability, training, ecclesial maturity, the ability to discern. If you really want to avoid tokenism, the criterion must be competence. Always. For men and for women. Otherwise, you end up fighting an ideology by building another, with the only difference that this time the controversy assumes the face of a theologically selective nostalgia..
The high-sounding request: «Do we want competent bishops or the approval of the media?» builds a contrast as suggestive as it is artificial. No canonical norm foresees that bishops are elected to obtain media consensus. The c. 378 §1 indicates very specific requirements: complete faith, good habits, piety, zeal for souls, wisdom, prudence, human virtues, good reputation, at least thirty-five years of age, five years of priesthood, doctorate or license in sacred disciplines or, at least, real expertise in them. The parameter is objective suitability, not journalistic pleasure. Stating that the recent appointments would be guided by a media obsession may be an opinion; converting it into a total interpretive key becomes, however, a self-contained narrative: any non-shared choice is explained as a transfer to the media; any profile not appreciated as a result of “tokenism”.
It is an effective rhetorical device, but fragile. If the criterion were really the applause of the “plain people”, How do you explain that many designations have been contested precisely by the media?? How can we explain that many episcopal elections have also provoked critical reactions in the secular world?? The argument works only as long as it remains unproven.; subjected to verification, loses consistency and is revealed to lack objective foundation. The real problem — and it is a serious problem — is not media approval. It is the quality of the information collected in the consultation process. And this is where the discourse should focus. The procedure provided for by the c. 377 §2-3 is articulated: common and secret consultation between the bishops; collection of qualified opinions; possible listening to priests and lay people; transmission of a detailed picture to the Apostolic See. The system is not built to replace episcopal judgment with media judgment. It is built to expand the candidate's knowledge. The instruction does not remove responsibility from the Apostolic See: qualifies her.
If some appointments turn out to be unhappy, the problem is not the presence of lay people or women in the consultative process. The problem, in your case, is the quality of the evaluations, the solidity of the information, the verification of the signs and — in times that Scripture would call “lean times” — also the objective difficulty of finding profiles of particular relevance and value. And here a significant detail emerges. The article denounces emotional criteria, impressionists, identities. But, when doing it, uses equally impressionistic categories: "disaster", “state of despair”, “power games”, “unlivable dynamics”. Strong terms, but lacking detailed documentation. The subjectivity of others is criticized by resorting to one's own subjectivity. If the problem is the quality of the designations, the discussion must remain objective. Otherwise, remains in the sphere of controversial printing.
Another effect question is the one enclosed in the slogan: "He gift"it is not improvised", with reference to the need to distinguish "between theology and selective use of law". It is the most theologically demanding part of the article, dedicated to episcopal office. And this is where extreme clarity is required.. The the task of teaching, to sanctify and governIt is typical of the episcopate (cf.. (c). 375). Nobody disputes it. No recent reform has attributed the episcopal officeto unordered subjects. No woman exercises episcopal office. Today no layman, man or woman, governs a diocese by virtue of sacramental power. When, in times past, distortions occurred in the management of the dioceses — with absent holders, sometimes never residents, and de facto administrations delegated to relatives or fiduciaries according to the logic of nepotism — these were historical abuses that the Tridentine reform corrected precisely to redirect ecclesial government to its authentic and pastoral form.. Evoking similar scenarios today as if they were reproducible means superimposing radically different and totally out of place historical plans..
The real issue is another: Who can cooperate in the instruction and administrative processes that precede or accompany the exercise of the gift? The answer of the law has already been given. It is not an innovation of the current pontificate or the previous one.. The c. 129 §2 provides that the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of the power of government according to law; the c. 228 recognizes suitable lay people the possibility of assuming ecclesiastical offices; the c. 377 §3 explicitly contemplates consultation also with priests and lay people in the process of episcopal appointment. The fundamental distinction is between sacramental ownership of the giftand functional cooperation in the exercise of power. Confusing both dimensions means transforming an administrative question into an ontological question.. And this is not a defense of theology, but alteration of their categories.
If only those who participate sacramentally in gift would be allowed to contribute to the discernment of a candidate, should be coherently excluded: lay academics consulted for their theological competence; unordained canonists; lay members of disciplinary commissions; economic experts in the dioceses. It would even be necessary to review the consolidated praxis of the Roman dicasteries, where doctors, jurists, experts from various disciplines collaborate without exercising any sacramental power. Just think of the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints: The scientific commission is made up of specialist doctors who evaluate the alleged miracles according to rigorously clinical criteria.. No one has ever considered it necessary to replace them with ecclesiastics without clinical training, just because they are ordered. The Church has never worked like this, not even in the most delicate areas.
The risk, therefore, It is not the “feminization” of the Curia, but the clericalization of every ecclesial function, as if Holy Order were a requirement for any administrative or consultative responsibility. and this, paradoxically, precisely contradicts the criticism directed elsewhere at “clericalism”. Recent history offers eloquent examples. Saint John Paul II elected Joaquín Navarro-Valls as Director of the Press Office of the Holy See, psychiatrist and lay doctor, not because it was ordered—it wasn't—, but because of great competition, balance and communicative intelligence. He was later succeeded by Father Federico Lombardi S.J., equally chosen for personal and professional qualities. In both cases, the criterion was not the sacramental degree, but the suitability for the function.
The episcopal office it is not improvised, certainly. But neither does it improperly extend to functions that do not ontologically belong to it.. Defending the sacramentality of the episcopate does not mean transforming all ecclesial collaboration into an appendix of the Sacred Orders. Means, on the contrary, guard the distinctions that theological tradition and the law of the Church have always known how to maintain.
The debate cannot be about the “feminization” of the Curia, nor about the obsession with quotas, nor about an alleged cession to sociological modernity. The real point is another: the quality of discernment and fidelity to the theological structure of the Church. If a woman exercises an administrative position legitimately conferred by the Roman Pontiff, the sacramentality of the episcopate has not been injured. If a nun participates in a consultative process, the ontology of the gift. If a layman offers a technical opinion, the hierarchy has not been desacralized. The Sacrament of Orders is not a cover for any organizational function. It is the root of the apostolic mission. Confusing the root with each leaf of the institutional tree is not a defense of tradition: It is a superficial theological approach.
The most serious risk is not the female presence in the dicasteries. It is the ideological use of theology to transform every administrative choice into an ontological crisis. It is the habit of reading everything as subversion. It is the inability to distinguish between cooperation and substitution, between consultation and ownership, between sacramental structure and legal organization. And there is also a detail that deserves to be said with sober clarity.: You cannot thunder against the “ideology of women” while systematically remaining silent about other power dynamics that cross much more structured ecclesiastical environments., branched and influential. Selective indignation is not doctrinal rigor: It is a controversial option. And when severity is exerted only in one direction, becomes suspicious. The Church does not need fears disguised as theology, but competition, responsibility, truth and inner freedom. You need well-educated appointments and solid information. Needs men and women who serve, no identity narratives that fuel permanent conflicts.
And, well, the criterion is competition, this must be demonstrated. If the criterion is the right, This should be read in its entirety., not by fragments and extrapolations. If the criterion is theology, this cannot be reduced to a slogan. The sacramentality of ecclesial authority is not in dispute, but it is not an argument to brandish against all forms of secular cooperation either.; otherwise, hierarchy ends up being defended in such a rigid way that it is transformed into a grotesque caricature. And the Church is not a cartoonish phenomenon, although some reduce it to a parody. It is a sacramental reality that lives in history, with legal structures, personal responsibilities and specific decisions. The rest belongs more to the controversy of certain anonymous blogs than to law or theology..
In this blog there is also anonymity as a moral position, which deserves sober observation. The harshest criticism — with accusations of incompetence, of authoritarianism, of ideological management — come from subjects who systematically choose anonymity, which may even have legitimate reasons in certain circumstances. But when such serious judgments are made about people and institutions, remain structurally anonymous while demanding transparency from others, while anonymous complaints and gossip are stigmatized, creates an obvious moral asymmetry, not without seriousness. Also because Catholic theology is not built on insinuations; Canon law is not based on unverifiable impressions; and moral authority requires precise assumptions of responsibility that often require courage., sometimes even true heroism. Criticizing is legitimate; delegitimizing without exposing oneself is much less so. When, indeed, the seriousness of sacramentality is invoked, it would be coherent to also invoke the seriousness of personal responsibility, almost absent in the columns of a blog that, establishing itself as a permanent court, However, he systematically avoids assuming the responsibility of appearing as a party. Otherwise, when a theological or legal argument does not stand up to the full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: just refer it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes the contrast with them constitutes in itself the most severe of replies.
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The Fathers of the Island of Patmos
HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Padre-Ariel-foto-2025-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-16 04:55:212026-02-16 12:05:48Donne, law and theology used as slogans by the blog “I can not remain silent” – Donne, law, and theology used as slogans by the blog “I can not remain silent” – Women, law and theology reduced to slogan by the blog “Silere non possum”
The statement released on the meeting held on 12 February 2026 between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (cf.. communicated in pdf), offers food for reflection not so much on a diplomatic level, as well as on the theological and ecclesiological one.
The tone of the text is deliberately short and sober, even benevolent. There is talk of a "cordial and sincere" meeting, of a «specifically theological dialogue path», of "very precise methodology", of clarification regarding the difference between an act of faith and "religious obedience of the mind and will" and on the different degrees of adhesion required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. However, beneath the formal and friendly surface, serious issues emerge, now old and unresolved.
Let's start with a canonical analysis of the "state of necessity" invoked. The most delicate point remains the threat - already publicly aired - to proceed with new episcopal ordinations in the absence of a pontifical mandate, justified by an alleged "state of necessity" expressed in these terms:
«Last Monday, 2 February, the Superior General of the Society of Saint Pius, that is, the consecration of bishops, will take place on Wednesday 1st July. The ceremony will be held here in Écône, on the famous Prato delle Ordinazioni, in the same place where, the 30 June 1988, Archbishop Lefebvre consecrated four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important to fully understand its scope and meaning. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is that, for the moment, did not receive the authorization of Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope that the Holy Father allows these consecrations. We must pray for this intention" (cf.. SSPX Actuality, who).
And here we need extreme clarity, because the Code of Canon Law is unambiguous:
«Let no Bishop consecrate any Bishop, if it does not first consist of the pontifical mandate" (can. 1013CIC); «the Bishop who consecrates someone Bishop without pontifical mandate and whoever receives the consecration from him incur excommunication automatic reserved to the Apostolic See" (can. 1382 CIC; currently can. 1382 §1 after the reform of 2021).
The statement from Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez correctly recalls the can. 331 the A The Eternal Shepherdthe First Vatican Council, reiterating full power, supreme, universal and immediate of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a disciplinary detail, but of a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The “state of necessity” argument it was used already in 1988 to justify the episcopal consecrations carried out by Bishop Marcel Lefebvre. But a state of necessity, in a canonical sense, it is not a subjective category, nor an ideological perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the causes of non-imputability or mitigation of the sentence (cann. 1323–1324 CIC), among which necessity figures, which must however be substantially real and objective, thus outlining a situation so serious as to force action to avoid imminent and not otherwise avoidable damage. Personal judgment regarding an alleged ecclesial crisis is not sufficient; there must be a real impossibility of resorting to the ordinary means of government and communion with the Apostolic See. Moreover, the necessity cannot be self-certified by the agent in an arbitrary or ideological way, but it must respond to objective criteria verifiable in the ecclesial system.
The history of the 20th century offers several concrete examples: in Eastern European countries under the Soviet regime, with bishops jailed or deported and communications cut off; in Maoist China, during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the Church operated clandestinely and contact with Rome was physically impossible; in some areas of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan conflicts, in conditions of total isolation and grave danger. In these contexts it was an objective physical and legal impossibility.
The difference with the current ecclesial situation is evident. Today there is no regime persecution that prevents communion with Rome, nor a forced interruption of institutional channels. In contexts in which the Fraternity invokes the state of necessity, the Church enjoys freedom of expression and action, maintains diplomatic relations with states and operates publicly. Any conflict is of a doctrinal or interpretative nature, not of material impossibility.
In this way, expand the notion of necessity to the extent of including subjective theological dissent means emptying the canonical institution of its proper meaning. And this is particularly paradoxical in environments that claim a rigorous Thomistic formation: precisely the authentic scholastic tradition demands conceptual precision and distinction of levels, not the extensive and ideological use of legal categories.
Then compare the current ecclesial situation to the Arian crisis - as is sometimes insinuated by certain circles - means forcing history and ecclesiology. During the Arian crisis the very divinity of the Incarnate Word was discussed; today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. The claim to present himself as a new Athanasius of Alexandria presupposes that Rome has become Arian: statement that, if taken seriously, it logically leads to formal schism and before it to juridical-theological ridicule. This is precisely because the argument of the state of necessity, applied to the unilateral decision to ordain bishops against the explicit will of the Roman Pontiff, it is so non-existent on a juridical and ecclesiological level that it appears to lack the minimum criteria of seriousness. Also because the need, against the other, it cannot be self-certified by whoever intends to carry out the act.
The statement signals a central theological point: the distinction between an act of faith (divine and catholic faith) and "religious respect of the mind and will" (cf. The light, 25) Before proceeding, it is appropriate to clarify these two concepts. With divine and catholic faith means the full and irrevocable assent that the believer gives to the truths revealed by God and proposed as such definitively by the Church: for example the Trinity, the Incarnation, the divinity of Christ. To knowingly deny one of these truths is to break communion in faith. The "religious respect of the mind and will", instead, concerns those teachings that the Magisterium proposes in an authentic way, although not with a dogmatic definition. In these cases it is not an act of faith in the strict sense, but of real membership, loyal and respectful, founded on trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Magisterium of the Church. It is not an optional opinion that anyone can accept or reject at will, but neither does it equate to an irreformable definition. The Prefect here, with evident grace, it effectively invites the Fraternity to return to the fold of classical Catholic theology, remembering that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of assent; but neither is it permissible to treat conciliar texts as freely contestable theological opinions. All this even in the face of reductive interpretations that continue to qualify Vatican II as a "only pastoral" council, almost as if it were an assembly of lower rank than previous ecumenical councils. Such a reading, as well as being theologically imprecise, ends up emptying the very authority of the conciliar Magisterium of content.
The Vatican, while not defining new dogmas with a solemn formula, it is an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. His teachings require, according to their nature and formulation, at least that religious respect which is not mere private opinion but real adherence, even if not definitive. It is legitimate to critically discuss some drifts of the post-conciliar period; but such phenomena cannot be identified with the Council as such. Already in the seventies, from the chair of the Pontifical Lateran University, Antonio Piolanti - an authoritative exponent of the Roman School - warned against confusing the Second Vatican Council with the "para-council": these are distinct realities. Nonetheless, before these elementary theological evidences, the tones of the Fraternity are unfortunately as follows:
«It is possible that the Holy See will tell us: “All right, we authorize you to consecrate bishops, but on condition that you accept two things: the first is the Second Vatican Council; and the second is the New Mass. Then, Yes, we will allow you to perform consecrations”. How we should react? It's simple. We would rather die than become modernists. We would rather die than renounce the full Catholic faith. We would rather die than replace the Mass of Saint Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI" (cf.. SSPX Actuality, who).
The Dicastery's request is not to "believe as dogma" every single conciliar expression, but to recognize its ecclesial authority according to the hierarchy of truths and degrees of assent. In other words: study what is disputed, understand theological categories, avoid ideological readings, but also recognize the seriousness of the interlocutor. The Catholic theological tradition has never been built on the caricature of the adversary, but rather on the rigorous analysis of his theses and the reasoned refutation of his errors. You can deeply disagree with a position, even judging it theologically erroneous, without thereby denying the other intelligence, scientific culture or competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend on the personal delegitimation of those who support it, but by the solidity of the arguments. Only in this climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. Is this, be clear: it is not a principle of academic courtesy, but the very method of great scholasticism. Just think about the structure of questionsof St. Thomas Aquinas, who precisely states the objections in their strongest form before proposing his own response (I answer). The truth, in the Catholic tradition, you don't assert yourself by eliminating your opponent, but overcoming the arguments on the level of reason and faith.
On behalf of the Superiors of the Fraternity of Saint Pius, the systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, together with the blackmail tone already used, it does not remain at the level of controversy, but it directly affects the ecclesiological question. The most serious fact is not so much the threat itself, as much as the modality. Dire, in essence, to the Roman Pontiff: “If you don't give us your approval, we will proceed anyway", constitutes improper pressure on the supreme authority of the Church. In canon law, requesting a warrant is an act of obedience; the threat to act without a mandate is an act of defiance. Papal power cannot be transformed into a bureaucratic obstacle that can be circumvented in the name of a superior awareness of the crisis. Ecclesial communion is non-negotiable. It is not a political table where a share of episcopal autonomy is negotiated.
This statement shows a Holy See that does not close, but invites dialogue as an opportunity for truth. Does not sanction immediately, but he proposes a path. It does not impose formulas, but asks for doctrinal clarification. It is difficult not to see in this attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesial patience combined with a spirit of great institutional nobility. The proposal to highlight "the minimum necessary for full communion" is already a methodological concession: we start from the essentials, it does not give complete consensus on everything. However, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is placed as a preliminary condition. And rightly so, because you can't have a conversation with a gun on the table, as if the exercise of authority had to bow to preventive pressure.
Finally, there is a structural element which deserves to be said without acrimony but with lucid realism. Some ecclesial movements, to exist and consolidate, they need a permanent enemy. Their identity is structured in the clash: modernist Rome, the traitorous Council, the ambiguous Pope, the hostile world... If this state of continuous tension were to cease, their raison d'être would also disappear. The logic of conflict is a real element of identity. Without conflict, the identity dissolves or normalizes. But the Church does not live on structural antagonisms; lives in hierarchical communion.
If the Fraternity really desires full communion, will have to decide whether it wants to be an ecclesial reality or a permanent opposition with ecclesial semblance. The difference is not semantic: it is truly ontological. True tradition is not polemical self-preservation, but living continuity in obedience. And obedience, in Catholic ecclesiology, it's not servility, but participation in the very form of the Church wanted by Christ.
The communiqué issued regarding the meeting held on 12 February 2026 between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez, and the Superior General of the Priestly Society of Saint Pius X, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (here), offers grounds for reflection not so much on the diplomatic level as on the theological and ecclesiological one.
The tone of the text is deliberately brief and sober, even benevolent. It speaks of a “cordial and sincere” meeting, of a “specifically theological dialogue,” of a “precise methodology,” and of clarification concerning the distinction between the act of faith and the “religious submission of mind and will,” as well as the different degrees of assent required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. Yet beneath this formally courteous surface, serious issues emerge — long-standing and unresolved.
Let us begin with a canonical analysis of the invoked “state of necessity.” The most delicate point remains the threat — already publicly announced — to proceed with new episcopal ordinations without a pontifical mandate, justified by an alleged “state of necessity,” expressed in the following terms:
“Last Monday, 2 February, the Superior General of the Society of Saint Pius X announced that episcopal consecrations — that is, the consecration of bishops — will take place on Wednesday, 1 July. The ceremony will be held here in Écône, on the famous Field of Ordinations, in the same place where, on 30 June 1988, Archbishop Lefebvre consecrated four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important to understand fully its scope and meaning. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is that, for the moment, it has not received authorization from Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope that the Holy Father will permit these consecrations. We must pray for this intention” (cf. SSPX News, here).
Here absolute clarity is required, because the Code of Canon Law is unequivocal:
“No Bishop is permitted to consecrate anyone as Bishop unless it is first evident that there is a pontifical mandate” (can. 1013 CIC); “A Bishop who consecrates someone a Bishop without a pontifical mandate, and the person who receives the consecration from him, incur a late sententiae excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See" (can. 1382 CIC; currently can. 1382 §1 following the 2021 reform).
The communiqué of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández rightly recalls canon 331 and the constitution The Eternal Shepherd of the First Vatican Council, reaffirming the full, supreme, universal, and immediate authority of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a disciplinary detail, but a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The argument of a “state of necessity” was already used in 1988 to justify the episcopal consecrations carried out by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. Yet a state of necessity, in canonical terms, is not a subjective category nor an ideological perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the causes of non-imputability or mitigation of penalty (cc. 1323–1324 CIC), among which necessity is included. Such necessity, however, must be genuinely real and objective, delineating a situation so grave as to compel action in order to avert imminent harm that cannot otherwise be avoided. A personal judgment concerning an alleged ecclesial crisis is insufficient; what is required is a real impossibility of recourse to the ordinary means of governance and communion with the Apostolic See. Moreover, necessity cannot be self-certified by the agent in an arbitrary or ideological manner; it must correspond to objective criteria verifiable within the ecclesial juridical order.
The history of the twentieth century offers concrete examples: in Eastern European countries under Soviet regimes, where bishops were imprisoned or deported and communications interrupted; in Maoist China, during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the Church operated clandestinely and contact with Rome was materially impossible; and in certain areas of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan conflicts, under conditions of total isolation and grave danger. In such contexts there existed an objective physical and juridical impossibility.
The difference with the present ecclesial situation is evident. Today there is no regime persecution preventing communion with Rome, nor any forced interruption of institutional channels. In the contexts in which the Society invokes a state of necessity, the Church enjoys freedom of expression and action, maintains diplomatic relations with states, and operates publicly. The conflict, if any, is doctrinal or interpretative in nature, not one of material impossibility.
To extend the notion of necessity in this way so as to include subjective theological dissent is to empty the canonical institute of its proper meaning. This appears particularly paradoxical in environments that claim rigorous Thomistic formation: authentic scholastic tradition demands conceptual precision and distinction of levels, not the expansive and ideological use of juridical categories.
To compare the current ecclesial situation to the Arian crisis — as some circles occasionally suggest — is to distort both history and ecclesiology. During the Arian crisis the very divinity of the Incarnate Word was at stake; today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. To present oneself as a new Athanasius of Alexandria presupposes that Rome has become Arian — an assertion which, if taken seriously, leads logically to formal schism and, prior to that, to juridical and theological absurdity. The argument of necessity, applied to the unilateral decision to ordain bishops against the explicit will of the Roman Pontiff, is so unfounded in law and ecclesiology as to appear devoid of minimum seriousness. Necessity, moreover, cannot be self-certified by the one who intends to perform the act.
The communiqué highlights a central theological point: the distinction between the act of faith (divine and catholic faith) and the “religious submission of mind and will” (cf. The light, 25). Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify these concepts. Divine faithand Catholic refers to the full and irrevocable assent given to truths revealed by God and definitively proposed as such by the Church — for example, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the divinity of Christ. To deny such a truth knowingly is to break communion in the faith.
The “religious submission of mind and will,” on the other hand, concerns teachings authentically proposed by the Magisterium, though not defined in a dogmatic manner. In such cases one does not make an act of faith in the strict sense, but rather gives a real, loyal, and respectful adherence, grounded in trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church’s Magisterium. It is not an optional opinion to be accepted or rejected at will, yet neither does it constitute an irreformable definition.
The Prefect thus gently invites the Society to re-enter the classical framework of Catholic theology, recalling that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of assent; yet it is equally illegitimate to treat conciliar texts as freely contestable theological opinions. Interpretations that continue to describe Vatican II as a “merely pastoral” council, as though it were somehow inferior in rank to previous ecumenical councils, are reductive. Such a reading is theologically imprecise and ultimately empties conciliar authority of its content.
Vatican II, though it did not define new dogmas with solemn formulae, is an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. Its teachings require, according to their nature and formulation, at least that religious submission which is not a mere private opinion but a real adherence, albeit non-definitive. It is legitimate to discuss critically certain post-conciliar developments; but such phenomena cannot be identified with the Council itself.
Already in the 1970s, from his chair at the Pontifical Lateran University, Antonio Piolanti — an authoritative representative of the Roman School — warned against confusing the Second Vatican Council with the “para-council”: they are distinct realities. Nevertheless, in the face of these elementary theological clarifications, the tone adopted by the Society is unfortunately the following:
“It is possible that the Holy See may tell us: ‘All right, we authorize you to consecrate bishops, but on condition that you accept two things: the first is the Second Vatican Council; and the second is the New Mass. And then, yes, we will allow you to carry out consecrations.’ How should we react? It is simple. We would rather die than become modernists. We would rather die than renounce the full Catholic faith. We would rather die than replace the Mass of Saint Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI” (cf. SSPX News, here).
The request of the Dicastery is not to “believe as dogma” every single conciliar expression, but to recognize its ecclesial authority according to the hierarchy of truths and the degrees of assent. In other words: to study what one contests, to understand the theological categories involved, to avoid ideological readings, but also to acknowledge the seriousness of one’s interlocutor. Catholic theological tradition has never been built upon caricaturing one’s opponent, but upon rigorous analysis of his theses and reasoned refutation of his errors. One may profoundly dissent from a position, even judge it theologically erroneous, without thereby denying the other’s intelligence, culture, or scholarly competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend upon the personal delegitimization of the one who proposes it, but upon the solidity of its arguments. Only in such a climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. And this, it should be clear, is not a matter of academic courtesy, but the very method of the great scholastic tradition. One need only consider the structure of the questionsof Saint Thomas Aquinas, who presents objections in their strongest form before offering his own response (I answer). In Catholic tradition, truth is not affirmed by eliminating one’s opponent, but by surpassing his arguments on the plane of reason and faith.
On the part of the Superiors of the Society of Saint Pius X, the systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, together with the previously adopted tone of ultimatum, does not remain on the level of polemics but directly affects the ecclesiological question. The most serious element is not so much the threat itself as the manner in which it is expressed. To say, in substance, to the Roman Pontiff: “If you do not grant us authorization, we shall proceed nonetheless,” constitutes an improper pressure upon the supreme authority of the Church. In canon law, the request for a mandate is an act of obedience; the threat to act without it is an act of defiance. One cannot transform pontifical authority into a bureaucratic obstacle to be bypassed in the name of a higher perception of crisis. Ecclesial communion is not negotiable. It is not a political table at which a quota of episcopal autonomy is bargained.
This communiqué shows a Holy See that does not close doors but invites dialogue as an occasion of truth. It does not immediately impose sanctions but proposes a path. It does not impose formulas but asks for doctrinal clarification. It is difficult not to see in the attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesial patience united to notable institutional nobility. The proposal to identify “the minimum necessary for full communion” already constitutes a methodological concession: one begins with what is essential, not with total agreement on every point. Nevertheless, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is set as a preliminary condition — and rightly so — for one cannot conduct dialogue with a gun on the table, as though the exercise of authority were to bend before preventive pressure.
There is finally a structural element that deserves to be stated without acrimony but with lucid realism. Certain ecclesial movements, in order to exist and consolidate themselves, require a permanent enemy. Their identity is structured around conflict: modernist Rome, the betraying Council, the ambiguous Pope, the hostile world. Were this constant tension to disappear, their very raison d’être would weaken. The logic of conflict becomes an identity-forming principle. Without conflict, identity dissolves or normalizes. But the Church does not live by structural antagonisms; she lives by hierarchical communion.
If the Society truly desires full communion, it must decide whether it wishes to be an ecclesial reality or a permanent opposition bearing ecclesial semblance. The difference is not semantic; it is ontological. True tradition is not polemical self-preservation, but living continuity in obedience. And obedience, in Catholic ecclesiology, is not servility, but participation in the very form of the Church willed by Christ.
From the Island of Patmos, 13 February 2026
.
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CARDINAL VÍCTOR MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ AND THE FRATERNITY OF SAN PÍO: THE NON-NEGOTIABLE POINT OF THE COMMONION
Theological-canonical note on the recent meeting between the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius
The statement released about the meeting held on 12 February 2026 between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez, and the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (here), offers food for reflection not so much on the diplomatic level as on the theological and ecclesiological level..
The tone of the text is deliberately brief and sober., even benevolent. There is talk of a "cordial and sincere" meeting, of a "specifically theological dialogue", of a "very precise methodology", and the clarification about the distinction between the act of faith and the "religious gift of the mind and will", as well as the different degrees of adhesion required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. However, beneath this formal and cordial surface, serious issues emerge, old and still unresolved.
Let us begin with a canonical analysis of the "state of necessity" invoked. The most delicate point remains the threat — already publicly announced — of proceeding to new episcopal ordinations without a pontifical mandate., justified by a supposed "state of necessity", expressed in the following terms:
«Last Monday, 2 February, The Superior General of the Society of Saint Pius X announced that episcopal consecrations, that is to say, the consecration of bishops, will take place on Wednesday 1 of July. The ceremony will take place here in Écône, in the famous Prado de las Ordinaciones, in the same place where, he 30 June 1988, Archbishop Lefebvre consecrated four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important to fully understand its scope and significance. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is that, for now, has not received authorization from Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope that the Holy Father allows these consecrations. We must pray for this intention." (cf. SSPX Present, here).
Absolute clarity is required here, because the Code of Canon Law is unequivocal:
«No Bishop consecrates someone as Bishop if the pontifical mandate is not first established» ((c). 1013 CIC); «The Bishop who consecrates someone as Bishop without papal mandate, and whoever receives consecration from him, incur en excommunication latae sententiae reserved a la Sede Apostólica" ((c). 1382 CIC; currently c. 1382 §1 after the reform of 2021).
The statement from Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández correctly remember the canon 331 and the constitution The Eternal Shepherd the First Vatican Council, reaffirming full power, supreme, universal and immediate of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a simple disciplinary detail, but of a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The “state of necessity” argument was already used in 1988 to justify the episcopal consecrations made by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. But a state of necessity, in canonical sense, It is not a subjective category nor an ideological perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the causes of non-imputability or mitigation of the penalty (cc. 1323–1324 CIC), among which is precisely the need. However, It must be a real and objective situation, that constitutes a severity such that it requires action to avoid imminent damage and that cannot be avoided in any other way. A personal judgment about an alleged ecclesial crisis is not enough; a real impossibility of resorting to the ordinary means of government and communion with the Apostolic See is required. Besides, the need cannot be self-certified by the person who intends to carry out the act, but must respond to objective, verifiable criteria within the ecclesiastical legal system..
The history of the 20th century offers concrete examples: in Eastern European countries under the Soviet regime, with bishops imprisoned or deported and communications interrupted; in Maoist China, during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the Church acted clandestinely and contact with Rome was materially impossible; in some areas of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan conflicts, in conditions of total isolation and serious danger. In such contexts there was an objective physical and legal impossibility.
The difference with the current ecclesial situation is evident. Today there is no regime persecution that prevents communion with Rome, nor forced interruption of institutional channels. In the contexts in which the Fraternity invokes the state of need, The Church enjoys freedom of expression and action, maintains diplomatic relations with States and acts publicly. The eventual conflict is of a doctrinal or interpretative nature, not of material impossibility.
Expanding in this way the notion of necessity Even including subjective theological dissent in it means emptying the canonical institute of its proper meaning.. And this is particularly paradoxical in environments that demand a rigorous Thomistic training.: precisely the authentic scholastic tradition demands conceptual precision and distinction of planes, not the extensive and ideological use of legal categories.
Compare the current ecclesial situation with the Arian crisis — as certain circles sometimes suggest — means forcing history and ecclesiology. During the Arian crisis, the very divinity of the Incarnate Word was under discussion.; Today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. Trying to present yourself as a new Athanasius of Alexandria presupposes that Rome has become Arian: statement that, taken seriously, logically leads to formal schism and, before it, to the legal-theological absurdity. The argument from the state of necessity, applied to the unilateral decision to ordain bishops against the explicit will of the Roman Pontiff, It is so inconsistent on the legal and ecclesiological level that it lacks the minimum criteria of seriousness. Besides, the need cannot be self-certified by the person who intends to carry out the act.
The statement makes a central theological point: the distinction between the act of faith (divine and catholic faith) and the "religious gift of the mind and will" (cf. The light, 25). Before continuing, It is worth clarifying these two concepts. With fides divine and catholic It is understood as the full and irrevocable assent that the believer gives to the truths revealed by God and proposed as such definitively by the Church.: For example, the Trinity, the incarnation, the divinity of Christ. Consciously denying one of these truths means breaking the communion in faith..
The "religious gift of the mind and will", instead, refers to those teachings that the Magisterium proposes in an authentic way, although not with dogmatic definition. In these cases it is not an act of faith in the strict sense., but of a real adhesion, loyal and respectful, founded on confidence in the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Magisterium of the Church. It is not an optional opinion that each person can accept or reject at will., but it is not equivalent to an irreformable definition either..
The Prefect thus invites, with evident delicacy, the Fraternity to reinsert itself into the channel of classical Catholic theology, remembering that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of assent; but it is not legitimate to treat conciliar texts as freely debatable theological opinions either.. All of this even in the face of reductive interpretations that continue to classify Vatican II as a “only pastoral” council., as if it were an assembly of lower rank with respect to previous ecumenical councils. A similar reading, in addition to being theologically imprecise, ends up emptying the very authority of the conciliar Magisterium of content.
Vatican II, although it has not defined new dogmas with a solemn formula, It is an ecumenical Council of the Catholic Church. His teachings demand, according to its nature and formulation, at least that religious gift that is not mere private opinion, but real adhesion, although not defining. It is legitimate to critically discuss some drifts of the post-conciliar period; but such phenomena cannot be identified with the Council as such.. Already in the seventies, from his professorship at the Pontifical Lateran University, Antonio Piolanti — a prominent exponent of the Roman School — warned against confusion between the Second Vatican Council and the “para-council.”: These are different realities.. However, in the face of these elementary theological precisions, The tones of the Brotherhood are unfortunately the following:
«It is possible that the Holy See tells us: "Alright, we authorize you to consecrate bishops, but on the condition that you accept two things: The first is the Second Vatican Council; and the second is the New Mass. And then, Yeah, “We will allow you to carry out consecrations.”. How should we react? It's simple. We would rather die than become modernists. We would rather die than renounce the full Catholic faith. "We would rather die than replace the Mass of Saint Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI." (cf. SSPX Present, here).
The request of the Dicastery does not consist of “believing as dogma” every conciliar expression, but in recognizing its ecclesial authority according to the hierarchy of truths and the degrees of assent. In other words: study what is questioned, understand the theological categories involved, avoid ideological readings, but also recognize the seriousness of the interlocutor. The Catholic theological tradition has never been built on the caricature of the adversary, but about the rigorous analysis of their theses and the argued refutation of their errors. You can deeply disagree with a position, even judging it theologically erroneous, without denying the other intelligence, culture or academic competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend on the personal delegitimization of the person who holds it., but of the solidity of his arguments. Only in this climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. And this – it should be emphasized – is not a principle of mere academic courtesy., but the very method of great scholasticism. Just think about the structure of the questionsof Saint Thomas Aquinas, which states the objections in their strongest form before proposing their response (I answer). In the Catholic tradition, the truth is not affirmed by eliminating the adversary, but by overcoming their arguments on the level of reason and faith.
On behalf of the Superiors of the Society of Saint Pius, the systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, linked to the ultimatum tone previously adopted, does not remain at the level of controversy, but it directly affects the ecclesiological issue. The most serious thing is not so much the threat itself as the modality with which it is formulated.. Say, in substance, to the Roman Pontiff: “If you do not grant us authorization, We will proceed anyway”, constitutes improper pressure on the supreme authority of the Church. In canon law, The request for a command is an act of obedience; the threat to act without it is an act of defiance. Papal power cannot be transformed into a bureaucratic obstacle that must be overcome in the name of a higher awareness of the crisis.. Ecclesial communion is not negotiable. It is not a political table in which a quota of episcopal autonomy is agreed upon..
This statement shows a Holy See that does not close doors, but invites dialogue as an opportunity of truth. Does not sanction immediately, but it proposes a path. Does not impose formulas, but requests doctrinal clarification. It is difficult not to see in this attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesial patience united with a notable institutional nobility. The proposal to indicate "the minimum necessary for full communion" already constitutes a methodological concession: be part of the essential, not a comprehensive consensus on everything. However, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is established as a preliminary condition. And rightly so, because you can't talk with a gun on the table, as if the exercise of authority should yield to preventive pressure.
Finally, there is a structural element that deserves to be pointed out without acrimony., but with lucid realism. Some ecclesiastical movements, to exist and consolidate, they need a permanent enemy. Your identity is structured in conflict: modernist Rome, the traitor council, the ambiguous Pope, the hostile world... If that continuous state of tension disappeared, a good part of its reason for being would also disappear. The logic of conflict becomes a true identity element. No conflict, identity is diluted or normalized. But the Church does not live on structural antagonisms; lives in hierarchical communion.
If the Fraternity really desires full communion, must decide if it wants to be an ecclesial reality or a permanent opposition with an ecclesial appearance. The difference is not semantic; It is properly ontological. True tradition is not controversial self-preservation, but living continuity in obedience. and obedience, in Catholic ecclesiology, it is not servility, but participation in the very form of the Church willed by Christ.
From the Island of Patmos, 12 February 2026
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CARDINAL VÍCTOR MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ AND THE PRIESTLY FRATERNITY OF ST. PIUS X: THE NON-NEGOTIABLE POINT OF THE CHURCH COMMUNITY
Theological-canonical note on the recent meeting between the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X
The notification about the on 12. February 2026 meeting between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Kardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez, and the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (available here), offers an opportunity for reflection – less on a diplomatic level than on a theological and ecclesiological level.
The tone of the text is deliberately brief and factual, yes, even benevolent. There is talk of a “warm and sincere” encounter, of a “specific theological dialogue”, of a “clear-cut methodology” and of a clarification regarding the distinction between the act of faith and the “religious obedience of the mind and will” and the different degrees of assent, required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. However, beneath this formal and friendly surface there are serious issues, long-standing and unresolved questions are brought to light.
Let's start with a canonistic analysis of the claimed “state of emergency”. The most sensitive point remains the intention, which has already been publicly announced, to carry out new episcopal ordinations without a papal mandate, justified by an alleged “emergency”, which was described in the following words:
“Last Monday, dem 2. February, announced the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X an, that the episcopal ordinations - i.e. the ordination of bishops - take place on Wednesday, dem 1. July, will take place. The ceremony is held here in Écône on the well-known grazing area of the Harriers, in the same place, to Archbishop Lefebvre on 30. June 1988 ordained four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important, to fully understand its scope and significance. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is this, that it has not yet received the approval of Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope, that the Holy Father will allow these ordinations. We must pray for this matter.” (cf. SSPX Current).
Extreme clarity is required here, because the code of canon law is clear:
“No bishop is allowed to consecrate anyone as a bishop, unless the papal mandate has been established beforehand.” (can. 1013 CIC); “A bishop, who consecrates someone as a bishop without a papal mandate, as well as that one, who receives consecration from him, incur the penalty of excommunication, which is reserved for the Apostolic See" (can. 1382 CIC; currently can. 1382 §1 after the reform of 2021).
Die Mitteilung von Kardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández rightly reminds us of can. 331 as well as the constitution The Eternal Shepherd of the First Vatican Council and thereby reaffirms the full, highest, universal and immediate power of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a mere disciplinary individual determination, but rather a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The “emergency” argument has already been 1988 used, to justify the episcopal ordinations carried out by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. However, an emergency in the canonical sense is neither a subjective category nor an ideologically colored perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the grounds for non-attribution or mitigation of punishment (cc. 1323–1324 CIC), among which the state of emergency is also mentioned. However, this must actually be real and objective and represent such a serious situation, that action is necessary, in order to avert imminent damage, which cannot be avoided otherwise. A personal judgment about an alleged church crisis is not enough; what is required is a real impossibility, to have recourse to the ordinary means of leadership and communion with the Apostolic See. In addition, a state of emergency cannot be declared arbitrarily or ideologically by the actor himself, but must be objective, correspond to verifiable criteria within the ecclesiastical legal system.
The story of the 20. Century offers concrete examples of this: in Eastern European countries under Soviet rule, where bishops were imprisoned or deported and communications were disrupted; in Maoist China during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the church worked underground and contact with Rome was effectively impossible; in certain regions of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan Wars, under conditions of complete isolation and acute danger. In such contexts there was an objective physical and legal impossibility.
The difference to the current church situation is obvious. Today there is no state persecution, which prevents communion with Rome, and no forced disruption of institutional lines of communication. In the contexts, in which the Brotherhood claims a state of emergency, enjoys the church religions- and freedom of action, maintains diplomatic relations with states and acts publicly. Any conflict is doctrinal or interpretive in nature, but not due to material impossibility.
To expand the concept of emergency in this way, that this includes subjective theological disagreement, means, to empty the canonical institute of its actual meaning. This seems particularly paradoxical in circles, who claim a strict Thomistic training for themselves: The authentic scholastic tradition in particular demands conceptual precision and the distinction between levels, not the extensive and ideological use of legal categories.
The current church situation comparing it with the Arian crisis – as is sometimes suggested in certain circles – means, to distort both history and ecclesiology. In the Arian crisis, the deity of the incarnate Word itself was at issue; Today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. Presenting yourself as the new Athanasius of Alexandria requires, that Rome had become Arian - a claim, which, taken seriously, logically leads to formal schism and before that to legal-theological absurdity. The argument of the emergency, applied to the unilateral decision, Consecrate bishops against the express will of the Roman Pontiff, is as unsustainable in a legal as in an ecclesiological sense, that it lacks minimal criteria of respectability. In addition, the state of emergency cannot be certified by the person themselves, who intends to carry out the act.
The communication then highlights a central theological point: the distinction between the act of belief (divine and catholic faith) and the “religious obedience of the mind and will” (cf. The light, 25). Before we continue, it is appropriate, to clarify these two terms. Under divine and catholic faith means full and irrevocable consent, which the believer gives to the truths revealed by God and finally presented as such by the Church - such as the Trinity, the incarnation or deity of Christ. To knowingly deny such a truth is to deny it, to break the community of faith.
The “religious obedience of the mind and of the will”, on the other hand, refers to those teachings, which are authentically presented by the Magisterium, although not in the form of a dogmatic definition. In these cases it is not an act of faith in the strict sense, but a real one, loyal and respectful consent, which is based on trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit towards the Magisterium of the Church. It is not just an optional opinion, which could be accepted or rejected at will, but also not an irreformable definition.
The prefect invites the brotherhood to attend with noticeable reluctance, to place itself once again within the framework of classical Catholic theology. He reminds you of that, that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of approval; However, it is also not permissible, to treat conciliar texts as freely contestable theological opinions. Interpretations, who continue to describe the Second Vatican Council as “merely pastoral.”, as if it were a meeting of inferior status compared to previous ecumenical councils, are reductionist. Such a reading is not only theologically imprecise, but ultimately empties the authority of the conciliar magisterium itself.
The Second Vatican Council did not have any new dogmas defined in a solemn form, is, however, an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. According to their nature and formulation, his teachings demand at least that religious obedience, which does not represent a purely private opinion, but a real one, although not definitive agreement. It's legit, to critically discuss certain developments of the post-conciliar period; However, these phenomena should not be identified with the Council as such. As early as the 1970s, Antonio Piolanti — a leading representative of the Roman School — warned against this from his chair at the Pontifical Lateran University, to confuse the Second Vatican Council with the so-called “Para-Council”.: These are different realities. Nevertheless, in view of these elementary theological clarifications, the tone of the Brotherhood is unfortunately as follows:
"It is possible, that the Holy See says to us: ‚Gut, we allow you, to consecrate bishops, under the condition, that you accept two things: firstly, the Second Vatican Council; secondly, the New Mass. Then we will allow you to be ordained.’ How should we react?? It's simple. We would rather die, to become modernists. We would rather die, than to renounce the full Catholic faith. We would rather die, than to replace the Mass of St. Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI.” (cf. SSPX Current).
The demand of the Dicastery is not this, every single conciliar formulation “to be believed as dogma”, but to recognize their ecclesiastical authority according to the hierarchy of truths and the degrees of approval. In other words: to study that, what you question; to understand the theological categories; to avoid ideological readings - and at the same time to recognize the seriousness of the interlocutor. The Catholic theological tradition has never been based on the caricature of the opponent, but rather on the careful analysis of his theses and the argumentative refutation of his errors. You can disagree deeply with a position, even judge them to be theologically erroneous, without the other therefore intelligence, to deny education or scientific competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend on the personal delegitimization of its proponent, but on the viability of their arguments. Only in such a climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. And this, it should be emphasized, is not a question of academic politeness, but the actual procedure of the great scholastic tradition. Just think of the structure questions of Saint Thomas Aquinas, which presents the objections in their strongest form, before giving his answer (I answer) formulated. In the Catholic tradition this does not affirm the truth, that you eliminate the opponent, but by overcoming one's arguments at the level of reason and faith.
From the superiors of the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X The systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, together with the previously adopted tone of ultimatum, does not remain at the level of polemic, but directly touches on the ecclesiological question. The most serious thing is less the threat itself than the manner in which it is delivered. To say this to the Roman Pontiff: “If you don’t give us permission, “We will still act”, represents undue pressure on the Church's highest authority. In canon law, asking for a mandate is an act of obedience; the threat, to act without a mandate, an act of rebellion. You cannot turn papal authority into a bureaucratic obstacle, that is intended to be circumvented in the name of a supposedly higher crisis perception. Church community is non-negotiable. It is not a political negotiating table, at which a measure of episcopal autonomy is negotiated.
This message shows a Holy See, that doesn't close, but invites dialogue as an opportunity for truth. It does not immediately impose sanctions, but suggests a way. It doesn't prescribe any formulas, but asks for doctrinal clarification. It is difficult, It is not possible to recognize in the attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesiastical patience combined with remarkable institutional nobility. The suggestion, to name “the minimum requirements for full community”., already represents a methodological concession: You start with the essentials, not with complete agreement on everything. Nevertheless, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is set as a temporary condition - and rightly so -, because you can't have a dialogue, when there is a gun on the table, as if the exercise of authority had to give way to preventative pressure.
Finally, there is a structural element, that without bitterness, but should be expressed with sober clarity. Some church movements require, to exist and consolidate, a permanent opponent. Your identity is formed in conflict: modernist Rome, the treacherous council, the ambiguous pope, the hostile world... If this state of permanent tension were to disappear, their own reason for existence would also falter. The logic of conflict becomes a principle that creates identity. Without conflict, identity dissolves or normalizes. The church, however, does not thrive on structural contradictions, but of hierarchical community.
If the brotherhood really strives for full communion, she has to decide, whether it wants to be a church reality or a permanent opposition with the appearance of a church. The difference is not semantic, but ontological in nature. True tradition is not polemical self-assertion, but living continuity in obedience. And obedience in Catholic ecclesiology is not servilism, but participation in the shape of the church desired by Christ.
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Padre-Ariel-foto-2025-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-13 17:32:272026-02-13 20:38:50Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernández and the Brotherhood of St. Pius X: the non-negotiable point of communion – Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Society of Saint Pius: the non-negotiable point of communion – Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Fraternity of Saint Pius: the non-negotiable point of communion – Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Society of Saint Pius X: The non-negotiable point of ecclesial community
ALBERTO RAVAGNANI READ THROUGH «BLOWIN’ IN THE WIND» DI BOB DYLAN
If we want the Church to have priests who are happy and serene in carrying out such a demanding and all-encompassing ministry, they must not be left floating in the wind, but that you respond with sincerity.
The well-known story of Alberto Ravagnani which crossed social media a few days ago, for his decision to leave the priesthood, he collected as is customary nowadays, comments and reflections of different nature and equally alternating positions: he did well, it hurt, it was time, let us pray for him.
Every choice remains profoundly human even when it has to do with realities that involve the spiritual sphere, faith, the church, It gave. Whereby, without prejudice to good conscience, must be respected, including that of Ravagnani who decides to put aside his being a Catholic priest. I asked myself, But, if there were deeper reasons behind this very striking gesture, due to Don Alberto's media exposure. Naturally, not knowing the person directly, indeed having frequented it almost nothing social, if not very rarely and out of curiosity towards the phenomenon of priests influence, I base myself on his latest releases, in which he explained some reasons for his gesture and in the book now published with the emblematic title: The choice (Who).
In a video interview (Who) Don Alberto confronts Giacomo Poretti, the well-known actor of the comic trio Aldo, John and James, which has a following podcastis that, against the other, he makes no secret of his faith. Giovanni delicately asks Alberto some questions about why he became a priest and why he has now decided to leave. Ravagnani's answers highlight how they used to be, before the conversion, occurred following a confession, he was introverted, very closed in on himself and how he then felt the desire to communicate his newfound happiness to everyone. The phrasebook is simple, it doesn't dig deep, according to a style in use among the influence, including priests, who have this need to be easily understood by everyone. So was the decision to leave, always explained with words that are far too simplistic for such a tiring choice, appears linked to his current desire for freedom which has led him to now perceive the priest's dress as tight for what he feels like doing, that is, equally bringing Jesus to young people, to the worlds that do not know him or mock him, but without the restrictions and rules imposed on those who hold the role of presbyter, who must obey the Bishop for example.
According to his words, the word "don" preceded by the first name, it would be an obstacle, because it would lead people to see the role first of all or to remember the negative examples of some priests. He confesses that he will always feel like "Don Alberto" and that probably having been a "Don" will still identify him that way in the eyes of those he meets, even if Giacomo Poretti cordially reminds him that it will always be for him: Alberto. But then Ravagnani also makes other confessions, that a 21 year old, in the seminar, when he began to dress like a priest, with the collar for example, he was happy about it, only to then realize that he had put other experiences aside, like emotional ones or a degree, to see and perceive himself only as a presbyter and as such dressed. It turns out, so, missing something and what previously identified it is no longer useful, indeed it appears to be an obstacle. The fact that a priest, now ex, can end the interview by talking about his perception of the priest as a man who must appear almost perfect in the eyes of people and therefore he, discovering instead the value of freedom with respect to this vision, now he can breathe a sigh of relief, makes you think.
In a later video (Who), done to promote his recent book, Ravagnani offers some other reasons that go deeper. He states sequentially:
«I was a good child, a good boy, a brave seminarian, a good priest, a brave father, a bravo influence, but the need to be so impeccable ended up overwhelming me. And maybe that was a good thing, because between being perfect and being true the second is much better".
Any therapist, to hear these words, would raise the antennas and ask the interested party questions that would no longer concern the choice itself to abandon the priesthood, behind which always hide judgments both of the interested party towards himself and of the users reached by such news. They would rather have to do with deeper reasons that infer the psychic reality of the person making such assertions and their personality, how it has developed over time and therefore why one should feel that they are good and perfect: compared to whom, to demonstrate what, which internal gratification or psychological position does it consolidate?
Opening his book we note that the sentence he uttered in the video is in fact the summary of the chapters that make up the writing. In the text he examines the epochal passages of his life up to this point and confesses among many other things that he has in fact turned to a therapist who is helping him to unravel the internal tangle. You can read it where one of the conversations with the specialist is reported: «I take a deep breath. But I know I have to do something. I have to have the courage to choose. For the good of the Fraternity (n.d.r: a communityanimated by him). And of the Church". «And also for his», he adds, piano. "Yup", I say after a moment, "for mine too". He remains silent for a while." (pag. 237).
Scrolling through the pages of the biography an aspect stands out that in itself would have nothing original, if it weren't for the character's notoriety. That is, the story of a young man who he carried with him throughout his adolescence, of the seminary and of the priestly ministry the psychological position of the child he implements, in a context of misunderstanding, especially family, a defense mechanism that leads him on the one hand to protect himself from the world that does not understand or welcome him as he is; on the other to consider himself better and capable of straightening out that world with his commitment and effort; shielding himself by becoming good, being perfect, show how good you are in order to be recognized.
Let's read his words arose following an outburst of violence by the father:
«I don't remember getting hurt, but I remember that I would have liked to do it to my father: obviously I had to cancel this immoral impulse. And then another ten thousand experience points for the good boy, who learns to suppress desires for revenge or anger, because he perceives those feelings as "wrong" and incompatible with being loved. That is how, year after year, the good child in me grows up to completely take over the scene of my life. Little Alberto becomes good and well-liked by everyone. At home I am obedient and never give my parents any trouble. At school I am polite and diligent, the model student praised by the teachers and always available to help my classmates. In my grandparents' town everyone tells me I'm an angel, because I'm kind, patient and imperturbable, basically an adult in a child's body. Or maybe, a child who is unable to live fully as such" (pag. 17).
The itinerary already seems well traced and where it can best be explored if not in the Church? An all-encompassing and enveloping entity, capable of enhancing the psychological mechanisms of goodness and perfection. A reality, The Other Brother, always needs improvement so why not enter right there where I can make my talent count, step by step, in a titanic effort that will then backfire on me, precisely because no one had helped me see that child who just wanted to be welcomed, understood and valued; that he could have different experiences, including mistakes, that bring a boy to maturity, until he becomes a man capable of making choices. Instead of banning yourself, to nourish a psychic position, the natural experiences of youthful life, like studying, sport, traveling and last but not least affection and sex. It comes naturally to me to say: there was no way it wouldn't end the way it did, with the abandonment of the priesthood. Because life presses with its demands, the body also screams and I am not here to underline that the only spaces of freedom that Ravagnani obtained for himself were those of autoeroticism, confessed by him in the book. So I think, that he was right in the end to make the choice he made, if this leads him to the truth of himself and to action, even in his thirties, the normal experiences that lead a young person to psychological maturity, morale, existential. Especially if you have never done them or if you have prevented them yourself due to an idea of unhealthy perfection. This is my wish for him, that he gets out of his script and lives a real life.
However, a painful question remains. How come the Church, that is, the people responsible for the training of that seminarian, later presbyter, they didn't notice all this at all? It's one thing for someone to become a good animator within an oratory, no matter how varied and engaging the Milanese ones may be, but it's another thing for a boy who is almost twenty years old to be welcomed into the seminary and brought to the priesthood without anyone ever helping him to look inside himself., so that he could become a real priest; not a good priest. And we're talking about years, not for a few days.
Ravagnani's analysis of life in the seminary, apart from the fact that he liked it and exalted it, but we also know why at this point, she is merciless. Let's also do the tare and let's also say that it comes from someone who is leaving and therefore it will inevitably be easy for him to now find out all the flaws of the case on how one gets to the priesthood and on how one lives or on the negative examples that abound. But that the Rector of a seminary - and we are talking about one of the most important dioceses in the Church -, be sure to ask a young man who enters: «Have you ever had sexual intercourse?»; while the true motivations of a boy who comes to write are never examined: «I've never tried with a girl, but with God yes. And I did it with him. I didn't ask him out, I asked him to enter the seminary" (pag. 35). Yet he speaks of multiple conversations he had with those responsible, with the spiritual father. Because this idea of self, this image of faith and God, cloaked in a Promethean search for perfection, it was never noticed? And conversely one has to ask: what kind of training is given in the seminars, what is it ultimately aimed at?
Priests leave who in one direction, some for another, there have been many and there will be many more. The church, as Francesco Guccini sang about his city of choice, Bologna, And: «An old matron, with slightly soft hips"; capable of absorbing everything and moving forward. But if these issues are not addressed, where you go? Today fewer and fewer children and young people are knocking on the doors of seminaries, but that's not the point in the end, as the story of Don Alberto reveals. Because even in those realities that are seen as the panacea for all ills, because there a few more young people arrive and ask for the dress, the strict rules and that tradition is maintained, people's intimate problems remain. Ravagnani also coveted the collar, he dressed in black, even in my underwear (his words, pag. 61), he felt like a priest to the core. Maybe something needs to be revised? Some fault admitted? Perhaps that good psychologist who pointed out to Ravagnani that good must be sought for oneself as well as for others, could have access to the seminars? Or you are afraid to find out the truth? That the king is often naked, even if he perceives himself to be true and right because he thinks he is dressed appropriately and respects the rules of the role to the full.
The questions pile up. But if we want the Church to have priests who are happy and serene in carrying out such a demanding and all-encompassing ministry, they must not be left floating in the wind, but that you respond with sincerity.
From the Hermitage, 11 February 2026
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/monaco-eremita-piccolo-.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150Hermit MonkHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngHermit Monk2026-02-11 20:58:152026-02-11 20:58:15Alberto Ravagnani read through Bob Dylan's «Blowin' in the wind».
HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Padre-Ivano-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150Father IvanoHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngFather Ivano2026-02-10 20:14:162026-02-10 20:45:15The case “Don Rava”: between those who are guilty and those who are innocent and that symptom of an ecclesial malaise that we still don't want to recognize
THE ATTORNEYS OF ITACA AND THE EPIC OF THE ENFORCEMENT THAT CANNOT BE SILENT
The only ones Sfranta never gets angry with are the suitors, we remember are the approximately one hundred nobles of Ithaca who in Homer's Odyssey insistently court Penelope during the absence of Ulysses, but that in the modern version clerical-rainbow instead they court Odysseus and ignore Penelope altogether.
—Hypatia's cogitatory—
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Author Hypatia Gatta Roman
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Let lobby clerical-rainbowit is preserved by avoiding direct exposure. He doesn't act openly, does not take responsibility for the most controversial decisions. He prefers to operate through third parties, using subjects that act as a screen, by performers, from expendable tools. They are the classics straw men they useful idiots: figures in charge of doing what the lobbyists decide, once the illusion of counting has been instilled in them, of belonging to the clerical power and of being able to gain some recognition from it. Here is a sample of what was just said in the image below:
Photo: graphic composition containing textual extracts reproduced without indication of author or source, as in Sfranta’s style.
In the clerical world, these subjects are often clericalized lay people who enjoy, just as such, of an operational freedom that others cannot afford. They are the ones who intervene where i clerics-rainbowthey do not intend - or cannot - expose themselves directly: they delegitimize, they offend, they report, they accuse, they give rise to proceedings without real foundation, aware that they will not produce any concrete results. What matters is not winning, but carry out disruptive actions, intimidate. This is the goal.
They act convinced that they matter and to have weight within the clerical power structure; in reality they are used precisely because they are replaceable, exposed and expendable. Reduced to mere executive tools, they are destined to absorb the brunt of the darkest deeds, those with whom i clerical-rainbowthose who pilot them do not intend to get their hands dirty. They think they're leading, while in reality they are direct, in the manner of the worst subordinate servants.
This mode of action is not episodic, but structural. I clerics-rainbowthus maintaining a safe distance: they don't sign, they don't speak, they do not appear. It is always the one who exposes himselfuseful idiot, to whom the dirty work is entrusted. It is the same mechanism that is found in every organization that intends to exercise control without openly assuming the moral and legal weight. Responsibility remains invisible; the action, instead, it is very concrete.
Alongside this first category, a second one emerges, more aggressive and dangerous: the one that the late Paolo Poliused to call, with unrivaled theatrical precision, the “sfrante”.
Clericalized to maximum power and characterized by bitter militancy, vindictive and sometimes openly violent on a relational level, the Sfranta, instead of building a dignified present for a mature future, he prefers to spend his days attacking his own social whoever decides on the spot: today the members of the National Association of Magistrates defined by her as "the worst of criminals" as well as "para-mafia association", tomorrow the Minister of Justice accused of being "colluded" and "clown", follows a well-known magistrate referred to as a "convict" and "more criminal than all the others", the day after tomorrow he throws flames on the members of a dicastery of the Holy See indicated as "illiterates" and "idiots", the President of the Journalists' Association defined as a "vulgar longshoreman", one of the most famous Italian journalists and television hosts branded as "the most vomiting" and "repressed bully", to follow up with the plumbers, the mechanics, unisex hairdressers … no one is saved from the Sfranta.
etc… etc …
The only ones Sfranta never gets angry with are the pass, that we remember are the approximately one hundred nobles of Ithaca who in’Homer's Odysseythey persistently court Penelope during Ulysses' absence, but that in the modern version clerical-rainbow instead they court Odysseus and ignore Penelope altogether.
Amazing reports follow in a cascade: exposed to the Order of Psychologists against one of the most famous Italian criminologists; threats of a lawsuit against a diocese that dared to officially deny the Sfranta with a public statement from the curia after it had repeatedly offended the bishop in various articles; invitations to sign an official protest to remove from the chair a theologian of recognized preparation and undeniable teaching qualities …
The Sfranta does not limit itself to acting as a passive instrument of the system, but she becomes an active actress, driven by the frenetic objective of clearing customs and legitimizing the fantastic rainbow worldinside the church. And if anyone opposes the entry of this Rainbow Trojan Horsewithin the walls of City of God, the accusation is ready and the critic branded as an "affectively unresolved subject". La Sfranta acts as a true vanguard of the system: he says and writes, via blog and social media, what certain clerical-rainbowthey cannot afford to state publicly; it strikes those whom the latter cannot attack directly; exerts constant pressure through accusations, insinuations, reports to the ecclesiastical authorities, letters, exposed, delegitimization campaigns. But be careful not to deny it, or to react to his barrages of insults, is never! Right there and then he immediately proclaims himself a victim, shouting about discrimination, according to the now known and consolidated schemes of Sfranta’s logic.
The “strength” of the Sfranta lies in the almost total absence of constraints. It does not answer to any ecclesiastical authority, does not risk canonical sanctions, does not pay any institutional price. He acts, de facto, in a gray area of substantial impunity, which renders any attempt at a proportionate legal reaction ineffective. For this reason it is very useful to certain groups of people clerical-rainbow who use it while maintaining an apparently neutral position: because she is the one who exposes herself, to talk, to write, to report; the puppeteers remain in total anonymity.
I clerical-rainbow that govern this system they rarely appear on the front lines. They observe, they protect, they orient, leaving it up to Sfranta to act and put her face to it, in a desperate attempt to delegitimize priests and theologians hostile to this Rainbow Pious Brotherhood. It is in this context that a Sfranta without any formal mandate turns into a promoter of "reports" motivated by an alleged zeal for the good of the Church. In addition to his writings, he also releases videos in which he sighs, she sobs and indulges in little moves that recall the satirist's less gifted sister Rita da Cascia played by the aforementioned great Paolo Poli.
No explicit accusation, no concrete evidence: just allusions, suspicious, sentences dropped with apparent discretion, in the hope that, by dint of repeating blatant falsehoods that are repeatedly denied as such, these end up being perceived as true, finally passing as such.
It is within this opaque environment that the Rainbow Pious Brotherhoodfinds the ideal conditions to consolidate and reproduce, remaining anonymous and sending a Sfranta who walks a tightrope on the attack, uttering insults and making bold allusions to behaviors that are indicated as criminally relevant without ever openly naming the targeted person, but making everyone understand who this unnamed person is, soon after, he begins to receive numerous messages from readers and friends who warn him «the Sfranta has taken it out on you again».
In this sense,, Sfranta has set a precedent. So much so that I decided to imitate it with the exact same technique: I didn't mention her, just like she doesn't name, often, those he heavily targets.
And now I say goodbye, I have to rush to assist Penelope, deeply depressed since i suitors of Ithaca they started waving the flag rainbowand to woo Ulysses while totally ignoring her. Even the suitors of Ithaca have now done an honest thing coming-out, or as Saint Augustine said in one of his famous sermons: «I can not remain silent (I can't keep silent)» (Sermon. 88, 14, 13, PL). Like this, they decided to do not be silent (don't be silent) and to openly court Ulysses.
From the Isle of Proci, 8 February 2026
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