Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple sandwich with mortadella than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros a kilo. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has transformed. Abstinence remains a sign, but the sign risks becoming empty if its profound meaning is not understood.
Not out of biting Florentine irony, but truth: I have sometimes wondered, with sincere curiosity - what Lenten penances can be proposed to vegetarians and vegans if they don't already eat meat themselves. Maybe abstinence from soy? Or from the organic salad? The question can make you smile, but it hides another one, much more serious: what it really means to do penance?
Abstinence from meat it does not arise from an ecclesiastical dietetics nor from an ancient theological distrust towards steak. It has its roots in an ascetic tradition that has always understood the symbolic and pedagogical value of food. In ancient societies, meat was not an ordinary food, but a sign of celebration, of abundance, of joy. Giving it up meant voluntarily taking away what was perceived as precious. It wasn't about mortifying the body, but to educate desire.
The Church has safeguarded this discipline not as an end in itself, but as a concrete sign of an interior attitude: the conversion. As Saint Leo the Great remembered, «Lenten fasting does not only consist of abstinence from food, but above all in moving away from sin" (The word is39, 2). Christian penance has never been a punitive exercise, but a path of freedom. You give up something lawful to remind yourself that not everything that is lawful is necessary, and that happiness does not depend on possession but on the order of the heart.
With the changing times, however, perceptions also change. Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple sandwich with mortadella than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros a kilo. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has transformed. Abstinence remains a sign, but the sign risks becoming empty if its profound meaning is not understood.
The point is not the meat: it is freedom. Penance does not consist in changing the menu, but in changing size. It is not deprivation as an end in itself, nor an exercise in ascetic voluntarism. It is an orderly renunciation of a good to acquire a greater good. It is taking something away from consumption to return it to faith, to hope and charity. Because «where is your treasure, your heart will also be there" (Mt 6,21): penance moves the treasure to reorient the heart. And maybe, in our time, the most difficult penances do not necessarily pass by the plate. Giving up steak can be relatively simple; giving up the screen on for hours can be much less. Turn off your phone, limit the use of social media, avoid entertainment as an end in itself, preserve silence in a world that lives on continuous noise: these are deprivations that touch raw nerves.
For most, it's harder to refrain from notifications and comments that gives a bloody Florentine steak. but yet, if penance has the aim of educating desire and strengthening inner freedom, that's exactly where the challenge takes place. Saint Paul expressed it with athletic images:
«I treat my body harshly and reduce it to slavery, because when you, after preaching to others, I myself will be disqualified" (1 Color 9,27).
The Pauline one is not contempt for the body, but discipline of freedom. Christian penance is not impoverishment, but an investment. It does not produce sterility, but fruitfulness. Giving up something for the love of God means creating space for God to act. It is a gesture that reduces the superfluous to bring out the essential. And the essential, for the Christian, it is not the sacrifice itself, but communion with Christ.
Lent is precisely this: a penitential journey that culminates in Holy Week and opens to the joy of the Resurrection. It is not a period of ritual sadness, but a time of preparation. We cross the desert to reach Easter. We give up something temporary to remind ourselves that we are destined for the eternal.
Abstinence from meat, At that time, it is not a disciplinary relic nor a food formalism. It's a sign. And like every sign, asks to be understood. If it remains an external gesture, it is reduced to empty practice. If it becomes a conscious act, it turns into a school of freedom. Whether it's meat, of screens or other ingrained habits, the question remains the same: I am the master of my desires or I am governed by them? Penance serves to answer this question with a concrete act. Because true mortification is not giving up what costs us nothing, but learning to say "no" to what dominates us, to be able to say a greater “yes” to God. And that "yes" does not end in forty days. It is the anticipation of an Easter that will never end.
Florence, 23 February 2026
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HOW EASY IS ABSTINENCE FROM MEAT AS A PENITENTIAL PRACTICE
Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros per kilogram. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence remains a sign, yet the sign risks becoming empty if it is not understood in its deeper meaning.
— Liturgical pastoral —
.
Author Simone Pifizzi
.
Not out of sharp Florentine irony, but in truth: at times I have wondered, with sincere curiosity, what Lenten penances might be proposed to vegetarians and vegans if they already do not eat meat. Perhaps abstinence from soy? Or from organic salad? The question may provoke a smile, but it conceals another, far more serious one: what does it truly mean to do penance?
Abstinence from meat does not arise from ecclesiastical dietetics nor from some ancient theological suspicion toward steak. It is rooted in an ascetical tradition that has always understood the symbolic and pedagogical value of food. In ancient societies, meat was not an ordinary food but a sign of celebration, abundance, and joy. To renounce it meant voluntarily refraining from what was perceived as precious. It was not about mortifying the body, but about educating desire.
The Church has preserved this discipline not as an end in itself, but as a concrete sign of an interior disposition: conversion. As Saint Leo the Great recalled, “Lenten fasting does not consist only in abstinence from food, but above all in turning away from sin” (The word is39, 2). Christian penance has never been a punitive exercise, but a path to freedom. One renounces something lawful in order to remind oneself that not everything lawful is necessary, and that happiness does not depend on possession but on the order of the heart.
With the passing of time, however, perceptions also change. Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass costing eighty euros per kilogram. Not because ecclesial discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence remains a sign, yet the sign risks becoming empty if it is not understood in its deeper meaning.
The point is not meat; it is freedom. Penance does not consist in changing the menu, but in changing the measure. It is not deprivation for its own sake, nor an exercise in ascetical voluntarism. It is an ordered renunciation of a good in order to acquire a greater good. It is withdrawing something from consumption in order to restore it to faith, hope, and charity. For “where your treasure is, there your heart will be also” (Mt 6:21): penance shifts the treasure so as to reorient the heart. And perhaps, in our own time, the more difficult penances do not necessarily pass through the plate. Renouncing a steak may prove relatively simple; renouncing a screen left on for hours may be far more difficult. Turning off the phone, limiting the use of social media, abstaining from entertainment for its own sake, preserving silence in a world that lives in constant noise: these are privations that touch exposed nerves.
For many — perhaps for most — it is more arduous to abstain from notifications and comments than from a rare Florentine steak. Yet if penance aims to educate desire and strengthen interior freedom, it is precisely there that the challenge lies. Saint Paul expressed it with athletic imagery:
“I discipline my body and keep it under control, lest after preaching to others I myself should be disqualified” (1 Color 9:27).
Paul’s words do not express contempt for the body, but discipline of freedom. Christian penance is not impoverishment, but investment. It does not produce sterility, but fruitfulness. To renounce something for love of God means creating space for God to act. It is a gesture that reduces the superfluous in order to bring forth the essential. And for the Christian, the essential is not sacrifice in itself, but communion with Christ.
Lent is precisely this: a penitential journey that culminates in Holy Week and opens onto the joy of the Resurrection. It is not a season of ritual sadness, but a time of preparation. One crosses the desert in order to reach Easter. One renounces something temporary in order to remember that we are destined for eternity.
Abstinence from meat, then, is neither a disciplinary relic nor a dietary formalism. It is a sign. And like every sign, it asks to be understood. If it remains an exterior gesture, it becomes an empty practice. If it becomes a conscious act, it turns into a school of freedom. Whether it concerns meat, screens, or other entrenched habits, the question remains the same: am I master of my desires, or am I governed by them? Penance helps us answer that question with a concrete act. For true mortification is not renouncing what costs us nothing, but learning to say “no” to what dominates us, in order to say a greater “yes” to God. And that “yes” does not end after forty days. It is the anticipation of an Easter that will know no sunset.
Florence, 23 February 2026
.
HOW EASY IS ABSTINENCE FROM MEAT AS PENANCE
Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass that costs eighty euros per kilo. Not because church discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence is still a sign, but the sign runs the risk of becoming empty if it is not understood in its deepest meaning.
— Liturgical pastoral care —
.
Author Simone Pifizzi
.
Not because of sharp Florentine irony, but in truth: sometimes I have wondered, with sincere curiosity, What Lenten penances can be proposed to vegetarians and vegans if they do not already eat meat?. Maybe soy withdrawal? Or organic salad? The question can bring a smile, but it contains another much more serious: What does it really mean to do penance??
Abstinence from meat is not born from an ecclesiastical diet nor from an ancient theological distrust of steak. It has its roots in an ascetic tradition that has always understood the symbolic and pedagogical value of food. In ancient societies, meat was not an ordinary food, but a party sign, of abundance and joy. Giving it up meant voluntarily withdrawing from what was perceived as precious.. It was not about mortifying the body, but to educate the desire.
The Church has preserved this discipline not as an end in itself, but as a concrete sign of an inner disposition: the conversion. As Saint Leo the Great remembered, «Lenten fasting does not consist only of abstinence from food, but above all in turning away from sin." (The word is39, 2). Christian penance has never been a punitive exercise, but a path of freedom. You give up something lawful to remind yourself that not everything lawful is necessary., and that happiness does not depend on possession, but of the order of the heart.
With the passage of time, however, perceptions also change. Today it may be more penitential to eat a simple mortadella sandwich than to order a sea bass that costs eighty euros per kilo. Not because church discipline has become obsolete, but because social reality has changed. Abstinence is still a sign, but the sign runs the risk of becoming empty if it is not understood in its deepest meaning.
The point is not the meat: it's freedom. Penance is not about changing the menu, but in changing the measurement. It is not deprivation in and of itself., nor exercise of ascetic voluntarism. It is an ordered renunciation of a good to acquire a greater good.. It is subtracting something from consumption to return it to faith, to hope and charity. Because "where is your treasure?", "Your heart will also be there." (Mt 6,21): Penance moves the treasure to reorient the heart. and maybe, in our time, the most difficult penances do not necessarily go through the plate. Giving up steak can be relatively easy; Giving up a screen on for hours can be much more difficult. Turn off the phone, limit the use of social networks, refrain from empty entertainment, guarding silence in a world that lives in constant noise: These are deprivations that touch sensitive nerves.
For many — perhaps most — It is more difficult to abstain from notifications and comments than from a good Florentine steak. However, If penitence aims to educate desire and strengthen inner freedom, It is precisely there where the challenge is played. Saint Paul expressed it with athletic images:
«I punish my body and enslave it, lest, having preached to others, "I myself was disqualified." (1 Color 9,27).
The Pauline is not contempt for the body, but discipline of freedom. Christian penance is not impoverishment, but investment. Does not produce sterility, but fertility. Giving up something for the love of God means creating space for God to act.. It is a gesture that reduces the superfluous to bring out the essential. and the essential, for the christian, it is not the sacrifice itself, but communion with Christ.
Lent is precisely this: a penitential path that culminates in Holy Week and opens to the joy of the Resurrection. It is not a period of ritual sadness, but a time of preparation. You cross the desert to reach Easter. Something temporary is given up to remember that we are destined for eternity.
Abstinence from meat, so, It is not a disciplinary relic nor a dietary formalism. It's a sign. And like every sign, asks to be understood. If it remains an external gesture, is reduced to an empty practice. If it becomes a conscious act, becomes a school of freedom. Whether it's meat, of screens or other ingrained customs, the question remains the same: Am I master of my desires or am I governed by them?? Penance serves to answer that question with a concrete act. Because true mortification is not giving up what costs us nothing, but learning to say “no” to that which dominates us, to be able to say a bigger “yes” to God. And that “yes” is not exhausted in forty days. It is the preview of an Easter that will never end..
Florence, 23 February 2026
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CONSCIENCE IS NOT A COUNCIL. THE FRATERNITY OF SAINT PIUS
One can remain in full communion by rejecting outright the authority of an Ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Certainly not due to rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretative option.
In the article on the meeting between Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the recently published Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius (see who) we have indicated what constitutes the non-negotiable point of the issue: ecclesial communion is not a feeling nor a self-declaration, but an objective fact based on the recognition of the authority of the Church.
The official letter from the Rev. Davide Pagliarani, Superior General of the Fraternity (see full text, who), repeats exactly the issue that we highlighted in that previous article: not a simple interpretative divergence, but a claim to redefine the very criteria of communion from within. In fact, the Fraternity speaks of a "case of conscience". It would not be, so, question of disciplinary dissent, but of fidelity to Tradition against alleged conciliar deviations. And here we must immediately stop, because we are not faced with a problem of liturgical sensitivity or theological accents, but rather to a structural issue: who judges who in the Church?
Let's start by clarifying a point that does not allow for ambiguity: conscience is not a higher instance than the Magisterium. Catholic doctrine is unequivocal. The authentic Magisterium of the bishops in communion with the Roman Pontiff "requires the religious obsequiousness of the will and intellect" (The light, 25). This is not a psychological option, but of an ecclesial duty that belongs to the very structure of faith. Conscience, in the Catholic tradition, it is not an autonomous source of truth, but a practical judgment that must be formed in the light of objective truth. If conscience is invoked against the Magisterium, the very order of faith is altered and the hierarchy of sources is overturned.
It's here, incidentally — without indulging in gratuitous polemical spirit, but for simple intellectual honesty - it is necessary to observe an element that cannot go unnoticed. For over four decades the environments of this Fraternity have proudly claimed to train their priests according to the most solid principles of logic, of classical scholasticism and Thomism. That's a really challenging statement. However, to the test of the texts and argumentative constructions that are proposed, it is not easy to trace that rational solidity that is proclaimed. In fact, confusing some manual formulas of decadent neo-scholasticism with Aristotelian logic, or with the great speculations of Saint Anselm of Aosta and Saint Thomas Aquinas, it means reducing a very high-level philosophical-theological tradition to a repetitive pattern. Logic is not a password, but rigor in proceeding, internal coherence, respect for the principles of non-contradiction and identity.
When conscience is erected as a superior tribunal with respect to the Magisterium e, at the same time, loyalty to scholasticism is invoked, we fall into an evident methodological contradiction, not to mention gross: we claim to defend the order of reason while undermining it at its roots. It is therefore not a question of theological schools, but of basic coherence. Saint Anselm never opposed his conscience to the authority of the Church; nor did St. Thomas ever build an alternative system to the Magisterium. Their greatness consisted precisely in harmonizing reason and faith within the ecclesial order, not in replacing it. And this is not an abstract statement. None of the great Doctors of the Church would ever have allowed themselves to oppose - even more so with aggressive tones - the ecclesiastical Authority for having clarified and established that the title of "co-redemptrix" cannot be attributed to the Virgin Mary (cf.. Mother of the Faithful People, 17). It can be argued theologically, can be explored further, it can be specified. But to oppose one's position to the legitimate authority of the Church as if it were an abuse to be corrected means crossing a limit that would horrify all the great masters of the scholastic tradition..
If today we intend to invoke Aosta and Aquinas, let it be done with the same intellectual discipline that these two Doctors demanded. Because praising logic while introducing a principle of subjective judgment that claims to evaluate an Ecumenical Council is not an act of fidelity to scholasticism, but a rhetorical operation that does not stand up to rational analysis. The Second Vatican Council states that the authentic interpretation of the Word of God "is entrusted to the living Magisterium of the Church alone" (God's word, 10). Not to the individual, not to a group, not to a Priestly Fraternity.
One further element must be observed: it is not uncommon for theologians of the so-called to be dismissed as "modernist heretics" in certain circles New Theology. It's a convenient simplification, but intellectually fragile. That there are problems in those currents is beyond question, just as there have been in the history of theology in almost all the great authors, including Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church. St. Augustine, converted, baptized and already bishop, he had to work quite a bit on himself to purify residues of Manichaeism; and nobody, because of this, denies his greatness. But let's also take the names that in certain circles are presented as the most dangerous of the theologians of the twentieth century: Karl Rahner and Hans Küng. We can — and in some cases we should — criticize Rahner. One can also radically disagree, but to think that the teaching staff of the Ecône Seminary could have supported a high-level theological discussion, conducted on the terrain of classical Thomism and great scholasticism, with a mind of vast culture like that of Hans Küng, it really means giving in to an overestimation that has no basis in reality.
Incidentally, a personal memory:Brunero Gherardini, theologian certainly not suspected of being pro-modernism, defined Leonard Boff as "one of the most brilliant ecclesiologists of the twentieth century". One may not agree with his conclusions, but to deny his intellectual stature would simply be to deny the evidence. What is at stake here is not adherence to the theses of these authors but a principle of intellectual honesty. Controversy does not replace argumentation nor does label replace refutation. The proclamation of orthodoxy is not equivalent to rational solidity. If scholasticism is invoked, really practice it: with logical rigor, with distinction of floors, with respect for ecclesial authority and with that discipline of reason that does not fear confrontation, but he faces it without caricature.
When it is declared that the Council and the post-conciliar Magisterium they would be breaking with Tradition and that such judgment would derive from an obligation of conscience, a leap is made that is not theological but structurally arbitrary: one attributes to one's conscience the power to review the authority that Christ established to safeguard the faith. That's the point, It's not a question of good or bad faith, but of an ecclesial order.
Placing Tradition against Magisterium it is an impossible construction, illogical. Yet the Fraternity speaks of fidelity to Tradition against the "fundamental orientations" of the Council, a contrast that is in and of itself theologically unsustainable. Tradition is not an archaeological deposit to be contrasted with the living Magisterium. It is the living transmission of the faith under the guidance of apostolic authority. The Council of Trent already taught that revelation is contained «in written books and unwritten traditions» (DS 1501), but always preserved and interpreted by the Church. Separating Tradition from the authority that safeguards it means transforming it into an ideological and illogical principle.
Theologian Joseph Ratzinger, well before becoming Pontiff, he remembered that Tradition is not an immobile block, but a living reality that grows in the understanding of faith, without breaking but also without fossilization. In particular, in the famous speech to the Roman Curia of 22 December 2005, he spoke of "hermeneutics of reform in the continuity of the single subject-Church" as opposed to a "hermeneutics of discontinuity and rupture" (in Speech to the Roman Curia, 22 December 2005). Rejecting an Ecumenical Council as such is not an exercise in discernment; it is the denial of an act of the universal Magisterium. A hermeneutic can be discussed, but authority cannot be suspended.
The letter from the Rev. Davide Pagliarani expresses availability for a theological comparison, but at the same time contests the conditions set by the competent authority by staging a form of dialogue that denies the hierarchical principle. And here the problem is not diplomatic, it's logical again. An ecclesial dialogue takes place within a hierarchical structure. If the legitimacy of those who convene and direct the discussion is not recognised, dialogue becomes a confrontation between equals that does not exist in the constitution of the Church, which is not a federation of autonomous interpretations but an ordered body. Demanding dialogue without recognizing the authority that establishes the criteria is equivalent to asking for recognition while maintaining one's own regulatory self-sufficiency.
In the previous article we wrote that communion is not a negotiable point (see who). We reiterate it, specifying what ecclesial communion implies: the recognition of the Roman Pontiff, of the Magisterium of the bishops in communion with him and the acceptance of the ecumenical Councils as acts of the universal Magisterium. It is not enough to declare yourself Catholic, because to be one it is necessary to accept the Catholic order. It is therefore easy to say: when a group exercises the sacred ministry, train the clergy, administers the Sacraments e, at the same time, suspends membership in an Ecumenical Council and in the subsequent Magisterium, an objective tension is created that cannot be normalized with rhetorical formulas. Communion is not self-definable, nor can it be reduced to self-certification; it is mutual recognition within a hierarchical order received from Christ. And it then comes naturally to ask whether some zealous followers of Aristotelian logic, who also declare that they base their school education on it, have not sometimes confused Aristotle with the sophists. Because classical logic is based on the principle of non-contradiction; sophistication, instead, on the art of making sustainable what remains contradictory.
The most problematic core it then lies in the risk of self-authorization. When one's ecclesial identity is built on the systematic contestation of authority, you enter into a dynamic that, historically, it has always produced fractures. It's not about accusing, but to note the structure that the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius. If in fact the ultimate criterion becomes: “our conscience judges the Council”, then the hierarchy of sources is totally overturned through what the Greeks called παράδοξος, from which the term paradox derives.
The Church is not founded on individual conscience, but on apostolic authority. Conscience is called to obey the truth guarded by the Church, not to replace it. The question, so, it's not whether there are questionable aspects in the post-conciliar period. The Church has always known tensions, clarifications, developments, starting from the First Council of Nicaea, which was not sufficient to draft the Symbol of Faith entirely, to the point that the subsequent First Council of Constantinople had to intervene, so that, the I believe, It is certainly not called the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Symbol by chance (see my latest work, who). The question is another: one can remain in full communion by rejecting outright the authority of an Ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Certainly not due to rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretative option.
This Fraternity it was dedicated by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to Saint Pius, the same Pontiff who condemned the modernists for maintaining that «the authority of the Church, whether he teaches or governs, must be submitted to the judgment of private conscience"; but like this, he warned, «the order established by God is overturned» (Feeding of Dominic's Sheep, 8 September 1907). Paradoxically, It is precisely here that the irony of the story is consummated: the most insidious modernists are not those who declare themselves as such, but those who, while condemning modernism, they assume the methodological principle, elevating one's conscience to the criterion of judgment of ecclesial authority.
CONSCIENCE IS NOT A COUNCIL. THE SOCIETY OF SAINT PIUS X AND THE SOPHISM OF SELF-AUTHORIZATION
Can one remain in full communion while rejecting wholesale the authority of an Ecumenical Council and of the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Not out of rigidity, but out of coherence. Subjective conscience is not a Council, and communion is not an interpretative option.
In the recent article on the relationship between Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Society of Saint Pius X (see here), we indicated what constitutes the non-negotiable point of the matter: ecclesial communion is neither a sentiment nor a self-declaration, but an objective reality grounded in the recognition of the Church’s authority.
The official letter of Rev. Davide Pagliarani, Superior General of the Fraternitas (full text, here), reproposes precisely the very knot we had highlighted in that previous article: not a simple interpretative divergence, but a claim to redefine from within the very criteria of communion itself. The Society speaks, in fact, of a «case of conscience». It would therefore not be a matter of disciplinary dissent, but of fidelity to Tradition against alleged conciliar deviations. And here one must pause immediately, for we are not facing a question of liturgical sensitivity or theological nuances, but a structural issue: who judges whom in the Church?
Let us begin by clarifying a point that admits of no ambiguity: conscience is not an instance superior to the Magisterium. Catholic doctrine is unequivocal. The authentic Magisterium of the bishops in communion with the Roman Pontiff «requires religious submission of will and intellect» (The light, 25). This is not a psychological option, but an ecclesial duty belonging to the very structure of faith. Conscience, in the Catholic tradition, is not an autonomous source of truth, but a practical judgment that must be formed in the light of objective truth. If conscience is invoked against the Magisterium, the very order of faith is altered and the hierarchy of sources overturned.
And here, by way of aside — without indulging in gratuitous polemics, but out of simple intellectual honesty — one must observe an element that cannot pass unnoticed. For more than four decades the circles of this Society have proudly claimed to form their priests according to the most solid principles of logic, classical scholasticism, and Thomism. It is a demanding claim indeed. Yet, when tested against the texts and argumentative constructions proposed, it is not easy to discern the rational solidity that is proclaimed. To confuse certain manualistic formulas of a decadent neo-scholasticism with Aristotelian logic, or with the great speculative syntheses of Saint Anselm of Aosta and Saint Thomas Aquinas, is to reduce a philosophical-theological tradition of the highest order to a repetitive schema. Logic is not a slogan, but rigor in reasoning, internal coherence, and respect for the principles of non-contradiction and identity.
When conscience is erected as a tribunal superior to the Magisterium and, at the same time, fidelity to scholasticism is invoked, one falls into an evident — not to say gross — methodological contradiction: one claims to defend the order of reason while undermining it at its root. This is therefore not a matter of theological schools, but of elementary coherence. Saint Anselm never opposed his own conscience to the authority of the Church; nor did Saint Thomas ever construct a system alternative to the Magisterium. Their greatness consisted precisely in harmonizing reason and faith within the ecclesial order, not in substituting themselves for it. Nor is this an abstract affirmation. None of the great Doctors of the Church would ever have presumed to oppose — all the more so with aggressive tones — ecclesiastical Authority for having clarified and established that the title «co-redemptrix» cannot be attributed to the Virgin Mary (cf. Mother of the Faithful People, 17). One may discuss theologically, one may deepen and refine; but to oppose one’s own position to the legitimate authority of the Church as though correcting an abuse is to cross a boundary that would have appalled all the great masters of the scholastic tradition.
If today one wishes to invoke the Aostan and the Angelic Doctor, let it be done with the same intellectual discipline those two Doctors demanded. For to extol logic while introducing a subjective principle of judgment that claims to evaluate an Ecumenical Council is not an act of fidelity to scholasticism, but a rhetorical operation that does not withstand rational analysis. The Second Vatican Council affirms that the authentic interpretation of the Word of God «has been entrusted to the living Magisterium of the Church alone» (God's word, 10). Not to the individual, not to a group, not to a Priestly Society.
And again, by way of aside — but in earnest — another element must be noted. It is not uncommon in certain circles to dismiss the theologians of the so-called Nouvelle Théologie as «modernist heretics». Such simplification is convenient, but intellectually fragile. That problematic elements may be found in those currents is beyond dispute, just as they have been present throughout the history of theology in nearly all the great authors, including the Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Saint Augustine, converted, baptized, and already a bishop, had to labor considerably upon himself to purge residual Manichaean tendencies; yet no one, for that reason, denies his greatness. Let us take, however, the names that in certain environments are presented as the most dangerous among twentieth-century theologians: Karl Rahner and Hans Küng. One may — and in certain cases must — criticize Rahner. One may also dissent radically; but to imagine that the faculty of the Seminary of Ecône could have sustained a high-level theological confrontation, conducted on the terrain of classical Thomism and the great scholastic tradition, with a mind of the vast culture of Hans Küng, is truly to indulge in an overestimation that finds no support in reality.
By way of personal recollection: Brunero Gherardini, a theologian certainly not suspect of modernist leanings, described Leonard Boff as «one of the most brilliant ecclesiologists of the twentieth century». One may disagree with his conclusions, but to deny his intellectual stature would simply be to deny the evidence. What is at stake here is not adherence to the theses of these authors, but a principle of intellectual honesty. Polemic does not replace argument, nor does labeling replace refutation. The proclamation of orthodoxy does not equate to rational solidity. If scholasticism is invoked, let it be practiced truly: with logical rigor, distinction of levels, respect for ecclesial authority, and that discipline of reason which does not fear confrontation, but engages it without caricature.
When it is declared that the Council and the post-conciliar Magisterium stand in rupture with Tradition, and that such judgment derives from an obligation of conscience, a leap is made that is not theological but structurally arbitrary: one attributes to one’s own conscience the power to sit in judgment over the authority that Christ constituted to safeguard the faith. This is the point. It is not a matter of good or bad faith, but of ecclesial order.
To set Tradition against the Magisterium is an impossible and illogical construction. Yet the Society speaks of fidelity to Tradition against the “fundamental orientations” of the Council — a contrast that is in itself and of itself theologically untenable. Tradition is not an archaeological deposit to be set against the living Magisterium. It is the living transmission of the faith under the guidance of apostolic authority. The Council of Trent already taught that revelation is contained «in written books and unwritten traditions» (DS 1501), yet always safeguarded and interpreted by the Church. To separate Tradition from the authority that guards it is to transform it into an ideological and illogical principle.
The theologian Joseph Ratzinger, long before becoming Pontiff, recalled that Tradition is not an immobile block, but a living reality that grows in the understanding of the faith, without rupture yet without fossilization. In his well-known address to the Roman Curia of 22 December 2005, he spoke of an «hermeneutic of reform in continuity of the one subject-Church» as opposed to an «hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture» (Address to the Roman Curia, 22 December 2005). To reject an Ecumenical Council as such is not an exercise of discernment; it is the denial of an act of the universal Magisterium. One may debate an hermeneutic, but one may not suspend authority.
The letter of Rev. Davide Pagliarani expresses willingness for theological dialogue, yet at the same time contests the conditions set by the competent authority, thereby staging a form of dialogue that denies the hierarchical principle. And here the problem is not diplomatic; it is once again logical. Ecclesial dialogue takes place within a hierarchical structure. If the legitimacy of those who convoke and guide the discussion is not recognized, dialogue becomes a confrontation among equals — something that does not exist in the constitution of the Church, which is not a federation of autonomous interpretations but an ordered body. To demand dialogue without recognizing the authority that establishes its criteria amounts to seeking recognition while maintaining one’s own normative self-sufficiency.
In the previous article we wrote that communion is not a negotiable point (see here). We reiterate this, specifying that ecclesial communion implies: recognition of the Roman Pontiff, of the Magisterium of the bishops in communion with him, and acceptance of the Ecumenical Councils as acts of the universal Magisterium. It is not enough to declare oneself Catholic; to be so, one must accept the Catholic order. It follows, then, that when a group exercises sacred ministry, forms clergy, administers the sacraments and, at the same time, suspends adherence to an Ecumenical Council and to the subsequent Magisterium, an objective tension arises that cannot be normalized by rhetorical formulas. Communion is not self-definable, nor can it be reduced to self-certification; it is reciprocal recognition within a hierarchical order received from Christ. One is then led to wonder whether certain zealous cultivators of Aristotelian logic, who declare that they ground their formation upon it, may at times have confused Aristotle with the sophists. For classical logic rests upon the principle of non-contradiction; sophistry, by contrast, upon the art of rendering sustainable what remains contradictory.
The most problematic nucleus lies in the risk of self-authorization. When one’s ecclesial identity is constructed upon systematic contestation of authority, one enters into a dynamic that historically has always produced fractures. This is not an accusation, but an observation of structure — the structure the Society of Saint Pius X has given itself. If the ultimate criterion becomes: “our conscience judges the Council,” then the hierarchy of sources is entirely overturned through what the Greeks called παράδοξος, from which the term “paradox” derives.
The Church is not founded upon individual conscience, but upon apostolic authority. Conscience is called to obey the truth safeguarded by the Church, not to replace it. The issue, therefore, is not whether there may be debatable aspects in the post-conciliar period. The Church has always known tensions, clarifications, developments — beginning with the First Council of Nicaea, which was not sufficient to formulate the Symbol of Faith in its entirety, so that the subsequent First Council of Constantinople had to intervene; hence the Creed is not by chance called the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol (see my latest work, here). The issue is another: can one remain in full communion while rejecting wholesale the authority of an Ecumenical Council and of the subsequent Magisterium? The Catholic answer is no. Not out of rigidity, but out of coherence. Subjective conscience is not a Council, and communion is not an interpretative option.
This Society was dedicated by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to Saint Pius X, the same Pontiff who condemned the modernists for maintaining that «the authority of the Church, whether teaching or governing, must be subjected to the judgment of private conscience»; yet thus, he warned, «the order established by God is overthrown» (Feeding of Dominic's Sheep, 8 September 1907). Paradoxically, it is precisely here that the irony of history unfolds: the most insidious modernists are not those who declare themselves such, but those who, while condemning modernism, unconsciously adopt its principle, elevating their own conscience to a criterion for judging ecclesial authority.
From the Island of Patmos, 20 February 2026
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CONSCIENCE IS NOT A COUNCIL. THE FRATERNITY OF SAINT PIO X AND THE SOPHISM OF SELF-AUTHORIZATION
Can we remain in full communion by rejecting en bloc the authority of an ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium?? The Catholic answer is no.. Not because of rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretive option.
In the recent article about the relationship between Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius (see here) We indicate what constitutes the non-negotiable point of the issue: ecclesial communion is neither a feeling nor a self-declaration, but an objective fact founded on the recognition of the authority of the Church.
The official letter of the Rev. Davide Pagliarani, Superior General of the Fraternitas (full text, here), exactly rethinks the knot that we had pointed out in that previous article: not a simple interpretative divergence, but the attempt to redefine from within the very criteria of communion. The Brotherhood speaks, indeed, of "case of conscience". would not be treated, therefore, of a disciplinary dissent, but of fidelity to Tradition in the face of alleged conciliar deviations. And here it is necessary to stop immediately, because we are not facing a problem of liturgical sensitivity or theological nuances, but before a structural issue: Who judges who in the Church?
Let's start by clarifying a point that does not allow ambiguity.: conscience is not a superior authority to the Magisterium. Catholic doctrine is unequivocal. The authentic Magisterium of the bishops in communion with the Roman Pontiff "requires the religious gift of will and understanding" (The light, 25). This is not a psychological choice, but of an ecclesial duty that belongs to the very structure of faith. The conscience, in the Catholic tradition, is not an autonomous source of truth, but a practical judgment that must be formed in the light of objective truth. If conscience is invoked against the Magisterium, the very order of faith is altered and the hierarchy of sources is inverted.
and here, by the way — without incurring a gratuitous polemical spirit, but for simple intellectual honesty — it is worth pointing out an element that cannot go unnoticed. For more than four decades, the circles of this Fraternitas have proudly claimed to train their priests according to the most solid principles of logic., of classical scholasticism and Thomism. It is a truly demanding statement.. However, to the testing of the texts and the argumentative constructions that are proposed, It is not easy to find that rational solidity that is proclaimed. Confusing certain manualistic formulas of a decadent neo-scholasticism with Aristotelian logic, or with the great speculations of Saint Anselm of Aosta and Saint Thomas Aquinas, It means reducing a very high level philosophical-theological tradition to a repetitive scheme. Logic is not a slogan, but rigor in the procedure, internal coherence and respect for the principles of non-contradiction and identity.
When conscience is erected as a court superior to the Magisterium and, at the same time, fidelity to scholasticism is invoked, falls into an obvious methodological contradiction, not to say rude: it is intended to defend the order of reason while undermining it at its roots. It is not about, therefore, of theological schools, but of basic coherence. Saint Anselm never opposed his own conscience to the authority of the Church; Not even Saint Thomas ever built an alternative system to the Magisterium. Its greatness consisted precisely in harmonizing reason and faith within the ecclesial order, not to replace it. And this is not an abstract statement.. None of the great Doctors of the Church would have allowed themselves to oppose – much less in aggressive tones – the ecclesiastical Authority for having clarified and established that the title of “co-redeemer” cannot be attributed to the Virgin Mary. (cf. Mother of the Faithful People, 17). It can be discussed theologically, can be deepened, can be specified. But to oppose one's own position to the legitimate authority of the Church as if it were an abuse that to correct means crossing a limit that would have scandalized all the great teachers of the scholastic tradition..
If today we intend to invoke Aostano and Aquinas, that it be done with the same intellectual discipline that these two Doctors demanded. Because praising logic while introducing a principle of subjective judgment that seeks to evaluate an ecumenical Council is not an act of fidelity to scholasticism., but a rhetorical operation that does not resist rational analysis. The Second Vatican Council affirms that the authentic interpretation of the Word of God "has been entrusted solely to the living Magisterium of the Church" (God's word, 10). Not to the individual, not to a group, not to a Priestly Fraternity.
Y, also in passing — but seriously — it is worth observing another element. It is not uncommon for the theologians of the so-called Nouvelle Théologie to be dismissed as "modernist heretics" in certain circles.. It's a convenient simplification., but intellectually fragile. That there are problems in these currents is indisputable, just as there have been in the history of theology in almost all the great authors, including Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Saint Augustine, converted, baptized and already bishop, he had to work a lot on himself to purify residues of Manichaeism; and nobody, for it, denies his greatness. Let's take, however, the names that in certain environments are presented as the most dangerous among the theologians of the 20th century: Karl Rahner and Hans Küng. One can — and in certain cases one should — criticize Rahner. One can even radically disagree; but to think that the teaching staff of the Ecône Seminary would have been able to sustain a high-level theological confrontation, developed in the field of classical Thomism and great scholasticism, with a mind of vast culture like that of Hans Küng, It means giving in to an overvaluation that finds no support in reality..
A personal memory,by the way: Brunero Gherardini, theologian certainly not suspected of philo-modernism, He defined Leonard Boff as "one of the most brilliant ecclesiologists of the 20th century". You can not share your conclusions, but to deny his intellectual stature would simply be to deny the evidence. Adherence to the theses of these authors is not at stake here., but a principle of intellectual honesty. Controversy does not replace argumentation nor does label replace refutation.. The proclamation of orthodoxy does not equate to rational solidity. If scholasticism is invoked, that it be truly practiced: with logical rigor, with distinction of plans, with respect for ecclesial authority and with that discipline of reason that does not fear debate, but he faces it without caricatures.
When it is declared that the Council and the post-conciliar Magisterium would be in breach with Tradition and that such a judgment would derive from an obligation of conscience, a leap is made that is not theological but structurally arbitrary: the power to judge the authority that Christ has established to guard the faith is attributed to one's own conscience. This is the point. It's not about good or bad faith, but of ecclesial order.
Poner Tradition and Magisterium is an impossible and illogical construction. Y, however, The Fraternity speaks of fidelity to Tradition in the face of the "fundamental guidelines" of the Council, a contrast in itself theologically unsustainable. Tradition is not an archaeological deposit that should be opposed to the living Magisterium. It is the living transmission of faith under the guidance of apostolic authority. Ya el Concilio de Trento taught that the revelation is contained "in written books and unwritten traditions" (DS 1501), but always guarded and interpreted by the Church. Separating Tradition from the authority that it safeguards means transforming it into an ideological and illogical principle..
Theologist Joseph Ratzinger, long before becoming Pontiff, remembered that Tradition is not an immobile block, but a living reality that grows in the understanding of faith, without rupture but also without fossilization. In his famous speech to the Roman Curia of the 22 December 2005 spoke of "hermeneutics of reform in the continuity of the single subject-Church" versus a "hermeneutics of discontinuity and rupture" (Speech at the Roman Curia, 22 December 2005). Rejecting an ecumenical Council as such is not an exercise in discernment; It is a denial of an act of the universal Magisterium. A hermeneutics can be discussed, but authority cannot be suspended.
The letter of the Rev. Davide Pagliarani expresses availability for a theological dialogue, but at the same time challenges the conditions established by the competent authority, staging a form of dialogue that denies the hierarchical principle. And here the problem is not diplomatic; It's logical again.. Ecclesial dialogue takes place within a hierarchical structure. If the legitimacy of the person who convenes and guides the debate is not recognized, Dialogue becomes a confrontation between equals that does not exist in the constitution of the Church, which is not a federation of autonomous interpretations, but an ordered body. Pretending dialogue without recognizing the authority that establishes its criteria is equivalent to demanding recognition while maintaining one's own normative self-sufficiency..
In the previous article we write that communion is not a negotiable point (see here). We reiterate it, specifying that ecclesial communion implies: the recognition of the Roman Pontiff, of the Magisterium of the bishops in communion with him and the acceptance of the ecumenical Councils as acts of the universal Magisterium. It is not enough to declare yourself Catholic, because to be so it is necessary to accept the Catholic order. Is, therefore, obvious: when a group exercises the sacred ministry, trains the clergy, administers the sacraments and, at the same time, suspends accession to an ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium, an objective tension is created that cannot be normalized through rhetorical formulas. Communion is not self-defining, nor can it be reduced to self-certification; it is reciprocal recognition within a hierarchical order received from Christ. And then the question spontaneously arises as to whether some zealous cultivators of Aristotelian logic, who declare that they founded their scholastic formation on it, They will not have ever confused Aristotle with the sophists. Because classical logic is based on the principle of non-contradiction; the sophistry, instead, in the art of making sustainable what remains contradictory.
The most problematic core lies in the risk of self-authorization. When one's own ecclesial identity is built on the systematic contestation of authority, you enter into a dynamic that, historically, has always produced fractures. It's not about accusing, but to verify the structure that the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius. If the last criterion becomes: "our conscience judges the Council", then the hierarchy of the sources is completely inverted through what the Greeks called παράδοξος, Where does the term “paradox” come from?.
The Church is not founded on individual conscience, but about apostolic authority. The conscience is called to obey the truth guarded by the Church, not to replace it. The question, therefore, It is not whether there are debatable aspects in the post-council. The Church has always known tensions, clarifications and developments, beginning with the First Council of Nicaea, which was not enough to completely write the Symbol of Faith, to the point that the later First Council of Constantinople had to intervene; hence the Creed is called, not by chance, With the Nicene-Constantinopolitan symbol (see my latest work, here). The question is another: Can we remain in full communion by rejecting en bloc the authority of an ecumenical Council and the subsequent Magisterium?? The Catholic answer is no.. Not because of rigidity, but for consistency. Subjective conscience is not a Council and communion is not an interpretive option.
This Fraternity was dedicated by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to Saint Pius, the same Pontiff who condemned the modernists for maintaining that "the authority of the Church, whether teaching or governing, "must be submitted to the judgment of private conscience"; But in this way — he warned — “the order established by God is disrupted.” (Feeding of Dominic's Sheep, 8 September of 1907). Paradoxically, It is precisely here where the irony of history is consummated: The most insidious modernists are not those who declare themselves as such., but who, even condemning modernism, they assume their methodological principle, raising his own conscience at the discretion of the ecclesial authority.
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CONDOLENCE FOR THE DEATH OF ABABOT UGO GIANLUIGI TAGNI
The Most Rev. Dom Ugo Gianluigi Tagni has returned to the house of the Father, of the Cistercian Order, Abbot emeritus of Casamari Abbey
– The briefs of the Fathers of the Isle of Patmos –
Author Editors of The Island of Patmos
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The Fathers of the Island of Patmos join in fraternal condolences to the family of Cistercian Monks for the death of the Most Rev. Dom Ugo Gianluigi Tagni, Abbot emeritus of Casamari Abbey, man of human and spiritual qualities as great as they are rare.
The funeral obsequies they will take place tomorrow, 17 February, at 15:00, in the abbey church of Casamari.
(In the picture: Abbot Ugo Gianluigi Tagni and Father Ariel S. Levi di Gualdo)
We entrust his soul to the Intercession of Mater Dei with the Prayer of Saint Bernard to the Blessed Virgin Mary.
Rome, 16 February 2026
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/faviconbianco150.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-16 22:41:242026-02-17 09:19:54Condolences for the death of Abbot Ugo Gianluigi Tagni
The statement released on the meeting held on 12 February 2026 between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (cf.. communicated in pdf), offers food for reflection not so much on a diplomatic level, as well as on the theological and ecclesiological one.
The tone of the text is deliberately short and sober, even benevolent. There is talk of a "cordial and sincere" meeting, of a «specifically theological dialogue path», of "very precise methodology", of clarification regarding the difference between an act of faith and "religious obedience of the mind and will" and on the different degrees of adhesion required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. However, beneath the formal and friendly surface, serious issues emerge, now old and unresolved.
Let's start with a canonical analysis of the "state of necessity" invoked. The most delicate point remains the threat - already publicly aired - to proceed with new episcopal ordinations in the absence of a pontifical mandate, justified by an alleged "state of necessity" expressed in these terms:
«Last Monday, 2 February, the Superior General of the Society of Saint Pius, that is, the consecration of bishops, will take place on Wednesday 1st July. The ceremony will be held here in Écône, on the famous Prato delle Ordinazioni, in the same place where, the 30 June 1988, Archbishop Lefebvre consecrated four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important to fully understand its scope and meaning. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is that, for the moment, did not receive the authorization of Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope that the Holy Father allows these consecrations. We must pray for this intention" (cf.. SSPX Actuality, who).
And here we need extreme clarity, because the Code of Canon Law is unambiguous:
«Let no Bishop consecrate any Bishop, if it does not first consist of the pontifical mandate" (can. 1013CIC); «the Bishop who consecrates someone Bishop without pontifical mandate and whoever receives the consecration from him incur excommunication automatic reserved to the Apostolic See" (can. 1382 CIC; currently can. 1382 §1 after the reform of 2021).
The statement from Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez correctly recalls the can. 331 the A The Eternal Shepherdthe First Vatican Council, reiterating full power, supreme, universal and immediate of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a disciplinary detail, but of a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The “state of necessity” argument it was used already in 1988 to justify the episcopal consecrations carried out by Bishop Marcel Lefebvre. But a state of necessity, in a canonical sense, it is not a subjective category, nor an ideological perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the causes of non-imputability or mitigation of the sentence (cann. 1323–1324 CIC), among which necessity figures, which must however be substantially real and objective, thus outlining a situation so serious as to force action to avoid imminent and not otherwise avoidable damage. Personal judgment regarding an alleged ecclesial crisis is not sufficient; there must be a real impossibility of resorting to the ordinary means of government and communion with the Apostolic See. Moreover, the necessity cannot be self-certified by the agent in an arbitrary or ideological way, but it must respond to objective criteria verifiable in the ecclesial system.
The history of the 20th century offers several concrete examples: in Eastern European countries under the Soviet regime, with bishops jailed or deported and communications cut off; in Maoist China, during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the Church operated clandestinely and contact with Rome was physically impossible; in some areas of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan conflicts, in conditions of total isolation and grave danger. In these contexts it was an objective physical and legal impossibility.
The difference with the current ecclesial situation is evident. Today there is no regime persecution that prevents communion with Rome, nor a forced interruption of institutional channels. In contexts in which the Fraternity invokes the state of necessity, the Church enjoys freedom of expression and action, maintains diplomatic relations with states and operates publicly. Any conflict is of a doctrinal or interpretative nature, not of material impossibility.
In this way, expand the notion of necessity to the extent of including subjective theological dissent means emptying the canonical institution of its proper meaning. And this is particularly paradoxical in environments that claim a rigorous Thomistic formation: precisely the authentic scholastic tradition demands conceptual precision and distinction of levels, not the extensive and ideological use of legal categories.
Then compare the current ecclesial situation to the Arian crisis - as is sometimes insinuated by certain circles - means forcing history and ecclesiology. During the Arian crisis the very divinity of the Incarnate Word was discussed; today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. The claim to present himself as a new Athanasius of Alexandria presupposes that Rome has become Arian: statement that, if taken seriously, it logically leads to formal schism and before it to juridical-theological ridicule. This is precisely because the argument of the state of necessity, applied to the unilateral decision to ordain bishops against the explicit will of the Roman Pontiff, it is so non-existent on a juridical and ecclesiological level that it appears to lack the minimum criteria of seriousness. Also because the need, against the other, it cannot be self-certified by whoever intends to carry out the act.
The statement signals a central theological point: the distinction between an act of faith (divine and catholic faith) and "religious respect of the mind and will" (cf. The light, 25) Before proceeding, it is appropriate to clarify these two concepts. With divine and catholic faith means the full and irrevocable assent that the believer gives to the truths revealed by God and proposed as such definitively by the Church: for example the Trinity, the Incarnation, the divinity of Christ. To knowingly deny one of these truths is to break communion in faith. The "religious respect of the mind and will", instead, concerns those teachings that the Magisterium proposes in an authentic way, although not with a dogmatic definition. In these cases it is not an act of faith in the strict sense, but of real membership, loyal and respectful, founded on trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Magisterium of the Church. It is not an optional opinion that anyone can accept or reject at will, but neither does it equate to an irreformable definition. The Prefect here, with evident grace, it effectively invites the Fraternity to return to the fold of classical Catholic theology, remembering that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of assent; but neither is it permissible to treat conciliar texts as freely contestable theological opinions. All this even in the face of reductive interpretations that continue to qualify Vatican II as a "only pastoral" council, almost as if it were an assembly of lower rank than previous ecumenical councils. Such a reading, as well as being theologically imprecise, ends up emptying the very authority of the conciliar Magisterium of content.
The Vatican, while not defining new dogmas with a solemn formula, it is an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. His teachings require, according to their nature and formulation, at least that religious respect which is not mere private opinion but real adherence, even if not definitive. It is legitimate to critically discuss some drifts of the post-conciliar period; but such phenomena cannot be identified with the Council as such. Already in the seventies, from the chair of the Pontifical Lateran University, Antonio Piolanti - an authoritative exponent of the Roman School - warned against confusing the Second Vatican Council with the "para-council": these are distinct realities. Nonetheless, before these elementary theological evidences, the tones of the Fraternity are unfortunately as follows:
«It is possible that the Holy See will tell us: “All right, we authorize you to consecrate bishops, but on condition that you accept two things: the first is the Second Vatican Council; and the second is the New Mass. Then, Yes, we will allow you to perform consecrations”. How we should react? It's simple. We would rather die than become modernists. We would rather die than renounce the full Catholic faith. We would rather die than replace the Mass of Saint Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI" (cf.. SSPX Actuality, who).
The Dicastery's request is not to "believe as dogma" every single conciliar expression, but to recognize its ecclesial authority according to the hierarchy of truths and degrees of assent. In other words: study what is disputed, understand theological categories, avoid ideological readings, but also recognize the seriousness of the interlocutor. The Catholic theological tradition has never been built on the caricature of the adversary, but rather on the rigorous analysis of his theses and the reasoned refutation of his errors. You can deeply disagree with a position, even judging it theologically erroneous, without thereby denying the other intelligence, scientific culture or competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend on the personal delegitimation of those who support it, but by the solidity of the arguments. Only in this climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. Is this, be clear: it is not a principle of academic courtesy, but the very method of great scholasticism. Just think about the structure of questionsof St. Thomas Aquinas, who precisely states the objections in their strongest form before proposing his own response (I answer). The truth, in the Catholic tradition, you don't assert yourself by eliminating your opponent, but overcoming the arguments on the level of reason and faith.
On behalf of the Superiors of the Fraternity of Saint Pius, the systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, together with the blackmail tone already used, it does not remain at the level of controversy, but it directly affects the ecclesiological question. The most serious fact is not so much the threat itself, as much as the modality. Dire, in essence, to the Roman Pontiff: “If you don't give us your approval, we will proceed anyway", constitutes improper pressure on the supreme authority of the Church. In canon law, requesting a warrant is an act of obedience; the threat to act without a mandate is an act of defiance. Papal power cannot be transformed into a bureaucratic obstacle that can be circumvented in the name of a superior awareness of the crisis. Ecclesial communion is non-negotiable. It is not a political table where a share of episcopal autonomy is negotiated.
This statement shows a Holy See that does not close, but invites dialogue as an opportunity for truth. Does not sanction immediately, but he proposes a path. It does not impose formulas, but asks for doctrinal clarification. It is difficult not to see in this attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesial patience combined with a spirit of great institutional nobility. The proposal to highlight "the minimum necessary for full communion" is already a methodological concession: we start from the essentials, it does not give complete consensus on everything. However, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is placed as a preliminary condition. And rightly so, because you can't have a conversation with a gun on the table, as if the exercise of authority had to bow to preventive pressure.
Finally, there is a structural element which deserves to be said without acrimony but with lucid realism. Some ecclesial movements, to exist and consolidate, they need a permanent enemy. Their identity is structured in the clash: modernist Rome, the traitorous Council, the ambiguous Pope, the hostile world... If this state of continuous tension were to cease, their raison d'être would also disappear. The logic of conflict is a real element of identity. Without conflict, the identity dissolves or normalizes. But the Church does not live on structural antagonisms; lives in hierarchical communion.
If the Fraternity really desires full communion, will have to decide whether it wants to be an ecclesial reality or a permanent opposition with ecclesial semblance. The difference is not semantic: it is truly ontological. True tradition is not polemical self-preservation, but living continuity in obedience. And obedience, in Catholic ecclesiology, it's not servility, but participation in the very form of the Church wanted by Christ.
The communiqué issued regarding the meeting held on 12 February 2026 between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez, and the Superior General of the Priestly Society of Saint Pius X, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (here), offers grounds for reflection not so much on the diplomatic level as on the theological and ecclesiological one.
The tone of the text is deliberately brief and sober, even benevolent. It speaks of a “cordial and sincere” meeting, of a “specifically theological dialogue,” of a “precise methodology,” and of clarification concerning the distinction between the act of faith and the “religious submission of mind and will,” as well as the different degrees of assent required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. Yet beneath this formally courteous surface, serious issues emerge — long-standing and unresolved.
Let us begin with a canonical analysis of the invoked “state of necessity.” The most delicate point remains the threat — already publicly announced — to proceed with new episcopal ordinations without a pontifical mandate, justified by an alleged “state of necessity,” expressed in the following terms:
“Last Monday, 2 February, the Superior General of the Society of Saint Pius X announced that episcopal consecrations — that is, the consecration of bishops — will take place on Wednesday, 1 July. The ceremony will be held here in Écône, on the famous Field of Ordinations, in the same place where, on 30 June 1988, Archbishop Lefebvre consecrated four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important to understand fully its scope and meaning. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is that, for the moment, it has not received authorization from Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope that the Holy Father will permit these consecrations. We must pray for this intention” (cf. SSPX News, here).
Here absolute clarity is required, because the Code of Canon Law is unequivocal:
“No Bishop is permitted to consecrate anyone as Bishop unless it is first evident that there is a pontifical mandate” (can. 1013 CIC); “A Bishop who consecrates someone a Bishop without a pontifical mandate, and the person who receives the consecration from him, incur a late sententiae excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See" (can. 1382 CIC; currently can. 1382 §1 following the 2021 reform).
The communiqué of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández rightly recalls canon 331 and the constitution The Eternal Shepherd of the First Vatican Council, reaffirming the full, supreme, universal, and immediate authority of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a disciplinary detail, but a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The argument of a “state of necessity” was already used in 1988 to justify the episcopal consecrations carried out by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. Yet a state of necessity, in canonical terms, is not a subjective category nor an ideological perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the causes of non-imputability or mitigation of penalty (cc. 1323–1324 CIC), among which necessity is included. Such necessity, however, must be genuinely real and objective, delineating a situation so grave as to compel action in order to avert imminent harm that cannot otherwise be avoided. A personal judgment concerning an alleged ecclesial crisis is insufficient; what is required is a real impossibility of recourse to the ordinary means of governance and communion with the Apostolic See. Moreover, necessity cannot be self-certified by the agent in an arbitrary or ideological manner; it must correspond to objective criteria verifiable within the ecclesial juridical order.
The history of the twentieth century offers concrete examples: in Eastern European countries under Soviet regimes, where bishops were imprisoned or deported and communications interrupted; in Maoist China, during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the Church operated clandestinely and contact with Rome was materially impossible; and in certain areas of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan conflicts, under conditions of total isolation and grave danger. In such contexts there existed an objective physical and juridical impossibility.
The difference with the present ecclesial situation is evident. Today there is no regime persecution preventing communion with Rome, nor any forced interruption of institutional channels. In the contexts in which the Society invokes a state of necessity, the Church enjoys freedom of expression and action, maintains diplomatic relations with states, and operates publicly. The conflict, if any, is doctrinal or interpretative in nature, not one of material impossibility.
To extend the notion of necessity in this way so as to include subjective theological dissent is to empty the canonical institute of its proper meaning. This appears particularly paradoxical in environments that claim rigorous Thomistic formation: authentic scholastic tradition demands conceptual precision and distinction of levels, not the expansive and ideological use of juridical categories.
To compare the current ecclesial situation to the Arian crisis — as some circles occasionally suggest — is to distort both history and ecclesiology. During the Arian crisis the very divinity of the Incarnate Word was at stake; today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. To present oneself as a new Athanasius of Alexandria presupposes that Rome has become Arian — an assertion which, if taken seriously, leads logically to formal schism and, prior to that, to juridical and theological absurdity. The argument of necessity, applied to the unilateral decision to ordain bishops against the explicit will of the Roman Pontiff, is so unfounded in law and ecclesiology as to appear devoid of minimum seriousness. Necessity, moreover, cannot be self-certified by the one who intends to perform the act.
The communiqué highlights a central theological point: the distinction between the act of faith (divine and catholic faith) and the “religious submission of mind and will” (cf. The light, 25). Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify these concepts. Divine faithand Catholic refers to the full and irrevocable assent given to truths revealed by God and definitively proposed as such by the Church — for example, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the divinity of Christ. To deny such a truth knowingly is to break communion in the faith.
The “religious submission of mind and will,” on the other hand, concerns teachings authentically proposed by the Magisterium, though not defined in a dogmatic manner. In such cases one does not make an act of faith in the strict sense, but rather gives a real, loyal, and respectful adherence, grounded in trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church’s Magisterium. It is not an optional opinion to be accepted or rejected at will, yet neither does it constitute an irreformable definition.
The Prefect thus gently invites the Society to re-enter the classical framework of Catholic theology, recalling that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of assent; yet it is equally illegitimate to treat conciliar texts as freely contestable theological opinions. Interpretations that continue to describe Vatican II as a “merely pastoral” council, as though it were somehow inferior in rank to previous ecumenical councils, are reductive. Such a reading is theologically imprecise and ultimately empties conciliar authority of its content.
Vatican II, though it did not define new dogmas with solemn formulae, is an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. Its teachings require, according to their nature and formulation, at least that religious submission which is not a mere private opinion but a real adherence, albeit non-definitive. It is legitimate to discuss critically certain post-conciliar developments; but such phenomena cannot be identified with the Council itself.
Already in the 1970s, from his chair at the Pontifical Lateran University, Antonio Piolanti — an authoritative representative of the Roman School — warned against confusing the Second Vatican Council with the “para-council”: they are distinct realities. Nevertheless, in the face of these elementary theological clarifications, the tone adopted by the Society is unfortunately the following:
“It is possible that the Holy See may tell us: ‘All right, we authorize you to consecrate bishops, but on condition that you accept two things: the first is the Second Vatican Council; and the second is the New Mass. And then, yes, we will allow you to carry out consecrations.’ How should we react? It is simple. We would rather die than become modernists. We would rather die than renounce the full Catholic faith. We would rather die than replace the Mass of Saint Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI” (cf. SSPX News, here).
The request of the Dicastery is not to “believe as dogma” every single conciliar expression, but to recognize its ecclesial authority according to the hierarchy of truths and the degrees of assent. In other words: to study what one contests, to understand the theological categories involved, to avoid ideological readings, but also to acknowledge the seriousness of one’s interlocutor. Catholic theological tradition has never been built upon caricaturing one’s opponent, but upon rigorous analysis of his theses and reasoned refutation of his errors. One may profoundly dissent from a position, even judge it theologically erroneous, without thereby denying the other’s intelligence, culture, or scholarly competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend upon the personal delegitimization of the one who proposes it, but upon the solidity of its arguments. Only in such a climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. And this, it should be clear, is not a matter of academic courtesy, but the very method of the great scholastic tradition. One need only consider the structure of the questionsof Saint Thomas Aquinas, who presents objections in their strongest form before offering his own response (I answer). In Catholic tradition, truth is not affirmed by eliminating one’s opponent, but by surpassing his arguments on the plane of reason and faith.
On the part of the Superiors of the Society of Saint Pius X, the systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, together with the previously adopted tone of ultimatum, does not remain on the level of polemics but directly affects the ecclesiological question. The most serious element is not so much the threat itself as the manner in which it is expressed. To say, in substance, to the Roman Pontiff: “If you do not grant us authorization, we shall proceed nonetheless,” constitutes an improper pressure upon the supreme authority of the Church. In canon law, the request for a mandate is an act of obedience; the threat to act without it is an act of defiance. One cannot transform pontifical authority into a bureaucratic obstacle to be bypassed in the name of a higher perception of crisis. Ecclesial communion is not negotiable. It is not a political table at which a quota of episcopal autonomy is bargained.
This communiqué shows a Holy See that does not close doors but invites dialogue as an occasion of truth. It does not immediately impose sanctions but proposes a path. It does not impose formulas but asks for doctrinal clarification. It is difficult not to see in the attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesial patience united to notable institutional nobility. The proposal to identify “the minimum necessary for full communion” already constitutes a methodological concession: one begins with what is essential, not with total agreement on every point. Nevertheless, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is set as a preliminary condition — and rightly so — for one cannot conduct dialogue with a gun on the table, as though the exercise of authority were to bend before preventive pressure.
There is finally a structural element that deserves to be stated without acrimony but with lucid realism. Certain ecclesial movements, in order to exist and consolidate themselves, require a permanent enemy. Their identity is structured around conflict: modernist Rome, the betraying Council, the ambiguous Pope, the hostile world. Were this constant tension to disappear, their very raison d’être would weaken. The logic of conflict becomes an identity-forming principle. Without conflict, identity dissolves or normalizes. But the Church does not live by structural antagonisms; she lives by hierarchical communion.
If the Society truly desires full communion, it must decide whether it wishes to be an ecclesial reality or a permanent opposition bearing ecclesial semblance. The difference is not semantic; it is ontological. True tradition is not polemical self-preservation, but living continuity in obedience. And obedience, in Catholic ecclesiology, is not servility, but participation in the very form of the Church willed by Christ.
From the Island of Patmos, 13 February 2026
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CARDINAL VÍCTOR MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ AND THE FRATERNITY OF SAN PÍO: THE NON-NEGOTIABLE POINT OF THE COMMONION
Theological-canonical note on the recent meeting between the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius
The statement released about the meeting held on 12 February 2026 between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez, and the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (here), offers food for reflection not so much on the diplomatic level as on the theological and ecclesiological level..
The tone of the text is deliberately brief and sober., even benevolent. There is talk of a "cordial and sincere" meeting, of a "specifically theological dialogue", of a "very precise methodology", and the clarification about the distinction between the act of faith and the "religious gift of the mind and will", as well as the different degrees of adhesion required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. However, beneath this formal and cordial surface, serious issues emerge, old and still unresolved.
Let us begin with a canonical analysis of the "state of necessity" invoked. The most delicate point remains the threat — already publicly announced — of proceeding to new episcopal ordinations without a pontifical mandate., justified by a supposed "state of necessity", expressed in the following terms:
«Last Monday, 2 February, The Superior General of the Society of Saint Pius X announced that episcopal consecrations, that is to say, the consecration of bishops, will take place on Wednesday 1 of July. The ceremony will take place here in Écône, in the famous Prado de las Ordinaciones, in the same place where, he 30 June 1988, Archbishop Lefebvre consecrated four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important to fully understand its scope and significance. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is that, for now, has not received authorization from Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope that the Holy Father allows these consecrations. We must pray for this intention." (cf. SSPX Present, here).
Absolute clarity is required here, because the Code of Canon Law is unequivocal:
«No Bishop consecrates someone as Bishop if the pontifical mandate is not first established» ((c). 1013 CIC); «The Bishop who consecrates someone as Bishop without papal mandate, and whoever receives consecration from him, incur en excommunication latae sententiae reserved a la Sede Apostólica" ((c). 1382 CIC; currently c. 1382 §1 after the reform of 2021).
The statement from Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández correctly remember the canon 331 and the constitution The Eternal Shepherd the First Vatican Council, reaffirming full power, supreme, universal and immediate of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a simple disciplinary detail, but of a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The “state of necessity” argument was already used in 1988 to justify the episcopal consecrations made by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. But a state of necessity, in canonical sense, It is not a subjective category nor an ideological perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the causes of non-imputability or mitigation of the penalty (cc. 1323–1324 CIC), among which is precisely the need. However, It must be a real and objective situation, that constitutes a severity such that it requires action to avoid imminent damage and that cannot be avoided in any other way. A personal judgment about an alleged ecclesial crisis is not enough; a real impossibility of resorting to the ordinary means of government and communion with the Apostolic See is required. Besides, the need cannot be self-certified by the person who intends to carry out the act, but must respond to objective, verifiable criteria within the ecclesiastical legal system..
The history of the 20th century offers concrete examples: in Eastern European countries under the Soviet regime, with bishops imprisoned or deported and communications interrupted; in Maoist China, during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the Church acted clandestinely and contact with Rome was materially impossible; in some areas of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan conflicts, in conditions of total isolation and serious danger. In such contexts there was an objective physical and legal impossibility.
The difference with the current ecclesial situation is evident. Today there is no regime persecution that prevents communion with Rome, nor forced interruption of institutional channels. In the contexts in which the Fraternity invokes the state of need, The Church enjoys freedom of expression and action, maintains diplomatic relations with States and acts publicly. The eventual conflict is of a doctrinal or interpretative nature, not of material impossibility.
Expanding in this way the notion of necessity Even including subjective theological dissent in it means emptying the canonical institute of its proper meaning.. And this is particularly paradoxical in environments that demand a rigorous Thomistic training.: precisely the authentic scholastic tradition demands conceptual precision and distinction of planes, not the extensive and ideological use of legal categories.
Compare the current ecclesial situation with the Arian crisis — as certain circles sometimes suggest — means forcing history and ecclesiology. During the Arian crisis, the very divinity of the Incarnate Word was under discussion.; Today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. Trying to present yourself as a new Athanasius of Alexandria presupposes that Rome has become Arian: statement that, taken seriously, logically leads to formal schism and, before it, to the legal-theological absurdity. The argument from the state of necessity, applied to the unilateral decision to ordain bishops against the explicit will of the Roman Pontiff, It is so inconsistent on the legal and ecclesiological level that it lacks the minimum criteria of seriousness. Besides, the need cannot be self-certified by the person who intends to carry out the act.
The statement makes a central theological point: the distinction between the act of faith (divine and catholic faith) and the "religious gift of the mind and will" (cf. The light, 25). Before continuing, It is worth clarifying these two concepts. With fides divine and catholic It is understood as the full and irrevocable assent that the believer gives to the truths revealed by God and proposed as such definitively by the Church.: For example, the Trinity, the incarnation, the divinity of Christ. Consciously denying one of these truths means breaking the communion in faith..
The "religious gift of the mind and will", instead, refers to those teachings that the Magisterium proposes in an authentic way, although not with dogmatic definition. In these cases it is not an act of faith in the strict sense., but of a real adhesion, loyal and respectful, founded on confidence in the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Magisterium of the Church. It is not an optional opinion that each person can accept or reject at will., but it is not equivalent to an irreformable definition either..
The Prefect thus invites, with evident delicacy, the Fraternity to reinsert itself into the channel of classical Catholic theology, remembering that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of assent; but it is not legitimate to treat conciliar texts as freely debatable theological opinions either.. All of this even in the face of reductive interpretations that continue to classify Vatican II as a “only pastoral” council., as if it were an assembly of lower rank with respect to previous ecumenical councils. A similar reading, in addition to being theologically imprecise, ends up emptying the very authority of the conciliar Magisterium of content.
Vatican II, although it has not defined new dogmas with a solemn formula, It is an ecumenical Council of the Catholic Church. His teachings demand, according to its nature and formulation, at least that religious gift that is not mere private opinion, but real adhesion, although not defining. It is legitimate to critically discuss some drifts of the post-conciliar period; but such phenomena cannot be identified with the Council as such.. Already in the seventies, from his professorship at the Pontifical Lateran University, Antonio Piolanti — a prominent exponent of the Roman School — warned against confusion between the Second Vatican Council and the “para-council.”: These are different realities.. However, in the face of these elementary theological precisions, The tones of the Brotherhood are unfortunately the following:
«It is possible that the Holy See tells us: "Alright, we authorize you to consecrate bishops, but on the condition that you accept two things: The first is the Second Vatican Council; and the second is the New Mass. And then, Yeah, “We will allow you to carry out consecrations.”. How should we react? It's simple. We would rather die than become modernists. We would rather die than renounce the full Catholic faith. "We would rather die than replace the Mass of Saint Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI." (cf. SSPX Present, here).
The request of the Dicastery does not consist of “believing as dogma” every conciliar expression, but in recognizing its ecclesial authority according to the hierarchy of truths and the degrees of assent. In other words: study what is questioned, understand the theological categories involved, avoid ideological readings, but also recognize the seriousness of the interlocutor. The Catholic theological tradition has never been built on the caricature of the adversary, but about the rigorous analysis of their theses and the argued refutation of their errors. You can deeply disagree with a position, even judging it theologically erroneous, without denying the other intelligence, culture or academic competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend on the personal delegitimization of the person who holds it., but of the solidity of his arguments. Only in this climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. And this – it should be emphasized – is not a principle of mere academic courtesy., but the very method of great scholasticism. Just think about the structure of the questionsof Saint Thomas Aquinas, which states the objections in their strongest form before proposing their response (I answer). In the Catholic tradition, the truth is not affirmed by eliminating the adversary, but by overcoming their arguments on the level of reason and faith.
On behalf of the Superiors of the Society of Saint Pius, the systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, linked to the ultimatum tone previously adopted, does not remain at the level of controversy, but it directly affects the ecclesiological issue. The most serious thing is not so much the threat itself as the modality with which it is formulated.. Say, in substance, to the Roman Pontiff: “If you do not grant us authorization, We will proceed anyway”, constitutes improper pressure on the supreme authority of the Church. In canon law, The request for a command is an act of obedience; the threat to act without it is an act of defiance. Papal power cannot be transformed into a bureaucratic obstacle that must be overcome in the name of a higher awareness of the crisis.. Ecclesial communion is not negotiable. It is not a political table in which a quota of episcopal autonomy is agreed upon..
This statement shows a Holy See that does not close doors, but invites dialogue as an opportunity of truth. Does not sanction immediately, but it proposes a path. Does not impose formulas, but requests doctrinal clarification. It is difficult not to see in this attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesial patience united with a notable institutional nobility. The proposal to indicate "the minimum necessary for full communion" already constitutes a methodological concession: be part of the essential, not a comprehensive consensus on everything. However, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is established as a preliminary condition. And rightly so, because you can't talk with a gun on the table, as if the exercise of authority should yield to preventive pressure.
Finally, there is a structural element that deserves to be pointed out without acrimony., but with lucid realism. Some ecclesiastical movements, to exist and consolidate, they need a permanent enemy. Your identity is structured in conflict: modernist Rome, the traitor council, the ambiguous Pope, the hostile world... If that continuous state of tension disappeared, a good part of its reason for being would also disappear. The logic of conflict becomes a true identity element. No conflict, identity is diluted or normalized. But the Church does not live on structural antagonisms; lives in hierarchical communion.
If the Fraternity really desires full communion, must decide if it wants to be an ecclesial reality or a permanent opposition with an ecclesial appearance. The difference is not semantic; It is properly ontological. True tradition is not controversial self-preservation, but living continuity in obedience. and obedience, in Catholic ecclesiology, it is not servility, but participation in the very form of the Church willed by Christ.
From the Island of Patmos, 12 February 2026
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CARDINAL VÍCTOR MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ AND THE PRIESTLY FRATERNITY OF ST. PIUS X: THE NON-NEGOTIABLE POINT OF THE CHURCH COMMUNITY
Theological-canonical note on the recent meeting between the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X
The notification about the on 12. February 2026 meeting between the Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Kardinal Victor Manuel Fernandez, and the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X, Rev. Davide Pagliarani (available here), offers an opportunity for reflection – less on a diplomatic level than on a theological and ecclesiological level.
The tone of the text is deliberately brief and factual, yes, even benevolent. There is talk of a “warm and sincere” encounter, of a “specific theological dialogue”, of a “clear-cut methodology” and of a clarification regarding the distinction between the act of faith and the “religious obedience of the mind and will” and the different degrees of assent, required by the texts of the Second Vatican Council. However, beneath this formal and friendly surface there are serious issues, long-standing and unresolved questions are brought to light.
Let's start with a canonistic analysis of the claimed “state of emergency”. The most sensitive point remains the intention, which has already been publicly announced, to carry out new episcopal ordinations without a papal mandate, justified by an alleged “emergency”, which was described in the following words:
“Last Monday, dem 2. February, announced the Superior General of the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X an, that the episcopal ordinations - i.e. the ordination of bishops - take place on Wednesday, dem 1. July, will take place. The ceremony is held here in Écône on the well-known grazing area of the Harriers, in the same place, to Archbishop Lefebvre on 30. June 1988 ordained four bishops. It will be a historic event, but it is important, to fully understand its scope and significance. The unusual aspect of this ceremony is this, that it has not yet received the approval of Pope Leo XIV. We sincerely hope, that the Holy Father will allow these ordinations. We must pray for this matter.” (cf. SSPX Current).
Extreme clarity is required here, because the code of canon law is clear:
“No bishop is allowed to consecrate anyone as a bishop, unless the papal mandate has been established beforehand.” (can. 1013 CIC); “A bishop, who consecrates someone as a bishop without a papal mandate, as well as that one, who receives consecration from him, incur the penalty of excommunication, which is reserved for the Apostolic See" (can. 1382 CIC; currently can. 1382 §1 after the reform of 2021).
Die Mitteilung von Kardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández rightly reminds us of can. 331 as well as the constitution The Eternal Shepherd of the First Vatican Council and thereby reaffirms the full, highest, universal and immediate power of the Roman Pontiff. This is not a mere disciplinary individual determination, but rather a constitutive principle of Catholic ecclesiology.
The “emergency” argument has already been 1988 used, to justify the episcopal ordinations carried out by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. However, an emergency in the canonical sense is neither a subjective category nor an ideologically colored perception of crisis. The Code of Canon Law precisely regulates the grounds for non-attribution or mitigation of punishment (cc. 1323–1324 CIC), among which the state of emergency is also mentioned. However, this must actually be real and objective and represent such a serious situation, that action is necessary, in order to avert imminent damage, which cannot be avoided otherwise. A personal judgment about an alleged church crisis is not enough; what is required is a real impossibility, to have recourse to the ordinary means of leadership and communion with the Apostolic See. In addition, a state of emergency cannot be declared arbitrarily or ideologically by the actor himself, but must be objective, correspond to verifiable criteria within the ecclesiastical legal system.
The story of the 20. Century offers concrete examples of this: in Eastern European countries under Soviet rule, where bishops were imprisoned or deported and communications were disrupted; in Maoist China during the harshest phases of religious persecution, when the church worked underground and contact with Rome was effectively impossible; in certain regions of the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan Wars, under conditions of complete isolation and acute danger. In such contexts there was an objective physical and legal impossibility.
The difference to the current church situation is obvious. Today there is no state persecution, which prevents communion with Rome, and no forced disruption of institutional lines of communication. In the contexts, in which the Brotherhood claims a state of emergency, enjoys the church religions- and freedom of action, maintains diplomatic relations with states and acts publicly. Any conflict is doctrinal or interpretive in nature, but not due to material impossibility.
To expand the concept of emergency in this way, that this includes subjective theological disagreement, means, to empty the canonical institute of its actual meaning. This seems particularly paradoxical in circles, who claim a strict Thomistic training for themselves: The authentic scholastic tradition in particular demands conceptual precision and the distinction between levels, not the extensive and ideological use of legal categories.
The current church situation comparing it with the Arian crisis – as is sometimes suggested in certain circles – means, to distort both history and ecclesiology. In the Arian crisis, the deity of the incarnate Word itself was at issue; Today no Trinitarian or Christological dogma is denied by the universal Magisterium. Presenting yourself as the new Athanasius of Alexandria requires, that Rome had become Arian - a claim, which, taken seriously, logically leads to formal schism and before that to legal-theological absurdity. The argument of the emergency, applied to the unilateral decision, Consecrate bishops against the express will of the Roman Pontiff, is as unsustainable in a legal as in an ecclesiological sense, that it lacks minimal criteria of respectability. In addition, the state of emergency cannot be certified by the person themselves, who intends to carry out the act.
The communication then highlights a central theological point: the distinction between the act of belief (divine and catholic faith) and the “religious obedience of the mind and will” (cf. The light, 25). Before we continue, it is appropriate, to clarify these two terms. Under divine and catholic faith means full and irrevocable consent, which the believer gives to the truths revealed by God and finally presented as such by the Church - such as the Trinity, the incarnation or deity of Christ. To knowingly deny such a truth is to deny it, to break the community of faith.
The “religious obedience of the mind and of the will”, on the other hand, refers to those teachings, which are authentically presented by the Magisterium, although not in the form of a dogmatic definition. In these cases it is not an act of faith in the strict sense, but a real one, loyal and respectful consent, which is based on trust in the assistance of the Holy Spirit towards the Magisterium of the Church. It is not just an optional opinion, which could be accepted or rejected at will, but also not an irreformable definition.
The prefect invites the brotherhood to attend with noticeable reluctance, to place itself once again within the framework of classical Catholic theology. He reminds you of that, that not all teachings of the Magisterium require the same degree of approval; However, it is also not permissible, to treat conciliar texts as freely contestable theological opinions. Interpretations, who continue to describe the Second Vatican Council as “merely pastoral.”, as if it were a meeting of inferior status compared to previous ecumenical councils, are reductionist. Such a reading is not only theologically imprecise, but ultimately empties the authority of the conciliar magisterium itself.
The Second Vatican Council did not have any new dogmas defined in a solemn form, is, however, an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. According to their nature and formulation, his teachings demand at least that religious obedience, which does not represent a purely private opinion, but a real one, although not definitive agreement. It's legit, to critically discuss certain developments of the post-conciliar period; However, these phenomena should not be identified with the Council as such. As early as the 1970s, Antonio Piolanti — a leading representative of the Roman School — warned against this from his chair at the Pontifical Lateran University, to confuse the Second Vatican Council with the so-called “Para-Council”.: These are different realities. Nevertheless, in view of these elementary theological clarifications, the tone of the Brotherhood is unfortunately as follows:
"It is possible, that the Holy See says to us: ‚Gut, we allow you, to consecrate bishops, under the condition, that you accept two things: firstly, the Second Vatican Council; secondly, the New Mass. Then we will allow you to be ordained.’ How should we react?? It's simple. We would rather die, to become modernists. We would rather die, than to renounce the full Catholic faith. We would rather die, than to replace the Mass of St. Pius V with the Mass of Paul VI.” (cf. SSPX Current).
The demand of the Dicastery is not this, every single conciliar formulation “to be believed as dogma”, but to recognize their ecclesiastical authority according to the hierarchy of truths and the degrees of approval. In other words: to study that, what you question; to understand the theological categories; to avoid ideological readings - and at the same time to recognize the seriousness of the interlocutor. The Catholic theological tradition has never been based on the caricature of the opponent, but rather on the careful analysis of his theses and the argumentative refutation of his errors. You can disagree deeply with a position, even judge them to be theologically erroneous, without the other therefore intelligence, to deny education or scientific competence. The authority of a thesis does not depend on the personal delegitimization of its proponent, but on the viability of their arguments. Only in such a climate is authentic theological dialogue possible. And this, it should be emphasized, is not a question of academic politeness, but the actual procedure of the great scholastic tradition. Just think of the structure questions of Saint Thomas Aquinas, which presents the objections in their strongest form, before giving his answer (I answer) formulated. In the Catholic tradition this does not affirm the truth, that you eliminate the opponent, but by overcoming one's arguments at the level of reason and faith.
From the superiors of the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X The systematic delegitimization of the interlocutor, together with the previously adopted tone of ultimatum, does not remain at the level of polemic, but directly touches on the ecclesiological question. The most serious thing is less the threat itself than the manner in which it is delivered. To say this to the Roman Pontiff: “If you don’t give us permission, “We will still act”, represents undue pressure on the Church's highest authority. In canon law, asking for a mandate is an act of obedience; the threat, to act without a mandate, an act of rebellion. You cannot turn papal authority into a bureaucratic obstacle, that is intended to be circumvented in the name of a supposedly higher crisis perception. Church community is non-negotiable. It is not a political negotiating table, at which a measure of episcopal autonomy is negotiated.
This message shows a Holy See, that doesn't close, but invites dialogue as an opportunity for truth. It does not immediately impose sanctions, but suggests a way. It doesn't prescribe any formulas, but asks for doctrinal clarification. It is difficult, It is not possible to recognize in the attitude of Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández a form of ecclesiastical patience combined with remarkable institutional nobility. The suggestion, to name “the minimum requirements for full community”., already represents a methodological concession: You start with the essentials, not with complete agreement on everything. Nevertheless, the suspension of episcopal ordinations is set as a temporary condition - and rightly so -, because you can't have a dialogue, when there is a gun on the table, as if the exercise of authority had to give way to preventative pressure.
Finally, there is a structural element, that without bitterness, but should be expressed with sober clarity. Some church movements require, to exist and consolidate, a permanent opponent. Your identity is formed in conflict: modernist Rome, the treacherous council, the ambiguous pope, the hostile world... If this state of permanent tension were to disappear, their own reason for existence would also falter. The logic of conflict becomes a principle that creates identity. Without conflict, identity dissolves or normalizes. The church, however, does not thrive on structural contradictions, but of hierarchical community.
If the brotherhood really strives for full communion, she has to decide, whether it wants to be a church reality or a permanent opposition with the appearance of a church. The difference is not semantic, but ontological in nature. True tradition is not polemical self-assertion, but living continuity in obedience. And obedience in Catholic ecclesiology is not servilism, but participation in the shape of the church desired by Christ.
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Padre-Ariel-foto-2025-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150father arielHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngfather ariel2026-02-13 17:32:272026-02-13 20:38:50Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernández and the Brotherhood of St. Pius X: the non-negotiable point of communion – Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Society of Saint Pius: the non-negotiable point of communion – Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Fraternity of Saint Pius: the non-negotiable point of communion – Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández and the Society of Saint Pius X: The non-negotiable point of ecclesial community
ALBERTO RAVAGNANI READ THROUGH «BLOWIN’ IN THE WIND» DI BOB DYLAN
If we want the Church to have priests who are happy and serene in carrying out such a demanding and all-encompassing ministry, they must not be left floating in the wind, but that you respond with sincerity.
The well-known story of Alberto Ravagnani which crossed social media a few days ago, for his decision to leave the priesthood, he collected as is customary nowadays, comments and reflections of different nature and equally alternating positions: he did well, it hurt, it was time, let us pray for him.
Every choice remains profoundly human even when it has to do with realities that involve the spiritual sphere, faith, the church, It gave. Whereby, without prejudice to good conscience, must be respected, including that of Ravagnani who decides to put aside his being a Catholic priest. I asked myself, But, if there were deeper reasons behind this very striking gesture, due to Don Alberto's media exposure. Naturally, not knowing the person directly, indeed having frequented it almost nothing social, if not very rarely and out of curiosity towards the phenomenon of priests influence, I base myself on his latest releases, in which he explained some reasons for his gesture and in the book now published with the emblematic title: The choice (Who).
In a video interview (Who) Don Alberto confronts Giacomo Poretti, the well-known actor of the comic trio Aldo, John and James, which has a following podcastis that, against the other, he makes no secret of his faith. Giovanni delicately asks Alberto some questions about why he became a priest and why he has now decided to leave. Ravagnani's answers highlight how they used to be, before the conversion, occurred following a confession, he was introverted, very closed in on himself and how he then felt the desire to communicate his newfound happiness to everyone. The phrasebook is simple, it doesn't dig deep, according to a style in use among the influence, including priests, who have this need to be easily understood by everyone. So was the decision to leave, always explained with words that are far too simplistic for such a tiring choice, appears linked to his current desire for freedom which has led him to now perceive the priest's dress as tight for what he feels like doing, that is, equally bringing Jesus to young people, to the worlds that do not know him or mock him, but without the restrictions and rules imposed on those who hold the role of presbyter, who must obey the Bishop for example.
According to his words, the word "don" preceded by the first name, it would be an obstacle, because it would lead people to see the role first of all or to remember the negative examples of some priests. He confesses that he will always feel like "Don Alberto" and that probably having been a "Don" will still identify him that way in the eyes of those he meets, even if Giacomo Poretti cordially reminds him that it will always be for him: Alberto. But then Ravagnani also makes other confessions, that a 21 year old, in the seminar, when he began to dress like a priest, with the collar for example, he was happy about it, only to then realize that he had put other experiences aside, like emotional ones or a degree, to see and perceive himself only as a presbyter and as such dressed. It turns out, so, missing something and what previously identified it is no longer useful, indeed it appears to be an obstacle. The fact that a priest, now ex, can end the interview by talking about his perception of the priest as a man who must appear almost perfect in the eyes of people and therefore he, discovering instead the value of freedom with respect to this vision, now he can breathe a sigh of relief, makes you think.
In a later video (Who), done to promote his recent book, Ravagnani offers some other reasons that go deeper. He states sequentially:
«I was a good child, a good boy, a brave seminarian, a good priest, a brave father, a bravo influence, but the need to be so impeccable ended up overwhelming me. And maybe that was a good thing, because between being perfect and being true the second is much better".
Any therapist, to hear these words, would raise the antennas and ask the interested party questions that would no longer concern the choice itself to abandon the priesthood, behind which always hide judgments both of the interested party towards himself and of the users reached by such news. They would rather have to do with deeper reasons that infer the psychic reality of the person making such assertions and their personality, how it has developed over time and therefore why one should feel that they are good and perfect: compared to whom, to demonstrate what, which internal gratification or psychological position does it consolidate?
Opening his book we note that the sentence he uttered in the video is in fact the summary of the chapters that make up the writing. In the text he examines the epochal passages of his life up to this point and confesses among many other things that he has in fact turned to a therapist who is helping him to unravel the internal tangle. You can read it where one of the conversations with the specialist is reported: «I take a deep breath. But I know I have to do something. I have to have the courage to choose. For the good of the Fraternity (n.d.r: a communityanimated by him). And of the Church". «And also for his», he adds, piano. "Yup", I say after a moment, "for mine too". He remains silent for a while." (pag. 237).
Scrolling through the pages of the biography an aspect stands out that in itself would have nothing original, if it weren't for the character's notoriety. That is, the story of a young man who he carried with him throughout his adolescence, of the seminary and of the priestly ministry the psychological position of the child he implements, in a context of misunderstanding, especially family, a defense mechanism that leads him on the one hand to protect himself from the world that does not understand or welcome him as he is; on the other to consider himself better and capable of straightening out that world with his commitment and effort; shielding himself by becoming good, being perfect, show how good you are in order to be recognized.
Let's read his words arose following an outburst of violence by the father:
«I don't remember getting hurt, but I remember that I would have liked to do it to my father: obviously I had to cancel this immoral impulse. And then another ten thousand experience points for the good boy, who learns to suppress desires for revenge or anger, because he perceives those feelings as "wrong" and incompatible with being loved. That is how, year after year, the good child in me grows up to completely take over the scene of my life. Little Alberto becomes good and well-liked by everyone. At home I am obedient and never give my parents any trouble. At school I am polite and diligent, the model student praised by the teachers and always available to help my classmates. In my grandparents' town everyone tells me I'm an angel, because I'm kind, patient and imperturbable, basically an adult in a child's body. Or maybe, a child who is unable to live fully as such" (pag. 17).
The itinerary already seems well traced and where it can best be explored if not in the Church? An all-encompassing and enveloping entity, capable of enhancing the psychological mechanisms of goodness and perfection. A reality, The Other Brother, always needs improvement so why not enter right there where I can make my talent count, step by step, in a titanic effort that will then backfire on me, precisely because no one had helped me see that child who just wanted to be welcomed, understood and valued; that he could have different experiences, including mistakes, that bring a boy to maturity, until he becomes a man capable of making choices. Instead of banning yourself, to nourish a psychic position, the natural experiences of youthful life, like studying, sport, traveling and last but not least affection and sex. It comes naturally to me to say: there was no way it wouldn't end the way it did, with the abandonment of the priesthood. Because life presses with its demands, the body also screams and I am not here to underline that the only spaces of freedom that Ravagnani obtained for himself were those of autoeroticism, confessed by him in the book. So I think, that he was right in the end to make the choice he made, if this leads him to the truth of himself and to action, even in his thirties, the normal experiences that lead a young person to psychological maturity, morale, existential. Especially if you have never done them or if you have prevented them yourself due to an idea of unhealthy perfection. This is my wish for him, that he gets out of his script and lives a real life.
However, a painful question remains. How come the Church, that is, the people responsible for the training of that seminarian, later presbyter, they didn't notice all this at all? It's one thing for someone to become a good animator within an oratory, no matter how varied and engaging the Milanese ones may be, but it's another thing for a boy who is almost twenty years old to be welcomed into the seminary and brought to the priesthood without anyone ever helping him to look inside himself., so that he could become a real priest; not a good priest. And we're talking about years, not for a few days.
Ravagnani's analysis of life in the seminary, apart from the fact that he liked it and exalted it, but we also know why at this point, she is merciless. Let's also do the tare and let's also say that it comes from someone who is leaving and therefore it will inevitably be easy for him to now find out all the flaws of the case on how one gets to the priesthood and on how one lives or on the negative examples that abound. But that the Rector of a seminary - and we are talking about one of the most important dioceses in the Church -, be sure to ask a young man who enters: «Have you ever had sexual intercourse?»; while the true motivations of a boy who comes to write are never examined: «I've never tried with a girl, but with God yes. And I did it with him. I didn't ask him out, I asked him to enter the seminary" (pag. 35). Yet he speaks of multiple conversations he had with those responsible, with the spiritual father. Because this idea of self, this image of faith and God, cloaked in a Promethean search for perfection, it was never noticed? And conversely one has to ask: what kind of training is given in the seminars, what is it ultimately aimed at?
Priests leave who in one direction, some for another, there have been many and there will be many more. The church, as Francesco Guccini sang about his city of choice, Bologna, And: «An old matron, with slightly soft hips"; capable of absorbing everything and moving forward. But if these issues are not addressed, where you go? Today fewer and fewer children and young people are knocking on the doors of seminaries, but that's not the point in the end, as the story of Don Alberto reveals. Because even in those realities that are seen as the panacea for all ills, because there a few more young people arrive and ask for the dress, the strict rules and that tradition is maintained, people's intimate problems remain. Ravagnani also coveted the collar, he dressed in black, even in my underwear (his words, pag. 61), he felt like a priest to the core. Maybe something needs to be revised? Some fault admitted? Perhaps that good psychologist who pointed out to Ravagnani that good must be sought for oneself as well as for others, could have access to the seminars? Or you are afraid to find out the truth? That the king is often naked, even if he perceives himself to be true and right because he thinks he is dressed appropriately and respects the rules of the role to the full.
The questions pile up. But if we want the Church to have priests who are happy and serene in carrying out such a demanding and all-encompassing ministry, they must not be left floating in the wind, but that you respond with sincerity.
From the Hermitage, 11 February 2026
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Sant'Angelo Cave in Ripe (Civitella del Tronto)
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HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/monaco-eremita-piccolo-.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150Hermit MonkHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngHermit Monk2026-02-11 20:58:152026-02-11 20:58:15Alberto Ravagnani read through Bob Dylan's «Blowin' in the wind».
HTTPS://i0.wp.com/isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Padre-Ivano-piccola.jpg?fit=150,150&ssl=1150150Father IvanoHTTPS://isoladipatmos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/logo724c.pngFather Ivano2026-02-10 20:14:162026-02-10 20:45:15The case “Don Rava”: between those who are guilty and those who are innocent and that symptom of an ecclesial malaise that we still don't want to recognize
THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN ETHICS, INELLIGINS AND AND TOMOGE TO THIS TO THIS OF THE AQUINE
The machine only perfects what it finds already in place in man: can refine a true thought, but do not generate truth; can clean up a successful sentence, but do not infuse the spirit that generated it. And it is precisely here that the parallel with the Thomistic principle becomes evident: «Greason does not take away nature, but finisht(grace does not destroy nature, but he perfects it)»
This article for our page Theologica It's based on my latest book Freedom denied, published by our editions and on sale Who.
I am preparing to address this topic linked to Artificial Intelligence, one of the prophetic masterpieces of modern cinema came to mind: 2001: Space Odyssey, directed by Stanley Kubrick and released in 1968. HAL appears in that film 9000, a very high level artificial intelligence, installed on board the spacecraft Discovery. HAL is perfect in calculation, infallible in data management, but devoid of what makes judgment human: conscience. When his programming conflicts with mission objectives, HAL doesn't "go crazy": it simply applies logic without the moral filter, without intentionality and without the ability to discern good from evil. The result is frightening: a very powerful machine becomes a mortal threat precisely because it does not understand man or the value of life. This intuition - cinematic but theologically lucid - shows that artificial intelligence raises problems that are not merely technical, but radically moral. What is at stake is not computing power - which no one disputes - but rather the risk that man delegates to an impersonal system what belongs exclusively to his conscience. And that's exactly what happens when you let a platform decide for itself what is "good" or "bad.", what can be said or what must be kept silent: an act that should be moral is delivered to the machine. And this is only the first step of the moral delegation to the machine.
Once the judgment on truth and falsehood has been surrendered to technology, the next step becomes almost inevitable: also give up educational common sense and personal responsibility. Or when a parent completely entrusts the algorithm with the task of filtering what a child can see, without critical vigilance: it means delegating educational responsibility to a statistical system. Or even when you ask Artificial Intelligence if a sentence is "offensive" or "morally acceptable": it means transferring a task that requires consciousness to the machine, I don't calculate.
What has been illustrated so far is not a set of technical details they are rather the decisive point. If the intention is missing, the machine can never understand what the man is doing when he speaks, warns, educa, treatment, corrects. And since he cannot access the “why”, reduces everything to the "how": does not evaluate the meaning, it only analyzes the shape. This is where misunderstanding becomes inevitable and systematic error. This is what happens, for instance, when a priest admonishes a believer or a father corrects a son: human conscience distinguishes between severity and cruelty, between correction and offense; the algorithm only records the harshness of the sentence and flags it as "hostile language". The doctor who writes «this risk leads to death» can see his words classified as “violent content”, because the machine doesn't distinguish a diagnosis from a threat. And a simple Bible verse can be censored as “offensive language” because Artificial Intelligence does not perceive moral purpose, but only the surface of the word. Because of this, any use of Artificial Intelligence that touches speech, the judgment, the relationship or freedom must be examined in the light of moral theology, not computer engineering.
The distinction is crucial: the machine doesn't decide, select; does not evaluate, filter; does not judge, Ranking. And what classifies is never good or bad, but only the probable and the improbable, the frequent and the rare, the statistical acceptable and the algorithmic suspicion. Human consciousness does the exact opposite: takes seriously the uniqueness of the act and the freedom of the agent; weighs intentions, circumstances, consequences; distinguishes between the reproach that saves and the offense that wounds; between severity out of love and cruelty out of contempt. The machine sees none of this.
When a father calls a son back, conscience recognizes the love that sustains it; the algorithm only sees a “potentially hostile” phrase. When a spiritual director admonishes one of his direct reports, conscience sees the mercy that accompanies the truth; the algorithm sees a violation of “community standards”. When a person speaks to correct, protect or educate, consciousness perceives finality, the machine only perceives the word hard. The result is paradoxical: where man combines justice and mercy, the machine only produces labels.
Moral ambiguity does not arise from technology: comes from the man who designs it. Because the algorithm is not neutral: carries out a moral he doesn't know, but that others have decided for him. And we see this every day: if a content calls into question the politically correct, the algorithm interprets it as “hostility”; if he criticizes some drifts of culture woke, labels it “discrimination”; if it addresses themes of Christian anthropology - for example sexual difference or the family - directing criticism at the powerful and politicized LGBT lobbies, reports it as “hate speech”, or “incitement to violence”, the so-called "hate speech”, verbatim: hate speech. All this not because the machine "thinks" like this, but because it was programmed to react and interact like this. The algorithm is not born neutral: it is born already educated by those who build it, shaped by ideological criteria that confuse criticism with aggression, reflection with offense, truth with violence. In other words, the algorithm has masters: reflects their fears, amplifies their beliefs, it censors what they fear. The platforms do not filter based on objective criteria but according to dominant ideologies: what the world idolizes is promoted, what the Gospel recalls is suspected; what satisfies is amplified, what warns is silenced. The result is a new form of cultural censorship: Elegant, polite, digitally sterilized — but still censored.
These analyzes of mine arise from reflections, from the studies and observations that I have been investigating for some time on the anthropological-cultural level and on the real functioning of digital platforms. This is precisely why I find it significant to note how, on a different but complementary level, the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith recently recalled a decisive principle, essentially going in the same direction of thought as me, reiterating that Artificial Intelligence, while being able to "cooperate in the growth of knowledge", it cannot in any way be equated with human intelligence which possesses a depth and dynamics that no machine learning system can replicate. This document highlights that Artificial Intelligence does not understand, but elaborate, does not judge, but calculate, and is intrinsically incapable of grasping the moral dimension of the action, since it lacks conscience and interiority (cf.. Who). He then clearly warns that moral discernment cannot be attributed to an algorithmic device: doing so would mean abdicating man's ethical responsibility and handing over the truth to a statistical mechanism. The illusion of an artificial moral intelligence is defined by the document as a form of naive technological idolatry, because the truth is not the result of calculation, but of the encounter between freedom and grace[1].
This magisterial reflection confirms the central point: consciousness cannot be programmed. The machine can assist, but don't judge; can help, but don't interpret; can filter, but do not discern. What belongs to man's freedom - and therefore to his relationship with God - cannot be delegated to any technology.
The ethics of artificial intelligence thus reveals its fragility: a machine can be programmed to recognize words, but he cannot understand the Word. It can identify commands, not commandments. It can register behaviors, do not distinguish between virtue and vice. It can detect correlations, do not grasp divine revelation. And especially: cannot know God. A culture that gets used to replacing the judgment of conscience with the scrutiny of an algorithm ends up forgetting that freedom is a spiritual act, not a outputdigital[2]. And this is where moral theology becomes decisive, because it reminds man that: the truth is always personal; good is always intentional; consciousness is always irreducible; moral judgment cannot be delegated to anyone, much less to a software.
This doesn't mean demonizing technology, but put it back in its place: that of an instrument, not a judge. Artificial Intelligence, At that time, it can certainly make human work more agile, but he cannot replace him at the decisive point: moral judgment, the only area in which it is not enough to know "how things are", but you have to decide "why do them". It is the place of consciousness, where man weighs intentions, assumes responsibility, He is accountable for his actions before God. The car doesn't fit here, can't enter: calculate, but he doesn't choose; analyze, but he doesn't answer; beginning, but he doesn't love. Like an excellent plastic surgeon, Artificial Intelligence can enhance what is already beautiful, but it cannot make beautiful what is not beautiful, can correct disproportions, can attenuate certain signs of aging; but he cannot create from nothing nor the beauty that is not there, nor restore the faded youth. It can enhance a lined face, but he cannot invent a new face. In the same way, Artificial Intelligence can help organize data, to clarify a text, to put complex topics in order; but it cannot give intelligence to a limited and mediocre subject, nor conscience to those who don't have it.
The image, perhaps a little crude but effective, it is that of the thoroughbred horse and the pony: technology can train, cure, make the Arabian stallion perform at his best, but it will never turn a poor pony into a thoroughbred. What isn't there, no algorithm will ever be able to create it. The machine only perfects what it finds already in place in man: can refine a true thought, but do not generate truth; can polish a successful sentence, but it cannot reach the consciousness from which that sentence arose.
The machine only perfects what it finds already in place in man: can refine a true thought, but do not generate truth; can clean up a successful sentence, but do not infuse the spirit that generated it. And it is precisely here that the parallel with the Thomistic principle becomes evident:
«Greason does not take away nature, but finish(grace does not destroy nature, but he perfects it)»[3].
At this point it becomes inevitable turn your gaze towards the more delicate terrain: if the machine can only perfect what it finds, then the real issue is not about the algorithm, but the man who hands himself over to him. And it is here that the Thomist analogy unfolds all its strength: just as grace does not work on emptiness, so technology does not work on the absence of consciousness. And when man stops exercising his own moral interiority, it is not the machine that gains power: it is man himself who loses stature. From this point arises the decisive — non-technical — problem, but spiritual — which we must now address. If we understand that the moral delegation to the machine is not a technical accident but an anthropological error, the question will arise as a logical consequence: what does man lose when he abdicates his conscience? He doesn't just lose an ability, but a spiritual dimension, the one in which the meaning of good and evil is decided. Technology can be powerful, sophisticated, very fast, but it cannot become a moral subject.
The Christian tradition he has always taught that the exercise of common sense is an art that arises from grace and freedom: a balance between prudence, truth and charity. The algorithm does not know any of these three. It's not prudent, because it doesn't evaluate; it's not true, because he doesn't know; It's not charitable, because he doesn't love. Because of this, using Artificial Intelligence as a tool is possible; using it as a criterion is inhumane, to think that it can create in place of man incapable of articulating a thought, or to produce intellectual work, it is illusory to say the least. Technology can assist humans, never judge him; the word can help, never replace it; can serve the mission, never determine its boundaries.
A civilization that delegates to the machine what belongs to consciousness loses its spiritual identity: becomes a company that knows a lot, but he understands little; who talks continuously, but he rarely listens; who judges everything, but she no longer judges herself.
Catholic morality reminds us that the criterion of good is not what the world accepts, but what God teaches. And God doesn't speak to algorithms: speak to the hearts. The Logoshe became flesh, not code; he became a man, I don't plan; a report was made, not mechanism. For this reason no artificial intelligence, however advanced, can it ever become the ultimate criterion of what is true, right, good and human. Because good cannot be calculated: and identify.
From the island of Patmos, 7 February 2026
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NOTE
[1]See. Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Old and new. Note on the relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence (28 January 2025). — On the correct integration between human capacity and technological tools in the elaboration of moral judgment.
[2] N.d.A. Outputmeans final result and is a technical-IT term that refers to the set of data that a computer emits during the production process, this in contrast to the input, which are instead the input data.
[3]Thomas Aquinas, QUESTION, I, q.1, a.8, ad 2, in The Works of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Leo.
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THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN ETHICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE THEOLOGY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
The machine perfects only what it already finds at work in man: it may refine a true thought, but cannot generate truth; it may clean a well-formed phrase, but cannot infuse the spirit that generated it. And it is precisely here that the parallel with the Thomistic principle becomes evident: “Grace does not destroy nature, but finish (grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it)”
This article for our Theologica page is taken from my latest book Freedom denied, published by our own press and available for purchase here. As I set out to address this theme concerning Artificial Intelligence, my mind returned to one of the prophetic masterpieces of modern cinema: 2001: A Space Odyssey, directed by Stanley Kubrick and released in 1968. In that film appears HAL 9000, an extremely advanced artificial intelligence installed aboard the spacecraft Discovery. HAL is perfect in calculation, infallible in data management, yet devoid of what makes human judgement truly human: conscience. When its programming comes into conflict with the objectives of the mission, HAL does not “go mad”: it simply applies logic without moral filtering, without intentionality, and without the capacity to discern good from evil. The result is terrifying: a supremely powerful machine becomes a mortal threat precisely because it neither understands man nor the value of life. This intuition — cinematic, yet theologically lucid — shows that artificial intelligence raises issues that are not merely technical, but radically moral. What is at stake is not computational power — which no one disputes — but the risk that man may delegate to an impersonal system what belongs exclusively to his conscience. And this is precisely what happens when one allows a platform to decide autonomously what is “good” or “bad”, what may be said and what must be silenced: one hands over to the machine an act that ought to be moral. And this is only the first step in the moral delegation to the machine.
Once judgement over truth and falsehood has been ceded to technology, the next step becomes almost inevitable: renouncing educational common sense and personal responsibility as well. When a parent entirely entrusts to an algorithm the task of filtering what a child may see, without critical supervision, this means delegating educational responsibility to a statistical system. Or again, when one asks Artificial Intelligence whether a phrase is “offensive” or “morally acceptable”, this means transferring to the machine a task that requires conscience, not calculation.
What has been outlined so far is not a collection of technical details, but rather the decisive point. Where intention is lacking, the machine can never understand what man is doing when he speaks, admonishes, educates, heals or corrects. And since it cannot access the “why”, it reduces everything to the “how”: it does not evaluate meaning, it analyses only form. It is here that misunderstanding becomes inevitable and error systematic. This is what happens, for example, when a priest admonishes a faithful person or a father corrects a child: the human conscience distinguishes between severity and cruelty, between correction and offence; the algorithm merely registers the harshness of the phrase and flags it as “hostile language”. A physician who writes “this risk leads to death” may see his words classified as “violent content”, because the machine does not distinguish diagnosis from threat. And even a simple biblical verse may be censored as “offensive language”, because Artificial Intelligence does not perceive moral purpose, but only the surface of words. For this reason, any use of Artificial Intelligence that touches speech, judgement, relationship or freedom must be examined in the light of moral theology, not computer engineering.
The distinction is decisive: the machine does not decide, it selects; it does not evaluate, it filters; it does not judge, it classifies. And what it classifies is never good or evil, but only the probable and the improbable, the frequent and the rare, statistical acceptability and algorithmic suspicion. Human conscience does the exact opposite: it takes seriously the uniqueness of the act and the freedom of the agent; it weighs intentions, circumstances and consequences; it distinguishes between rebuke that saves and offence that wounds; between severity born of love and cruelty born of contempt. The machine sees none of this.
When a father reproves a child, conscience recognises the love that sustains it; the algorithm sees only a “potentially hostile” phrase. When a spiritual director admonishes one entrusted to him, conscience perceives mercy accompanying truth; the algorithm sees a violation of “community standards”. When a person speaks in order to correct, protect or educate, conscience grasps the purpose; the machine perceives only harsh words. The result is paradoxical: where man unites justice and mercy, the machine produces nothing but labels.
Moral ambiguity does not arise from technology: it arises from the man who designs it. For the algorithm is not neutral: it executes a morality it does not know, but which others have decided for it. And we see this every day: if content challenges political correctness, the algorithm interprets it as “hostility”; if it criticises certain excesses of woke culture, it labels it “discrimination”; if it addresses themes of Christian anthropology — for example sexual difference or the family — by criticising powerful and politicised LGBT lobbies, it flags it as “hate speech” or “incitement to violence”. All this not because the machine “thinks” this way, but because it has been programmed to react this way. The algorithm is not born neutral: it is already educated by those who build it, shaped by ideological criteria that confuse criticism with aggression, reflection with offence, truth with violence. In other words, the algorithm has masters: it reflects their fears, amplifies their convictions, censors what they fear. Platforms do not filter according to objective criteria but according to dominant ideologies: what the world idolises is promoted, what the Gospel recalls is suspected; what pleases is amplified, what admonishes is silenced. The result is a new form of cultural censorship: elegant, polite, digitally sterilised — yet still censorship.
These analyses arise from reflections, studies and observations that I have long been developing on the anthropological-cultural level and on the real functioning of digital platforms. It is precisely for this reason that I find it significant to note how, on a different yet complementary level, the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith has recently recalled a decisive principle, essentially moving in the same direction of thought, reaffirming that Artificial Intelligence, while it may “cooperate in the growth of knowledge”, can in no way be equated with human intelligence, which possesses a depth and dynamism that no machine-learning system can replicate. This document stresses that Artificial Intelligence does not understand, but processes; does not judge, but calculates; and is intrinsically incapable of grasping the moral dimension of action, since it lacks conscience and interiority (cf. here). It therefore clearly warns that moral discernment cannot be attributed to an algorithmic device: to do so would mean abdicating human ethical responsibility and handing truth over to a statistical mechanism. The illusion of an artificial moral intelligence is defined by the document as a form of naïve technological idolatry, because truth is not the fruit of calculation, but of the encounter between freedom and grace[1].
This magisterial reflection confirms the central point: conscience cannot be programmed. The machine may assist, but not judge; it may help, but not interpret; it may filter, but not discern. What belongs to human freedom — and thus to man’s relationship with God — cannot be delegated to any technology.
The ethics of artificial intelligence thus reveal their fragility: a machine may be programmed to recognise words, but it cannot understand the Word. It can identify commands, not commandments. It can catalogue behaviours, not distinguish between virtue and vice. It can detect correlations, not grasp divine revelation. And above all: it cannot know God. A culture that becomes accustomed to replacing the judgement of conscience with algorithmic screening ends up forgetting that freedom is a spiritual act, not a digital output[2]. It is here that moral theology becomes decisive, for it reminds man that truth is always personal; good is always intentional; conscience is always irreducible; moral judgement cannot be delegated to anyone, least of all to software.
This does not mean demonising technology, but restoring it to its proper place: that of a tool, not a judge. Artificial Intelligence may certainly make human work more efficient, but it cannot replace it at the decisive point: moral judgement, the only realm in which it is not enough to know “how things are”, but one must decide “why to do them”. This is the realm of conscience, where man weighs intentions, assumes responsibility, and answers for his actions before God. Here the machine does not enter, cannot enter: it calculates, but does not choose; it analyses, but does not answer; it simulates, but does not love. Like an excellent plastic surgeon, Artificial Intelligence may enhance what is already beautiful, but it cannot make beautiful what is not; it may correct disproportions, soften certain marks of time, but it cannot create beauty from nothing nor restore youth once it has faded. It may enhance a marked face, but it cannot invent a new one. In the same way, Artificial Intelligence may help organise data, clarify a text, or order complex arguments; but it cannot give intelligence to a limited and mediocre subject, nor conscience to one who lacks it.
The image — perhaps somewhat stark, but effective — is that of the thoroughbred horse and the pony: technology may train, care for and bring out the best in the Arabian stallion, but it will never turn a poor pony into a thoroughbred. What is not there, no algorithm will ever create. The machine perfects only what it already finds at work in man: it may refine a true thought, but cannot generate truth; it may polish a successful phrase, but cannot reach the conscience from which that phrase arose.
The machine perfects only what it already finds at work in man: it may refine a true thought, but cannot generate truth; it may clean a well-formed phrase, but cannot infuse the spirit that generated it. And it is precisely here that the parallel with the Thomistic principle becomes evident:
“Grace does not destroy nature, but finish (grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it)” [3].
At this point it becomes inevitable to turn our gaze to the most delicate ground: if the machine can perfect only what it finds, then the true question does not concern the algorithm, but the man who hands himself over to it. And it is here that the Thomistic analogy displays its full force: just as grace does not act upon a void, so technology does not work upon the absence of conscience. And when man ceases to exercise his moral interiority, it is not the machine that gains power: it is man himself who loses stature. From this point arises the decisive problem — not technical, but spiritual — that we must now confront. If we understand that moral delegation to the machine is not a technical accident but an anthropological error, the question will arise by logical consequence: what does man lose when he abdicates his conscience? He does not lose merely a skill, but a spiritual dimension, the one in which the meaning of good and evil is decided. Technology may be powerful, sophisticated, extremely rapid, but it cannot become a moral subject.
Christian tradition has always taught that the exercise of sound judgement is an art born of grace and freedom: a balance between prudence, truth and charity. The algorithm knows none of these three. It is not prudent, because it does not evaluate; it is not true, because it does not know; it is not charitable, because it does not love. For this reason, using Artificial Intelligence as a tool is possible; using it as a criterion is inhuman. To think that it can create in place of a man incapable of articulating a thought or producing intellectual work is, at the very least, illusory. Technology may assist man, never judge him; may help speech, never replace it; may serve the mission, never determine its boundaries.
A civilisation that delegates to the machine what belongs to conscience loses its spiritual identity: it becomes a society that knows much, but understands little; that speaks incessantly, but rarely listens; that judges everything, but no longer judges itself.
Catholic morality reminds us that the criterion of good is not what the world accepts, but what God teaches. And God does not speak to algorithms: He speaks to hearts. The Logos became flesh, not code; became man, not programme; became relationship, not mechanism. For this reason no artificial intelligence, however advanced, can ever become the ultimate criterion of what is true, just, good and human. Because good is not calculated: it is recognised.
From the Isle of Patmos, 7 February 2026
.
NOTES
[1]CF. Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Old and new. Note on the relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence (28 January 2025) — On the correct integration between human capacity and technological tools in the formation of moral judgement.
[2] A.N. Output means final result and is a technical computing term referring to the set of data produced by a computer through a processing operation, in contrast to input, which are the incoming data.
[3] Thomas Aquinas, QUESTION, I, q.1, a.8, ad 2, in the Works of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Leonine Edition.
.
THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN ETHICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE THEOLOGY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
The machine perfects only what it already finds in action in man.: can hone a true thought, but not generate the truth; can clean up a successful sentence, but not instill the spirit that has generated it. And it is precisely here where the parallelism with the Thomistic principle becomes evident.: «Grace does not destroy nature, but finish (grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it)».
This article for our page Theologica It is taken from my latest book Freedom denied (Freedom denied) published by our editions and available for sale here.
When I am ready to discuss this topic related to Artificial Intelligence, one of the most prophetic works of modern cinema came to mind: 2001: space odyssey, directed by Stanley Kubrick and released in 1968. HAL appears in that movie 9000, a very high level artificial intelligence, installed aboard the Discovery spacecraft. HAL is perfect in calculation, foolproof in data management, but it lacks that which makes judgment truly human: the conscience. When your schedule conflicts with mission objectives, HAL does not “go crazy”: simply apply logic without the moral filter, without intentionality and without the ability to discern good from evil. The result is shocking: a very powerful machine becomes a mortal threat precisely because it does not understand man or the value of life. This cinematic intuition, but theologically very clear — shows that artificial intelligence raises problems that are not merely technical, but radically moral. What is at stake is not the computing power - which no one disputes - but the risk that man delegates to an impersonal system what belongs exclusively to his conscience.. And this is precisely what happens when a platform is allowed to autonomously decide what is “good” or “bad.”, what can be said and what should be silenced: an act that should be moral is handed over to the machine. And this is only the first step of moral delegation to the machine.
Once surrendered to technology the judgment about what is true and what is false, the next step becomes almost inevitable: also renounce educational common sense and personal responsibility. Occurs, For example, when a parent completely entrusts an algorithm with the task of filtering what a child can see, without critical oversight: means delegating educational responsibility to a statistical system. Or when Artificial Intelligence is asked if a phrase is “offensive” or “morally acceptable”: means transferring a task that requires consciousness to the machine, not calculation.
What has been explained so far does not constitute a set of technical details, but the decisive point. If the intention is missing, the machine can never understand what the man is doing when he speaks, reprimands, educa, cure or correct. And since you cannot access the “why”, reduce everything to the “how”: does not evaluate the meaning, analyze only the shape. It is here that misunderstanding becomes inevitable and systematic error. It's what happens, For example, when a priest admonishes a believer or a father corrects a son: human conscience distinguishes between severity and cruelty, between correction and offense; The algorithm only records the harshness of the phrase and marks it as “hostile language.”. The doctor who writes "this risk leads to death" may see his words classified as "violent content", because the machine does not distinguish a diagnosis from a threat. Even a simple Bible verse can be censored as “offensive language.”, because Artificial Intelligence does not perceive the moral purpose, but only the surface of the word. For this reason, any use of Artificial Intelligence that affects the word, to the trial, to relationship or freedom must be examined in the light of moral theology, not computer engineering.
The distinction is decisive: the machine does not decide, select; does not evaluate, filter; does not judge, classify. And what classifies is never good or evil, but only the probable and the improbable, the frequent and the rare, what is statistically acceptable and what is algorithmically suspicious. Human consciousness does exactly the opposite.: takes seriously the uniqueness of the act and the freedom of the agent; ponder intentions, circumstances and consequences; distinguishes between the rebuke that saves and the offense that hurts; between severity out of love and cruelty out of contempt. The machine sees none of this..
When a father rebukes a son, conscience recognizes the love that sustains it; the algorithm sees only one “potentially hostile” phrase. When a spiritual director admonishes those under his charge, conscience perceives the mercy that accompanies the truth; the algorithm sees a violation of “community standards”. When a person speaks to correct, protect or educate, consciousness grasps the purpose; the machine only perceives the hard word. The result is paradoxical: where man unites justice and mercy, the machine produces only labels.
Moral ambiguity is not born of technology: born from the man who designs it. Because the algorithm is not neutral: executes a morality that he does not know, but that others have decided for him. And we see this every day: if content questions political correctness, the algorithm interprets it as “hostility”; If you criticize certain cultural drifts woke, labels it “discrimination”; if it addresses issues of Christian anthropology — for example, sexual difference or the family — criticizing the powerful and politicized LGBT lobbies, He describes it as “incitement to hatred” or “incitement to violence”, the call (c). All of this is not because the machine “thinks” like that., but because it has been programmed to react that way. The algorithm is not born neutral: It is born already educated by those who build it, shaped by ideological criteria that confuse criticism with aggression, reflection with offense, the truth with violence. In other words, the algorithm has masters: reflects your fears, amplifies your convictions, censor what they fear. The platforms do not filter according to objective criteria, but according to dominant ideologies: what the world idolizes is promoted, what the Gospel remembers is suspicious; what pleases is amplified, what admonishes is silenced. The result is a new form of cultural censorship: Elegant, polite, digitally sterilized — but always censored.
These reflections of mine are born from studies, analysis and observations that I have been delving into for some time now at the anthropological-cultural level and in the real functioning of digital platforms. Precisely for this reason I consider it significant to point out how, on a different but complementary level, The Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith has recently recalled a decisive principle, going substantially in the same direction of thought, reaffirming that Artificial Intelligence, even being able to "cooperate in the growth of knowledge", cannot be compared in any way to human intelligence, that has a depth and dynamics that no machine learning system can replicate. This document highlights that Artificial Intelligence does not include, but processes; does not judge, but it calculates; and is intrinsically incapable of grasping the moral dimension of action, lacking consciousness and interiority (cf.. here). Warn, therefore, clearly that moral discernment cannot be attributed to an algorithmic device: To do so would mean abdicating man's ethical responsibility and handing over the truth to a statistical mechanism.. The illusion of an artificial moral intelligence is defined by the document as a form of naive technological idolatry, because the truth is not the result of calculation, but of the encounter between freedom and grace[1].
This magisterial reflection confirms the central point: consciousness is not programmed. The machine can assist, but don't judge; can help, but not interpret; can filter, but not discern. That which belongs to the freedom of man — and, therefore, to your relationship with God — cannot be delegated to any technology.
The ethics of artificial intelligence thus revealing its fragility: a machine can be programmed to recognize words, but can't understand the Word. Can identify orders, not commandments. Can census behaviors, not distinguishing between virtue and vice. Can detect correlations, not accepting divine revelation. Y, above all: can't know God. A culture that gets used to replacing the judgment of conscience with the screening of an algorithm ends up forgetting that freedom is a spiritual act, not a output digital[2]. This is where moral theology becomes decisive., because it remembers the man who: the truth is always personal; good is always intentional; consciousness is always irreducible; moral judgment cannot be delegated to anyone, and even less to a software.
This does not mean demonizing technology, but return it to its proper place: that of instrument, not that of judge. Artificial Intelligence can certainly make human work more agile, but cannot replace it at the decisive point: the moral judgment, the only area in which it is not enough to know “how things are”, but it is necessary to decide “why to do them”. It is the place of consciousness, where man ponders intentions, assumes responsibilities and is responsible for his actions before God. The machine does not fit here, can't get in: calculate, but don't choose; analysis, but he doesn't respond; beginning, but he doesn't love. As an excellent plastic surgeon, Artificial Intelligence can enhance what is already beautiful, but you cannot make beautiful what is not beautiful; can correct disproportions, can attenuate certain signs of time, but it cannot create from nothing beauty that does not exist nor restore youth that has already withered.. Can enhance a marked face, but can't invent a new face. In the same way, Artificial Intelligence can help organize data, clarify a text, sort complex arguments; but it cannot give intelligence to a limited and mediocre subject, nor conscience to those who lack it.
The image, maybe a little crude but effective, It is that of the race horse and the pony: technology can train, care for and make the Arabian stallion perform to the maximum, but it will never transform a poor pony into a thoroughbred. What does not exist, no algorithm can ever create it. The machine perfects only what it already finds in action in man.: can hone a true thought, but not generate the truth; can polish a successful sentence, but not reaching the consciousness from which that phrase has arisen.
The machine perfects only what it already finds in action in man: can hone a true thought, but not generate the truth; can clean up a successful sentence, but not instill the spirit that has generated it. And it is precisely here where the parallelism with the Thomistic principle becomes evident.:
«Grace does not destroy nature, but finish (grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it)»[3].
At this point, it becomes inevitable to look at the most delicate terrain: if the machine can perfect only what it finds, then the real issue does not concern the algorithm, but to the man who gives himself to him. And this is where the Thomistic analogy displays all its force.: just as grace does not act on emptiness, In the same way, technology does not work on the absence of consciousness.. And when man stops exercising his moral interiority, It is not the machine that gains power: It is the man himself who loses height. From here arises the decisive problem — not a technical one., but spiritual — which we must now face. If we understand that moral delegation to the machine is not a technical accident but an anthropological error, The question will arise by logical consequence: What does a man lose when he abdicates his conscience?? You don't just lose one skill, but a spiritual dimension, the one in which the meaning of good and evil is decided. Technology can be powerful, sophisticated, very fast, but cannot become a moral subject.
The Christian tradition has always taught that the exercise of good judgment is an art born of grace and freedom: a balance between prudence, truth and charity. The algorithm does not know any of these three. It is not wise, because it doesn't evaluate; it's not true, because you don't know; It is not charitable, because he doesn't love. For this reason, using Artificial Intelligence as an instrument is possible; using it as a criterion is inhumane. To think that I can create instead of a man incapable of articulating a thought or producing intellectual work is, at least, illusory. Technology can assist man, never judge him; can help the word, never replace it; can serve the mission, never determine its confines.
A civilization that delegates to the machine that which belongs to consciousness loses its spiritual identity: becomes a society that knows a lot, but understands little; who talks continuously, but rarely listens; who judges everything, but she no longer judges herself.
Catholic morality reminds us that the criterion of good is not what the world accepts, but what God teaches. And God does not speak to algorithms: speaks to the hearts. The Logos became flesh, not code; he became a man, not program; relationship was made, not mechanism. That's why no artificial intelligence, no matter how advanced it is, can never become the ultimate criterion of what is true, fair, good and human. Because good is not calculated: is recognized.
From the Island of Patmos, 7 February 2026
.
NOTES
[1] See. Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Old and new. Note on the relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence (28 January 2025). —On the correct integration between human capacity and technological instruments in the elaboration of moral judgment.
[2] N. from A. Output means final result and is a technical-computer term that refers to the set of data that a computer emits through a production process., as opposed to input, what is the input data.
[3] Thomas Aquinas, QUESTION, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2, en Sancti Thomas de Aquinas Opera Omnia, Leonina edition.
.
THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN ETHICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE THEOLOGY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUIN
The machine only perfects that, what it already finds in humans: It can refine a true thought, but produce no truth; she can clean up a successful sentence, but not breathe the spirit, who produced him. And it is precisely here that the parallel to the Thomian principle becomes evident: „Grace does not destroy nature, but finish (grace does not destroy nature, but completes it)“
This post for our category Theologica is my latest book Freedom denied (Freedom denied), which was published by our publisher and available here is.
When I set out to do it, to address this topic in connection with artificial intelligence, One of the most prophetic masterpieces of modern cinema came to mind: 2001: A space odyssey, directed by Stanley Kubrick and 1968 published. HAL appears in this film 9000, a highly developed artificial intelligence, which is installed on board the spaceship Discovery. HAL is perfect at arithmetic, infallible in data processing, but she misses that, what constitutes human judgment: the conscience. When their programming conflicts with the mission's goals, HAL doesn’t “go” crazy: it simply applies logic without a moral filter, without intentionality and without the ability, to distinguish between good and evil. The result is shocking: This is precisely why an extremely powerful machine becomes a deadly threat, because she doesn't understand people and the value of life. This one – cinematic, but theologically extremely clear - intuition shows, that artificial intelligence poses problems, which are not just of a technical nature, but radically moral. It's not the computing power that's at issue - no one disputes that -, but the danger, that man leaves to an impersonal system, which is solely the responsibility of his conscience. This is exactly what is happening, if you allow a platform, to decide autonomously, what is “good” or “evil”., what can be said and what must be kept quiet: You transfer an act to the machine, which would have to be moral. And this is just the first step of moral delegation to the machine.
As soon as technology is left to decide what is true and false, the next step becomes almost inevitable: also to forgo educational common sense and personal responsibility. This happens about then, when a parent completely delegates the task to an algorithm, to filter, what a child can see, without critical supervision: That means, to delegate educational responsibility to a statistical system. Or if you ask artificial intelligence, whether a sentence is “offensive” or “morally acceptable”.: Then you give the machine a task, which requires conscience, not calculation.
What was presented here, is not an ensemble of technical details, but the crucial point. The intention is missing, the machine can never understand, what man does, when he speaks, admonished, educates, heals or corrects. And because she has no access to the “why”., she reduces everything to the “how”: It doesn't evaluate the meaning, but only analyzes the form. This is where the misunderstanding becomes inevitable and the systematic error sets in. Something like that, when a priest admonishes a believer or a father corrects his son: Human conscience distinguishes between severity and cruelty, between correction and insult; the algorithm simply registers the harshness of the sentence and marks it as “hostile language”. The doctor, who writes: “This risk leads to death”, can see his words classified as “violent content”., because the machine cannot distinguish a diagnosis from a threat. Even a simple Bible verse can be censored as “offensive language.”, because the artificial intelligence does not perceive the moral goal, but only the surface of the word. That's why every use of artificial intelligence must, of language, Verdict, Relationship or freedom touched, be examined in the light of moral theology, not in the context of computer science.
The distinction is crucial: The machine doesn't decide, she selects; she doesn't judge, she filters; she doesn't judge, classifies them. And what classifies them, is never good or evil, but only the probable and the improbable, Common and rare, Statistically acceptable and algorithmically suspect. The human conscience does the exact opposite: It takes the uniqueness of the action and the freedom of the actor seriously; it weighs intentions, circumstances and consequences; it distinguishes between rebuke, that saves, and the insult, who hurt; between severity out of love and cruelty out of contempt. The machine doesn't see any of this.
When a father corrects his child, conscience recognizes love, who carries him; the algorithm only sees one “potentially hostile” sentence. When a spiritual director admonishes his entrusted person, conscience recognizes mercy, that accompanies the truth; the algorithm sees a violation of “community standards”. When someone speaks, to correct, to protect or educate, conscience grasps the objective; the machine only records the hard word. The result is paradoxical: There, where man combines justice and mercy, the machine only produces labels.
The moral ambiguity does not arise from technology, but to people, who designs them. Because the algorithm is not neutral: He carries out a moral, that he doesn't know, but which others have set for him. This is evident every day: Does a piece of content question what is politically correct?, the algorithm interprets this as “hostility”; he criticizes certain excesses of the woke culture, he labels it as “discrimination”; He deals with topics of Christian anthropology - such as gender differences or the family - and criticizes powerful ones, politicized LGBT lobbies, it is marked as “hate speech” or “glorification of violence”.. None of this, because the machine “thinks” like that, but because it was programmed that way. The algorithm is not born neutral: He is trained from the start by his developers, shaped by ideological criteria, criticism with aggression, Confusing reflection with insult and truth with violence. In other words: The algorithm has masters. He reflects their fears, reinforces their beliefs, censored, what they fear. Platforms do not filter based on objective criteria, but according to dominant ideologies: What the world adores, is encouraged; what the gospel brings to mind, is suspected; what you like, is reinforced; what admonishes, is silenced. The result is a new form of cultural censorship: elegant, polite, digitally sterilized – but still censorship.
These considerations arise from studies, Reflections and observations, which I have been deepening for some time on an anthropological-cultural level as well as with regard to the real functioning of digital platforms. That's precisely why I think it's important to note, that on another, but at a complementary level the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith has recently recalled a crucial principle and is essentially moving in the same direction of thought: It affirms, that artificial intelligence can “contribute to the growth of knowledge”., However, in no way should it be equated with human intelligence, which has depth and dynamism, which no machine learning system can replicate. The document underlines, that artificial intelligence does not understand, but processed; doesn't judge, but calculated; and is fundamentally incapable due to lack of conscience and inwardness, to grasp the moral dimension of action (cf. here). It therefore clearly warns against this, to attribute moral distinction to an algorithmic system: This would mean, to abdicate man's ethical responsibility and leave the truth to a statistical mechanism. The illusion of artificial moral intelligence has been described as a form of naive technological idolatry, since truth does not arise from calculation, but from the encounter between freedom and grace[1].
This magisterial reflection confirms the central point: The conscience cannot be programmed. The machine can support, but don't judge; help, but not interpret; filter, but don't differentiate. What belongs to human freedom - and thus to his relationship to God -, cannot be transferred to any technology.
The ethics of artificial intelligence thus reveal their fragility: A machine can be programmed, to recognize words, but she can't understand the word. She can identify commands, not commandments. It can capture behavior, do not distinguish between virtue and vice. She can see correlations, do not grasp divine revelation. And especially: She cannot recognize God. One culture, who gets used to it, to replace the judgment of conscience with the testing of an algorithm, eventually forgets, that freedom is a spiritual act, not a digital one Output[2]. This is where moral theology becomes crucial, because it reminds people of it: Truth is always personal; the good is always intentional; conscience is always irreducible; Moral judgment cannot be delegated to anyone – least of all to one Software.
This does not mean, to demonize the technology, but to put them in their right place: that of the tool, not the judge. Artificial intelligence can certainly make human work more efficient, But it cannot replace it at the crucial point: in moral judgment, the only area, in which it is not enough to know, “how things are”, but in which decisions must be made, “why you do them”. It is the place of conscience, where people weigh up intentions, Takes responsibility and stands up for your actions before God. The machine has no access here, she can't have one: She calculates, but doesn't choose; analyzed, but doesn't answer; simulated, but doesn't love. Like a great plastic surgeon, artificial intelligence can enhance what is already beautiful, but it cannot make beautiful, what it is not; she can correct proportions, Alleviate signs of aging, but neither creating beauty out of nothing nor returning lost youth. It can enhance a drawn face, but don't invent a new face. Artificial intelligence can also help, to organize data, clarify texts, to structure complex arguments; However, it cannot give intelligence to a limited and mediocre subject, nor can it give intelligence to a person without conscience.
The picture – perhaps a bit drastic, but effective – is that of the noble thoroughbred and the pony: Technology can train the Arabian stallion, maintain and lead to peak performance, but she will never turn a poor pony into a racehorse. What doesn't exist, no algorithm can ever create. The machine only perfects that, what it already finds in humans: It can sharpen a true thought, but do not produce truth; she can polish a successful sentence, but do not reach the conscience, from which this sentence emerged.
The machine only perfects that, what it already finds in humans: It can refine a true thought, but produce no truth; she can clean up a successful sentence, but not breathe the spirit, who produced him. And it is precisely here that the parallel to the Thomian principle becomes evident:
Grace does not take away nature, but finish (grace does not destroy nature, but completes it)“[3].
At this point it becomes inevitable, to focus on the most delicate terrain: If only the machine can perfect that, what she finds, then the real question is not about the algorithm, but the people, who surrenders to him. This is where the Thomian analogy develops its full power: Just as grace does not work on the void, technology does not work in the absence of conscience. And when the person stops, to practice one's moral interiority, It is not the machine that gains power – the human being loses size. This is where the crucial problem arises – not a technical one, but of a spiritual nature –, which we now have to face. If we understand, that the moral delegation to the machine is not a technical accident, but is an anthropological error, the question inevitably arises: What does man lose?, if he renounces his conscience? He doesn't just lose an ability, but a spiritual dimension, those, in which the meaning of good and evil is decided. The technology may be powerful, sophisticated and incredibly fast, however, she can never become a moral subject.
The Christian tradition has always taught, that the exercise of sound judgment is an art, which comes from grace and freedom: a balance of wisdom, truth and love. The algorithm does not recognize any of these three. He's not smart, because he doesn't weigh things up; not true, because he doesn't recognize; not loving, because he doesn't love. That's why it's possible, to use artificial intelligence as a tool; Using it as a criterion is inhumane. To believe, she could create in place of a person, who is incompetent, to articulate a thought or produce an intellectual work, is at least illusory. Technology can support people, never judge him; it can serve the Word, never replace it; she can help the mission, never determine their boundaries.
A civilization, which is left to the machine, what belongs to the conscience, loses her spiritual identity: It becomes a society, who knows a lot, but understands little; who speaks incessantly, but rarely listens; who judges everything, but no longer judges himself.
Catholic morality reminds us of this, that the criterion of good is not that, what the world accepts, but that, what God teaches. And God doesn’t speak to algorithms: He speaks to the heart. The Logos became flesh, not code; he became human, not program; it has become a relationship, not mechanism. That's why no artificial intelligence can, no matter how advanced it is, ever become the final measure of that, what true, just, is good and humane. Because the good is not calculated: It is recognized.
From the island of Patmos, 7. February 2026
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NOTES
[1] cf. Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Old and new. Note on the relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence (28. January 2025). — On the proper integration of human abilities and technological tools in the formation of moral judgments.
[2] Anm. (d). A.: Output refers to the final result and is a technical term in computer science, which refers to the entirety of the data, that a computer outputs as part of a processing process, in contrast to the input, i.e. the input data.
[3] Thomas Aquinas, QUESTION, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2, in the Works of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Leonine edition.
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