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DONNE, LAW AND THEOLOGY USED AS SLOGANS BY THE BLOG I CAN'T BE SILENT

When a theological or legal argument does not stand up to a full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is sufficient to trace it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes the comparison with them is already in itself the most severe of responses.

— Theology and canon law —

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A necessary premise is necessary. the blog I can not remain silent it has never aroused particular appreciation among the editors of this magazine, not out of prejudice, but by method.

Our mission is not to fuel controversy, but rather to recall the theological and juridical truth when this is exposed in an imprecise way, approximate or ideologically oriented. The problem is not criticism - which is legitimate and sometimes necessary in the Church - but the quality of criticism. When texts of an ecclesiological and canonical nature are disseminated with peremptory tones, selective quotes and arguments that seem solid only until they are subjected to scrutiny, it becomes necessary to intervene. Not so much for professionals, who possess the tools to discern, as for those priests in good faith and for those Catholic faithful who are not adequately prepared, which risk taking as rigorous analyzes what often turns out to be a rhetorical and emotional construction rather than theological and juridical one.

The last article «Women who evaluate bishops? The results of this tokenism are there for all to see" (see who), represents an emblematic example of this approach. In several places the text borders on invective; in legal and theological citations, then, the authenticity sometimes appears similar to that of a zircon presented as a pure diamond: shiny on the surface, but lacking the structural consistency that only rigorous analysis can guarantee. For this reason - and for this reason alone -, it is appropriate to go into detail.

«The power of government is an unresolved issue» constitutes the main topic of the article, solemn in form yet fragile in substance. It is stated that the power of government, being sacramentally rooted in Holy Orders, cannot be "normalized" nor exercised according to administrative logic that involves non-ordained faithful. The reference to Benedict XVI - in particular to the catechesis on governing office the 26 May 2010 — it's suggestive, but markedly selective. And above all theologically imprecise. Not for academic subtlety, but due to an evident confusion between sacramental ownership of the gift and legal cooperation in the exercise of authority.

The text uses correct formulas — «sacramental structure», «sacred origin of authority», "bond with the Sacrament of Orders" - but isolates them from the overall context of Catholic doctrine, transforming them into apologetic slogans through selective extrapolations. The result is an argument that appears compact only until it is subjected to a complete reading of the sources. It's true: the hierarchy in the Church has a "sacred origin"; ecclesial authority does not arise from a sociological investiture; the gift governing it is not comparable to one leadership corporate. But, from these premises, what the article claims to demonstrate does not follow at all.

The Code of Canon Law is extremely clear: the can. 129 § 1 states that those who have received Holy Orders are eligible for the power of government. Ma he §2, which immediately follows - and here is the point systematically ignored - establishes that «the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of this power, according to law". To cooperate does not mean to usurp, replace or exercise the episcopal office, but participate, according to methods determined by the ecclesial system, to the concrete exercise of functions that are not of a sacramental nature, but administrative, consultative, investigation, management. Denying this principle one should consistently maintain that: lay people operating in ecclesiastical courts exercise a surreptitious episcopate; the lay experts who participated in the Ecumenical Councils participated sacramentally in the the task of teaching; every administrative function of the Curia requires episcopal consecration, to the point of transforming the ecclesial organization into a sort of monolithic exclusively sacramental apparatus. Simply said,: such a conclusion is not only not required by Catholic theology, but it misrepresents the fundamental distinction between sacramental ownership and juridical cooperation.

Following the logic of the authors of the article, at least one titular bishop should be appointed to manage the parking lots of the Vatican City State, so as to prevent a simple administrative official from exercising an "insufficiently sacramental" power in matters of blue lines and time discs, perhaps with appropriate references to sacramental dogmatics. Of course: the absurd is not the irony but the premise. Benedict XVI, in recalling the "sacred origin" of ecclesial authority, he has never maintained that every act of government in the Church ontologically coincides with the exercise of Holy Orders. The distinction between the power of the order e the power of government it is classic in Catholic theology and finds a clear and systematic formulation in canon law. The sacramental origin of the episcopate does not eliminate the institutional and juridical dimension of ecclesial government: the foundation and the structure. Confusing these levels means exchanging the root for the branches. Authority is born sacramentally, but its concrete administration is instead structured according to juridical forms. The two dimensions are not alternatives, but complementary.

When it is stated that an administrative appointment «shifts the center of gravity from the Holy Order to the papal nomination», a false dilemma is constructed. The Roman Pontiff does not create the sacramentality of the episcopate through an administrative act; but he can legitimately confer non-sacramental government roles on those who have not received the Order, provided that it is not the actual exercise of episcopal office. Reducing everything to the category of "sacred origin" to deny any form of lay cooperation is not a defense of theology: it is a rhetorical construction that takes on the language of doctrine to support an identity position. All expressed - and it is a fact that cannot be ignored - by authors who systematically choose anonymity, while they do not hesitate to describe them as "ignorant", «incompetent», "illiterate" or even "wandering clerics thrown out of their dioceses" people who have gained preparation and competence through decades of serious study and ongoing training. The moral authority of criticism is not strengthened with invective, least of all with anonymity.

The section dedicated to the «female gaze» presents itself as a criticism of ideology. Ma, paradoxically, ends up building a mirror-image and inverse ideology. It is stated that the idea of ​​a "peculiar female gaze" is an empty thesis, sentimental, identity. However, to demolish this thesis we resort to the same scheme that we would like to refute: Women are attributed with an emotional predisposition, unstable, incapable of objective discernment. The stereotype cannot be overcome: you turn it upside down. The topic thus slides from a legitimate perplexity about the risk of personalistic criteria to a generalized judgment on the presumed female inclination towards sentimentalism. It is not a theological passage nor a canonical argument, not even a well-founded sociological analysis, it's just a rhetorical device.

If there really was a "feminine criterion" intrinsically unreliable in discernment, one should then conclude — consistently — that women cannot be judges in ecclesiastical courts, nor teachers of moral theology, nor authorized to exercise consultative functions in the canonical field or to manage complex administrative offices. But the Church has never taught anything of the sort. The can. 228 § 1 it is unmistakable: suitable lay people are able to assume ecclesiastical offices and tasks for which they are capable. The criterion is not gender, but suitability. The law is clear, it becomes less so when it is read in fragments or bent to a thesis based on prejudice. Attributing to women a natural inclination towards emotional judgment is in fact equivalent to repeating, in a polemical way, the same stereotyped anthropology that it claims to want to fight. We move from the myth of the "naturally welcoming mother" to the myth of the "naturally impressionable woman". Change the sign, not the structure.

At this point a question arises spontaneously — and it doesn't need to be shouted but asked calmly — because critical attention focuses almost exclusively on women? Because you can't read it, with the same vehemence, an analysis of the male power dynamics that have produced clientelism for decades, cross protections, ideological consortiums and networks of influence are not always clear?

The recent history of the Curia was not marked by an excess of the "female gaze", but rather crossed by logics of belonging, sometimes very compact, sometimes surprisingly indulgent towards well-known internal fragilities, as long as they are placed in the right relational network. When we thunder against the female presence as a destabilizing factor, but there is silence about much more structured and deep-rooted protection systems, criticism inevitably loses credibility. Not because the presence of women is untouchable - no ecclesial function is - but because the selectivity of indignation is always a clue. Impetuously stigmatizing the femininity of those who are women by nature and grace, while at the same time overlooking certain "masculine" habits and vices that have nothing evangelically virile about them, it is not doctrinal rigor, it is a polemical asymmetry.

Another point deserves clarification: the consultation process for choosing bishops — governed by cann. 377 e 378 — does not attribute sacramental power to any consultant. It does not confer the episcopal office. The consultation is an investigative tool, non-exercise of governing office. When a lay person - man or woman - expresses an opinion, does not exercise sacramental jurisdiction: contributes to an information process. The decision then remains entirely with the Apostolic See.

Claim that the mere presence of women in a consultative body compromises the sacramentality of the episcopate means confusing distinct levels of the ecclesial order. It is a notable conceptual confusion, not a defense of the doctrine. The real problem, if it exists, it is not the gender of the consultants but the quality of the criteria. If some appointments are questionable, the question is not whether the person expressing an opinion was a man or a woman, but ask yourself: what information was collected? By what method? With what verification? With what final assumption of responsibility? Reducing everything to an identity opposition - "feminine gaze" versus "sacramental governance" - not only oversimplifies reality, but it distorts it. The Church does not need symbolic quotas. But it doesn't even need selective indignation, ready to take action on some profiles and surprisingly silent and protective on other, much more consolidated power dynamics, even when they emerge in a public and seriously scandalous form (cf.. who).

The difference between an ideological presence and a competent presence it doesn't go through gender. Go through eligibility, training, ecclesial maturity, the ability to discern. If you really want to avoid tokenism, the criterion must be competence, always. For men and women. Otherwise we end up fighting one ideology by building another, with the only difference that this time the controversy takes on the face of a theologically selective nostalgia.

The bombastic question: «We want competent bishops or the approval of the media?» constructs a contrast that is as suggestive as it is artificial. No canonical law provides that bishops are chosen to obtain media consensus. The can. 378 § 1 indicates very concrete requirements: intact faith, good morals, compassion, very per le anime, wisdom, prudence, human virtues, good reputation, at least thirty-five years of age, five years of priesthood, doctorate or license in sacred disciplines or at least real expertise in them. The parameter is objective suitability, not journalistic approval. To say that recent appointments are driven by a media obsession may be an opinion; however, transforming it into a total interpretative key becomes a self-sufficient narrative: every choice that is not shared is explained as giving in to the media; every unwanted profile as the result of "tokenism".

It is an effective rhetorical mechanism, but fragile. If the criterion was really the applause of the "popular", how can it be explained that many appointments were contested by the media? How can it be explained that quite a few episcopal choices have generated critical reactions even in the secular world? The argument works only as long as it remains unproven; subjected to verification, loses consistency and reveals itself to have no objective basis. The real problem — and it is a serious problem — is not media approval. It is the quality of the information collected in the consultation process. And this is where the discussion should focus. The procedure foreseen by can. 377 §2-3 it is articulated: common and secret consultation among the bishops; collection of qualified opinions; possible listening to priests and lay people; transmission of a detailed picture to the Apostolic See. The system is not built to replace episcopal judgment with media judgment. It is built to broaden the candidate's knowledge. The investigation does not remove responsibility from the Apostolic See; the qualification.

If some appointments are unfortunate, the problem is not the presence of lay people or women in the consultative process. The problem, eventually, it is the quality of the evaluations, the solidity of the information, the verification of reports and - in times that Scripture would call "lean" - also the objective difficulty of finding profiles of particular depth and value. And here a significant detail emerges: the article denounces emotional criteria, impressionistic, identity. But in doing so he uses equally impressionistic categories: "disaster", "state of desperation", "power games", «unliveable dynamics». Strong terms, but without detailed documentation. We criticize the subjectivity of others by resorting to our own subjectivity. If the problem is the quality of the appointments, the discussion must remain objective, otherwise we remain in the sphere of polemical impression.

Another impressive question it is what is contained in the slogan: «Il gift you can't improvise", with reference to the need to distinguish "between theology and selective use of law". It is the most theologically challenging part of the article, dedicated to gift episcopal. And this is where extreme clarity is needed. The the task of teaching, to sanctify and govern it belongs to the episcopate (cf.. can. 375). Nobody disputes it. No recent reform has attributed the episcopal office to non-ordained subjects. No woman exercises the episcopal office. Today no layman, man or woman, governs a diocese by virtue of sacramental power. When, in past eras, distortions occurred in the management of the dioceses — with absent owners, sometimes never residents and administrations de facto delegated to relatives or trustees according to the logic of nepotism - these were historical abuses that the Tridentine reform corrected precisely to bring ecclesial government back to its authentic and pastoral form. Evoking similar scenarios today as if they were re-proposable means superimposing radically different and completely inappropriate historical plans.

The real question is another: who can cooperate in the investigative and administrative processes that precede or accompany the exercise of gift? The legal answer has already been given. It is not an innovation of the current or previous pontificate. The can. 129 §2 provides that the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of the power of government according to law; the can. 228 recognizes suitable lay people the possibility of assuming ecclesiastical offices; the can. 377 §3 it explicitly contemplates the consultation of priests and lay people in the process of episcopal appointment. The fundamental distinction is between sacramental ownership of gift and functional cooperation in the exercise of authority. Confusing the two dimensions means transforming an administrative question into an ontological question. And this is not a defense of theology, but alteration of its categories.

If only to those who sacramentally participate in the gift is given to contribute to the discernment of a candidate, then it should consistently be excluded: lay academics consulted for their theological expertise; non-ordained canonists; lay people included in disciplinary commissions; economic experts in the dioceses. We should even review the consolidated practice of the Roman dicasteries, where doctors, jurists, experts from various disciplines collaborate without exercising any sacramental power. Just think of the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints: the scientific commission is made up of medical specialists who evaluate the alleged miracles according to strictly clinical criteria. No one has ever found it necessary to replace them with clergy without clinical training, just because they are tidy. The Church has never worked like this, not even in the most delicate areas.

The risk, so, it is not the "feminization" of the Curia, but the clericalization of every ecclesial function, as if Holy Orders were a requirement for any administrative or consultative responsibility. Is this, paradoxically, contradicts precisely the criticism directed elsewhere at "clericalism". Recent history offers eloquent examples. Saint John Paul II chose him as Director of the Press Office of the Holy See Joaquín Navarro-Valls, psychiatrist and lay doctor, not because he was tidy - he wasn't - but because of his great competence, Balance, communicative intelligence. Father then succeeded him Federico Lombardi S.J., He was also chosen for his high personal and professional qualities. In both cases, the criterion was not the sacramental degree, but suitability for function.

«The episcopal munus cannot be improvised», Certainly, but neither does it improperly extend to functions that do not ontologically belong to it. Defending the sacramentality of the episcopate does not mean transforming every ecclesial collaboration into an appendix of the Holy Orders. Means, on the contrary, preserve the distinctions that theological tradition and Church law have always been able to maintain.

The debate cannot concern the "feminization" of the Curia, nor the obsession with quotas, nor an alleged surrender to sociological modernity. The real point is something else: the quality of discernment and fidelity to the theological structure of the Church. If a woman exercises an administrative role legitimately conferred by the Roman Pontiff, the sacramentality of the episcopate has not been affected. If a religious participates in a consultative process, the ontology of the gift. If a layperson offers a technical opinion, the hierarchy has not been desacralized. The Sacrament of Orders is not a cover for every organizational function, it is the root of the apostolic mission. Confusing the root with every leaf of the institutional tree is not a defense of tradition: it is theological approximation for amateurs.

The most serious risk is not the presence of women in ministries, but the ideological use of theology to transform every administrative choice into an ontological crisis. It's the habit of reading everything as subversion. It is the inability to distinguish between cooperation and substitution, between consultation and ownership, between sacramental structure and juridical organization. And then there is a detail that deserves to be said with sober clarity: one cannot thunder against the "ideology of women" while systematically remaining silent on other power dynamics that pass through much more structured ecclesiastical environments, branched and influential. Selective indignation is not doctrinal rigor: it is a controversial choice. And when severity is exercised only in one direction, becomes suspicious. The Church does not need fears disguised as theology but competence, responsibility, truth and inner freedom. It needs well-educated appointments and solid information. It needs men and women who serve, not of identity narratives that fuel permanent conflicts.

Therefore, if the criterion is competence, this itself must be demonstrated. If the criterion is law, everything should be read anyway, not for fragments and extrapolations. If the criterion is theology, this cannot be reduced to slogans. The sacramentality of ecclesial authority is not in question, but neither is it an argument to be brandished against every form of lay cooperation, otherwise we end up defending the hierarchy so rigidly as to transform it into a grotesque caricature. And the Church is not a caricatural phenomenon, even if some reduce it to a parody. It is a sacramental reality that lives in history, with legal structures, personal responsibilities and concrete decisions. The rest belongs more to the controversy of some blogs than to law or theology.

In this blog there is also anonymity as a moral posture, which deserves sober observation. The harshest criticism — with accusations of incompetence, of authoritarianism, of ideological management — come from subjects who systematically choose anonymity, which may even have legitimate reasons in particular circumstances. But when you make such heavy judgments about people and institutions, remain structurally anonymous while demanding transparency from others, while anonymous complaints and gossip are stigmatized, creates an evident moral asymmetry, not without gravity. Also because Catholic theology is not built on insinuations; canon law is not based on unverifiable impressions; and moral authority requires precise assumptions of responsibility which often require courage, sometimes even real heroism. Criticizing is legitimate; delegitimizing without exposing yourself is much less so. In fact, when the seriousness of sacramentality is invoked, it would be coherent to also invoke the seriousness of personal responsibility, almost absent from the columns of a blog that, setting itself up as a permanent tribunal, However, he systematically avoids taking on the responsibility of appearing as a party. The rest, when a theological or legal argument does not stand up to a full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is sufficient to trace it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes, serious and scientific comparison with them, is already in itself the most severe of replies.

From the island of Patmos, 15 February 2026

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DONNE, LAW, AND THEOLOGY USED AS SLOGANS BY THE BLOG I CAN'T BE SILENT

When a theological or juridical argument cannot withstand an integral reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is enough to bring it back to the sources themselves, because at times the very confrontation with them is already, in itself, the most severe of replies.

— Theology and canon law —

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A necessary premise is in order. The blog I can not remain silent has never enjoyed particular esteem among the Fathers who edit this journal. Not out of prejudice, but out of method. Our mission is not to fuel polemics, but to recall theological and juridical truth whenever it is presented in an imprecise, approximate, or ideologically slanted manner. The problem is not criticism — which in the Church is legitimate and at times necessary — but the quality of criticism. When ecclesiological and canonical texts are circulated with peremptory tones, selective citations, and arguments that seem solid only so long as they are not subjected to verification, it becomes our duty to intervene. Not so much for specialists, who possess the tools to discern, as for those priests acting in good faith and for those Catholic faithful who are not adequately prepared, and who risk taking as rigorous analysis what often proves to be a rhetorical and emotive construction rather than a theological and juridical one.

The most recent article, “Women who evaluate bishops? The results of this tokenism are plain for all to see” (see here), is an emblematic example of this approach. In more than one place the text borders on invective; and in its juridical and theological citations, its authenticity at times resembles that of a zircon presented as a pure diamond: brilliant on the surface, yet lacking the structural consistency that only rigorous analysis can provide. For this reason — and for this reason alone — it is fitting to enter into the substance of the matter.

“The power of governance: an unresolved knot” constitutes the article’s main argument, solemn in form and yet fragile in substance. It is claimed that the power of governance, being sacramentally rooted in sacred Orders, cannot be “normalized” nor exercised according to administrative logics that involve non-ordained members of the faithful. The appeal to Benedict XVI — particularly to the catechesis on the governing office of 26 May 2010 — is suggestive, but markedly selective, and above all theologically imprecise. Not because of academic subtleties, but because of an evident confusion between the sacramental titularity of the gift and juridical cooperation in the exercise of authority.

The text employs correct formulas — “sacramental structure,” “sacred origin of authority,” “bond with the Sacrament of Orders” — but isolates them from the overall context of Catholic doctrine, turning them into apologetic slogans by means of selective extrapolations. The result is an argument that appears compact only so long as it is not subjected to an integral reading of the sources. It is true: the hierarchy in the Church has a “sacred origin”; ecclesial authority does not arise from a sociological investiture; the governing office is not reducible to corporate leadership. Yet from these premises there follows nothing of what the article claims to prove.

The Code of Canon Law is exceedingly clear: can. 129 §1 states that those who have received sacred Orders are capable of the power of governance. But §2, which follows immediately — and here lies the point that is systematically ignored — adds that “lay members of the Christian faithful can cooperate in the exercise of this power according to the norm of law.” And to cooperate does not mean to usurp, substitute oneself, or exercise the episcopal gift; rather, it means to participate — according to modalities determined by the Church’s legal order — in the concrete exercise of functions that are not sacramental in nature, but administrative, consultative, investigative, and managerial. Denying this principle would require one coherently to maintain that: lay members of ecclesiastical tribunals exercise a surrogate episcopate; lay experts who intervened in Ecumenical Councils participated sacramentally in the the task of teaching; every administrative function of the Roman Curia would require episcopal consecration, turning ecclesial organization into a monolithic apparatus exclusively sacramental. It is quickly said: such a conclusion is not only not required by Catholic theology; it distorts the fundamental distinction between sacramental titularity and juridical cooperation.

Following the logic of the article’s authors, one should then appoint at least a titular bishop to oversee the parking areas of the Vatican City State, lest a mere administrative official exercise an authority “insufficiently sacramental” in matters of blue lines and parking discs — perhaps with suitable references to sacramental dogmatics. To be clear: the absurdity is not the irony, but the premise. Benedict XVI, in recalling the “sacred origin” of ecclesial authority, never maintained that every act of governance in the Church coincides ontologically with the exercise of sacred Orders. The distinction between the power of the order and the power of government is classical in Catholic theology and finds in canon law a clear and systematic formulation. The sacramental origin of the episcopate does not eliminate the institutional and juridical dimension of ecclesial governance: it grounds it and structures it. To confuse these levels is to mistake the root for the branches. Authority arises sacramentally; its concrete administration is articulated through juridical forms. The two dimensions are not alternatives, but complementary.

When it is claimed that an administrative appointment “shifts the center of gravity from sacred Orders to papal appointment,” a false dilemma is constructed. The Roman Pontiff does not create the sacramentality of the episcopate by an administrative act; yet he can legitimately confer non-sacramental offices of governance upon those who have not received Orders, provided that what is at stake is not the proper exercise of the episcopal gift. To reduce everything to the category of “sacred origin” in order to deny every form of lay cooperation is not the defense of theology: it is a rhetorical construction that adopts the language of doctrine to support an identitarian position. All this is advanced — and this is a fact that cannot be ignored — by authors who systematically choose anonymity, while not hesitating to label as “ignorant,” “incompetent,” “illiterate,” or even “wandering clerics cast out of their dioceses” persons who have acquired preparation and competence through decades of serious study and ongoing formation. The moral authority of criticism is not strengthened by invective, least of all by anonymity.

The section devoted to the “female gaze” presents itself as a critique of ideology. Yet, paradoxically, it ends up constructing a specular and inverted ideology. It is asserted that the idea of a peculiarly female “gaze” would be empty, sentimentalistic, identitarian. However, in order to demolish this thesis, the very same schema it would refute is employed: women are attributed an emotional, unstable disposition, incapable of objective discernment. The stereotype is not overcome; it is reversed. The argument thus slips from a legitimate concern about the risk of personalist criteria into a generalized judgment about an alleged female inclination to sentimentalism. This is not a theological passage, nor a canonical argument, nor even a sound sociological analysis: it is a rhetorical device.

If there truly existed an intrinsically unreliable “female criterion” in discernment, one would then have to conclude — consistently — that women could not be judges in ecclesiastical tribunals, nor professors of moral theology, nor competent to exercise consultative functions in canonical matters, nor capable of directing complex administrative offices. But the Church has never taught anything of the sort. Canon 228 §1 is unequivocal: suitably qualified lay persons are capable of assuming ecclesiastical offices and functions for which they are competent. The criterion is not gender, but suitability. The law is clear; it becomes less so only when read in fragments or bent to a thesis rooted in prejudice. To attribute to women a natural inclination to emotional judgment is, in polemical guise, to reproduce the very stereotyped anthropology one claims to combat. One passes from the myth of the “naturally welcoming mother” to the myth of the “naturally impressionable woman.” The sign changes; the structure does not.

At this point a question arises spontaneously — and it need not be shouted, only posed calmly: why does critical attention focus almost exclusively on women? Why does one not read, with the same vehemence, an analysis of male power dynamics which for decades have produced clientelism, mutual protection, ideological factions, and networks of influence not always transparent?

Against Sister Raffaella Petrini, now Governor of the Vatican City State — a title traditionally in use, although juridically it is a presidency — the columns of that blog directed not only criticism but outright personal invective.

The recent history of the Curia has not been marked by an excess of a “female gaze,” but rather by dynamics of belonging — at times very compact, at times surprisingly indulgent toward well-known internal fragilities — provided they are situated within the right relational network. When one thunders against the female presence as a destabilizing factor, yet remains silent about far more structured and deeply rooted systems of protection, criticism inevitably loses credibility. Not because women’s presence is untouchable — no ecclesial function is — but because selective indignation is always a sign. To stigmatize with impetuosity the femininity of those who are women by nature and by grace, while at the same time overlooking certain “male” behaviors that have nothing evangelically virile about them, is not doctrinal rigor; it is polemical asymmetry.

Another point requires clarity: the consultative process for the selection of bishops — governed by cann. 377 and 378 — does not confer sacramental power upon any consultor. It does not grant the episcopal gift. It does not turn an opinion into an act of governance. Consultation is an investigative instrument, not the exercise of the governing office. When a lay person — man or woman — offers an opinion, he does not exercise sacramental jurisdiction; he contributes to an informational process. The decision remains with the Apostolic See.

To claim that the mere presence of women in a consultative body compromises the sacramentality of the episcopate is to confuse distinct levels of the Church’s legal order. This is conceptual confusion, not defense of doctrine. The real problem, if any, is not the consultors’ gender but the quality of the criteria. If certain appointments prove questionable, the issue is not whether the person who offered an opinion was male or female, but: what information was gathered? By what method? With what verification? With what assumption of final responsibility? To reduce everything to an identitarian opposition — “female gaze” versus “sacramental governance” — not only oversimplifies reality; it deforms it. The Church does not need symbolic quotas. Yet she also does not need selective indignations, ready to activate against certain profiles and surprisingly silent about other power dynamics far more consolidated, even when they emerge publicly and scandalously.

The difference between an ideological presence and a competent presence does not pass through gender. It passes through suitability, formation, ecclesial maturity, and the capacity for discernment. If one truly wishes to avoid tokenism, then the criterion must be competence — always, for men and for women. Otherwise one ends up combating one ideology by constructing another, with the only difference that this time polemics assume the guise of a theologically selective nostalgia.

The resounding question, “Do we want competent bishops or the approval of the media?” constructs a contrast as suggestive as it is artificial. No canonical norm provides that bishops are chosen in order to obtain media consensus. Canon 378 §1 indicates very concrete requirements: sound faith, good morals, piety, zeal for souls, wisdom, prudence, human virtues, good reputation, at least thirty-five years of age, five years of priesthood, a doctorate or licentiate in sacred disciplines — or at least true expertise in them. The parameter is objective suitability, not journalistic approval. To claim that recent appointments would be guided by a media obsession may be an opinion; to transform it into a total interpretive key, however, becomes a self-sufficient narrative: every unwelcomed choice is explained as capitulation to the media; every disliked profile as the fruit of “tokenism.”

It is a rhetorically effective mechanism, but a fragile one. If the criterion were truly the applause of the “common folk,” how does one explain that many appointments have been contested precisely by the media? How does one explain that not a few episcopal choices have generated critical reactions even in secular circles? The argument works only so long as it remains unproven; once subjected to verification, it loses consistency and reveals itself without objective foundation. The real problem — and it is a serious one — is not media approval. It is the quality of the information gathered in the consultative process. And it is here that the discussion ought to concentrate. The procedure envisaged by can. 377 §§2–3 is articulated: common and secret consultation among bishops; gathering of qualified opinions; possible listening to priests and laity; transmission of a well-documented dossier to the Apostolic See. The system is not built to replace episcopal judgment with media judgment. It is built to broaden knowledge of the candidate. The investigation does not remove responsibility from the Apostolic See; it qualifies it.

If certain appointments prove unhappy, the problem is not the presence of laity or women in the consultative process. The problem, if anything, is the quality of evaluations, the solidity of information, the verification of reports and — at times when Scripture would speak of “lean years” — also the objective difficulty of finding candidates of particular depth and worth. Here a significant detail emerges. The article denounces emotional, impressionistic, identitarian criteria. Yet in doing so it employs equally impressionistic categories: “disaster,” “a state of despair,” “power games,” “unlivable dynamics.” Strong terms, but lacking detailed documentation. One criticizes the subjectivity of others while resorting to one’s own. If the issue is the quality of appointments, the discussion must remain objective. Otherwise it remains within the sphere of polemical impression.

Another rhetorical question is encapsulated in the slogan, “The gift is not improvised,” along with an appeal to the need to distinguish “between theology and selective use of law.” This is the article’s most theologically demanding portion, devoted to the episcopal gift. Here utmost clarity is required. The the task of teaching, to sanctify and govern is proper to the episcopate (cf. can. 375). No one contests this. No recent reform has attributed the episcopal gift to non-ordained persons. No woman exercises the episcopal gift. Today no lay person, man or woman, governs a diocese by virtue of sacramental power. When, in past epochs, distortions occurred in diocesan governance — with absent titulars, sometimes never resident, and administrations in fact delegated to relatives or trusted persons according to logics of nepotism — these were historical abuses which the Tridentine reform corrected precisely in order to restore ecclesial governance to its authentic pastoral form. To evoke such scenarios today as though they were re-proposable is to superimpose radically different historical planes, wholly out of place.

The real question is another: who may cooperate in the investigative and administrative processes that precede or accompany the exercise of the gift? The answer of the law is already given. This is not an innovation of the current pontificate nor of the preceding one. Canon 129 §2 provides that lay members of the faithful may cooperate in the exercise of the power of governance according to the law; can. 228 recognizes that suitably qualified laity may assume ecclesiastical offices; can. 377 §3 explicitly envisages consultation also of priests and laity in the process of episcopal appointment. The fundamental distinction is between the sacramental titularity of the gift and functional cooperation in the exercise of authority. To confuse the two is to turn an administrative question into an ontological one. And this is not the defense of theology, but an alteration of its categories.

If only those who participate sacramentally in the gift were permitted to contribute to discernment about a candidate, one would coherently have to exclude: lay academics consulted for their theological competence; non-ordained canonists; lay members of disciplinary commissions; economic experts in dioceses. One would even have to revise the consolidated practice of Roman dicasteries, where physicians, jurists, and experts in various disciplines collaborate without exercising any sacramental authority. Consider the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints: its scientific commission is composed of specialist physicians who evaluate alleged miracles according to rigorously clinical criteria. No one has ever thought it necessary to replace them with clerics lacking clinical training simply because they are ordained. The Church has never functioned in this way, not even in the most delicate spheres.

The risk, therefore, is not the “feminization” of the Curia, but the clericalization of every ecclesial function, as though sacred Orders were required for any administrative or consultative responsibility. And this, paradoxically, contradicts precisely the critique elsewhere directed against “clericalism.” Recent history offers eloquent examples. Saint John Paul II chose Joaquín Navarro-Valls, a layman and psychiatrist, as Director of the Holy See Press Office — not because he was ordained (he was not), but because of great competence, balance, and communicative intelligence. He was later succeeded by Fr. Federico Lombardi, S.J., likewise chosen for personal and professional qualities. In both cases the criterion was not sacramental rank, but suitability for the function.

The episcopal gift is not improvised, certainly. Yet neither is it improperly extended to functions that do not belong to it ontologically. To defend the sacramentality of the episcopate does not mean to turn every ecclesial collaboration into an appendage of sacred Orders. It means, on the contrary, to safeguard the distinctions that theological tradition and the Church’s law have always known how to maintain.

The debate cannot concern the “feminization” of the Curia, nor an obsession with quotas, nor an alleged capitulation to sociological modernity. The true point is another: the quality of discernment and fidelity to the Church’s theological structure. If a woman exercises an administrative office legitimately conferred by the Roman Pontiff, the sacramentality of the episcopate has not been compromised. If a religious sister participates in a consultative process, the ontology of the gift has not been altered. If a lay person offers technical advice, the hierarchy has not been desacralized. The Sacrament of Orders is not a covering for every organizational function; it is the root of the apostolic mission. To confuse the root with every leaf of the institutional tree is not the defense of tradition: it is theological approximation by amateurs.

The more serious risk is not the female presence in dicasteries. It is the ideological use of theology to turn every administrative decision into an ontological crisis. It is the habit of reading everything as subversion. It is the inability to distinguish between cooperation and substitution, between consultation and titularity, between sacramental structure and juridical organization. And there is also a detail that must be stated with sober clarity: one cannot thunder against the “ideology of woman” while systematically remaining silent about other dynamics of power that traverse ecclesial environments far more structured, ramified, and influential. Selective indignation is not doctrinal rigor; it is a polemical choice. And when severity is exercised in only one direction, it becomes suspect. The Church does not need fears disguised as theology, but competence, responsibility, truth, and interior freedom. She needs well-prepared appointments and solid information. She needs men and women who serve, not identitarian narratives that nourish permanent conflicts.

If, then, the criterion is competence, that competence must itself be shown. If the criterion is law, the law must be read in its entirety, not by fragments and extrapolations. If the criterion is theology, theology cannot be reduced to slogans. The sacramentality of ecclesial authority is not in question, but neither is it an argument to be brandished against every form of lay cooperation; otherwise one ends up defending the hierarchy so rigidly as to turn it into a grotesque caricature. And the Church is not a caricatural phenomenon, even if some reduce her to parody. She is a sacramental reality living in history, with juridical structures, personal responsibilities, and concrete decisions. The rest belongs more to the polemics of certain anonymous blogs than to law or theology.

In this blog, moreover, anonymity functions as a moral posture that deserves a sober observation. The harshest critiques — with accusations of incompetence, authoritarianism, ideological governance — come from persons who systematically choose anonymity, which may in certain circumstances even have legitimate reasons. But when one formulates judgments so heavy against persons and institutions, remaining structurally anonymous while demanding transparency from others, while stigmatizing anonymous denunciations and gossip, creates an evident moral asymmetry, not without gravity. For Catholic theology is not built on insinuations; canon law is not founded on unverifiable impressions; and moral authority requires precise assumptions of responsibility which not infrequently demand courage, at times even true heroism. Criticism is legitimate; delegitimizing others without exposing oneself is far less so. When one invokes the seriousness of sacramentality, it would be coherent to invoke also the seriousness of personal responsibility — almost wholly absent from the columns of a blog which, setting itself up as a permanent tribunal, systematically avoids assuming the responsibility of appearing as a party. Moreover, when a theological or juridical argument cannot withstand an integral reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: it is enough to bring it back to the sources themselves, because at times the very confrontation with them is already, in itself, the most severe of replies.

From the Isle of Patmos, 15 February 2026

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WOMEN, LAW AND THEOLOGY REDUCED TO SLOGAN BY THE BLOG SILERE NON POSSUM

When a theological or legal argument does not withstand the full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: just refer it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes the contrast with them constitutes in itself the most severe of replies.

— theology and canon law—

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A necessary premise is imposed. The blog I can not remain silent has never aroused particular appreciation among the Fathers editors of this magazine. Not because of prejudice, but by method. Our mission is not to fuel controversies, but to refer to theological and legal truth when it is presented imprecisely, approximate or ideologically oriented. The problem is not criticism — which in the Church is legitimate and sometimes necessary —, but the quality of the criticism. When texts of an ecclesiological and canonistic nature are disseminated with peremptory tones, selective citations and arguments that appear solid only as long as they are not subjected to verification, it is necessary to intervene. Not so much for the specialists, who possess the instruments to discern, as for those priests of good faith and for those Catholic faithful not adequately prepared, that run the risk of assuming as rigorous analysis what often turns out to be a rhetorical and emotional construction rather than a theological and legal one..

The last article «Women who evaluate bishops? The results of this tokenism are visible to all. (see here) represents an emblematic example of this approach. At several points the text borders on invective.; in legal and theological quotes, besides, authenticity sometimes appears similar to that of a zircon presented as a pure diamond: shiny on the surface, but lacking the structural consistency that only a rigorous analysis can guarantee. For this reason - and only for this reason - it is advisable to go into the background.

«The power of government, an unresolved knot constitutes the supporting argument of the article, as solemn in form as fragile in substance. It is stated that the power of government, being sacramentally rooted in the sacred Order, It cannot be “normalized” or exercised according to administrative logic that involves non-ordained faithful.. The reference to Benedict XVI — in particular to the catechesis on the governing office the 26 May 2010 — is suggestive, but markedly selective. Y, above all, theologically imprecise. Not for academic subtlety, but because of an evident confusion between the sacramental ownership of the gift and legal cooperation in the exercise of power.

The text uses correct formulas — «sacramental structure», "sacred origin of authority", «link with the Sacrament of Orders» —, but it isolates them from the global context of Catholic doctrine, transforming them into apologetic slogans through selective extrapolations. The result is an argument that appears compact only when it is not subjected to a full reading of the sources.. It's true: The hierarchy in the Church has a “sacred origin”; ecclesiastical authority is not born from a sociological investiture; he governing office It is not comparable to business leadership. But from these premises it does not follow at all what the article aims to demonstrate..

The Code of Canon Law is extremely clear: the c. 129 §1 states that those who have received Holy Orders are qualified for the power of government. But §2, which immediately follows - and here is the point systematically ignored - establishes that "the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of said power, according to the law. And cooperating does not mean usurping, replace or exercise the episcopal office, but participate, according to modalities determined by the ecclesial order, in the concrete exercise of functions that are not sacramental in nature, but administrative, consultative, training, management. Denying this principle, it would be necessary to coherently maintain that: The lay members of the ecclesiastical courts exercise a de facto episcopate; The lay experts who participated in the ecumenical Councils participated sacramentally in the the task of teaching; Every administrative function of the Curia requires episcopal ordination, until transforming the ecclesial organization into a kind of monolithic exclusively sacramental apparatus. It's easy to say: Such a conclusion is not only not required by Catholic theology., but rather misrepresents his fundamental distinction between sacramental ownership and legal cooperation.

Following the logic of the anonymous authors of the article, At least one titular bishop would then have to be appointed to manage the parking lots of the Vatican City State., in order to prevent a simple administrative official from exercising a power that is “not sufficiently sacramental” in matters of regulated zones and time zones — perhaps with appropriate references to sacramental dogmatics —. Well understood: the absurd is not the irony, but the premise. Benedict XVI, by remembering the "sacred origin" of ecclesial authority, He never maintained that every act of government in the Church ontologically coincides with the exercise of Sacred Orders.. The distinction between the power of the order and the power of government It is classic in Catholic theology and finds a clear and systematic formulation in canon law.. The sacramental origin of the episcopate does not eliminate the institutional and legal dimension of ecclesial government: the foundation and the structure. Confusing these levels means confusing the root with the branches.. Authority is born sacramentally; its specific administration is articulated, instead, according to legal forms. The two dimensions are not alternatives, but complementary.

When it is stated that an administrative appointment "shifts the center of gravity from the Holy Orders to the papal appointment", a false dilemma is created. The Roman Pontiff does not create the sacramentality of the episcopate through an administrative act; but can legitimately confer non-sacramental governmental duties on those who have not received Orders., as long as it is not the exercise of the episcopal office. Reducing everything to the category of "sacred origin" to deny all forms of lay cooperation is not a defense of theology: It is a rhetorical construction that assumes the language of doctrine to sustain an identity position.. All of this expressed — and it is a fact that cannot be ignored — by authors who systematically choose anonymity., while they do not hesitate to describe them as "ignorant", “incompetent”, "illiterates" or even "errant clerics expelled from their dioceses" to people who have acquired preparation and competence over decades of serious study and ongoing formation. The moral authority of criticism is not reinforced by invective, and even less with anonymity.

The section dedicated to the "female gaze" It is presented as a critique of ideology. But, paradoxically, ends up building a mirror and inverse ideology. It is stated that the idea of ​​a feminine "peculiar gaze" would be an empty thesis, sentimentalist, identity. However, To demolish this thesis, we resort to the same scheme that we would like to refute.: an emotional predisposition is attributed to women, unstable, incapable of objective discernment. The stereotype is not overcome: it is turned around. The argument thus slips from a legitimate perplexity about the risk of personalistic criteria to a generalized judgment about the alleged feminine inclination to sentimentalism.. It is not a theological passage. It is not a canonical argument. It is not even a founded sociological analysis: It's a rhetorical device.. If there really existed an intrinsically unreliable "feminine criterion" in discernment, It would then be necessary to conclude – coherently – that women cannot be judges in ecclesiastical courts., nor teachers of moral theology, nor authorized to exercise consultative functions at the canonical level or to direct complex administrative offices. But the Church has never taught anything like that.. The c. 228 §1 is unambiguous: Suitable lay people are capable of assuming ecclesiastical offices and assignments for which they are capable.. The criterion is not gender, but the suitability. The law is clear; It is less so when it is read in fragments or adheres to a thesis based on prejudice.. Attributing to women a natural inclination to emotional judgment is equivalent, indeed, to re-propose — in a polemical way — the same stereotypical anthropology that they declare they want to combat. We move from the myth of the “naturally welcoming mother” to the myth of the “naturally impressionable woman.”. change the sign, not the structure. At this point, a question arises spontaneously — and does not need to be shouted, but posed calmly—: Why is critical attention focused almost exclusively on women?? Why not read, with the same vehemence, an analysis of the male power dynamics that for decades have produced clientelism, cross protections, ideological cliques and influence networks not always clean?

Contra la hermana Raffaella Petrini, today Governor of Vatican City State — title traditionally in use, although legally it is a presidency —, From the columns of that blog not only criticism was directed, but real personal invectives.

The recent history of the Curia has not been marked by an excess of the “female gaze”, but rather crossed by logics of belonging, sometimes very compact, sometimes surprisingly forgiving of well-known internal frailties, as long as they were located in the appropriate relational network. When there is thunder against the female presence as a destabilizing factor, but is silent about much more structured and deep-rooted protection systems, criticism inevitably loses credibility. Not because the presence of women is untouchable — no ecclesial function is —, but because the selectivity of indignation is always an indication. Vigorously stigmatize the femininity of someone who is a woman by nature and by grace., and at the same time ignore certain “masculine” behaviors that have nothing evangelically virile about them., It is not doctrinal rigor.: It is a controversial asymmetry.

Another point deserves clarity: the consultation process for the election of bishops — disciplined by the ccs. 377 and 378 — does not attribute sacramental power to any consultant. It does not confer the episcopal office. Does not convert an opinion into an act of government. Consultation is an instrument of instruction, non-exercise governing office. When a layman — man or woman — expresses an opinion, does not exercise sacramental jurisdiction: contributes to an information process. The decision corresponds to the Apostolic See.

Maintain that the simple presence of women in a consultative body it compromises the sacramentality of the episcopate means confusing different levels of the ecclesial order. It's a conceptual confusion, not a defense of the doctrine. The real problem, if it exists, It is not the genre of consultants. It is the quality of the criteria. If some designations are debatable, The question is not to establish whether the person who issued an opinion was a man or a woman., but to wonder: What information has been collected? With what method? With what verification? With what assumption of final responsibility? Reducing everything to an identity contrast — “feminine gaze” versus “sacramental government” — not only oversimplifies reality, but it deforms it. The Church does not need symbolic fees. But it doesn't need selective indignation either., ready to activate on some profiles and surprisingly silent on other much more consolidated power dynamics, even when they emerge publicly and scandalously .

The difference between an ideological presence and a competent presence It doesn't go by gender. Go through suitability, training, ecclesial maturity, the ability to discern. If you really want to avoid tokenism, the criterion must be competence. Always. For men and for women. Otherwise, you end up fighting an ideology by building another, with the only difference that this time the controversy assumes the face of a theologically selective nostalgia..

The high-sounding request: «Do we want competent bishops or the approval of the media?» builds a contrast as suggestive as it is artificial. No canonical norm foresees that bishops are elected to obtain media consensus. The c. 378 §1 indicates very specific requirements: complete faith, good habits, piety, zeal for souls, wisdom, prudence, human virtues, good reputation, at least thirty-five years of age, five years of priesthood, doctorate or license in sacred disciplines or, at least, real expertise in them. The parameter is objective suitability, not journalistic pleasure. Stating that the recent appointments would be guided by a media obsession may be an opinion; converting it into a total interpretive key becomes, however, a self-contained narrative: any non-shared choice is explained as a transfer to the media; any profile not appreciated as a result of “tokenism”.

It is an effective rhetorical device, but fragile. If the criterion were really the applause of the “plain people”, How do you explain that many designations have been contested precisely by the media?? How can we explain that many episcopal elections have also provoked critical reactions in the secular world?? The argument works only as long as it remains unproven.; subjected to verification, loses consistency and is revealed to lack objective foundation. The real problem — and it is a serious problem — is not media approval. It is the quality of the information collected in the consultation process. And this is where the discourse should focus. The procedure provided for by the c. 377 §2-3 is articulated: common and secret consultation between the bishops; collection of qualified opinions; possible listening to priests and lay people; transmission of a detailed picture to the Apostolic See. The system is not built to replace episcopal judgment with media judgment. It is built to expand the candidate's knowledge. The instruction does not remove responsibility from the Apostolic See: qualifies her.

If some appointments turn out to be unhappy, the problem is not the presence of lay people or women in the consultative process. The problem, in your case, is the quality of the evaluations, the solidity of the information, the verification of the signs and — in times that Scripture would call “lean times” — also the objective difficulty of finding profiles of particular relevance and value. And here a significant detail emerges. The article denounces emotional criteria, impressionists, identities. But, when doing it, uses equally impressionistic categories: "disaster", “state of despair”, “power games”, “unlivable dynamics”. Strong terms, but lacking detailed documentation. The subjectivity of others is criticized by resorting to one's own subjectivity. If the problem is the quality of the designations, the discussion must remain objective. Otherwise, remains in the sphere of controversial printing.

Another effect question is the one enclosed in the slogan: "He gift "it is not improvised", with reference to the need to distinguish "between theology and selective use of law". It is the most theologically demanding part of the article, dedicated to episcopal office. And this is where extreme clarity is required.. The the task of teaching, to sanctify and govern It is typical of the episcopate (cf.. (c). 375). Nobody disputes it. No recent reform has attributed the episcopal office to unordered subjects. No woman exercises episcopal office. Today no layman, man or woman, governs a diocese by virtue of sacramental power. When, in times past, distortions occurred in the management of the dioceses — with absent holders, sometimes never residents, and de facto administrations delegated to relatives or fiduciaries according to the logic of nepotism — these were historical abuses that the Tridentine reform corrected precisely to redirect ecclesial government to its authentic and pastoral form.. Evoking similar scenarios today as if they were reproducible means superimposing radically different and totally out of place historical plans..

The real issue is another: Who can cooperate in the instruction and administrative processes that precede or accompany the exercise of the gift? The answer of the law has already been given. It is not an innovation of the current pontificate or the previous one.. The c. 129 §2 provides that the lay faithful can cooperate in the exercise of the power of government according to law; the c. 228 recognizes suitable lay people the possibility of assuming ecclesiastical offices; the c. 377 §3 explicitly contemplates consultation also with priests and lay people in the process of episcopal appointment. The fundamental distinction is between sacramental ownership of the gift and functional cooperation in the exercise of power. Confusing both dimensions means transforming an administrative question into an ontological question.. And this is not a defense of theology, but alteration of their categories.

If only those who participate sacramentally in gift would be allowed to contribute to the discernment of a candidate, should be coherently excluded: lay academics consulted for their theological competence; unordained canonists; lay members of disciplinary commissions; economic experts in the dioceses. It would even be necessary to review the consolidated praxis of the Roman dicasteries, where doctors, jurists, experts from various disciplines collaborate without exercising any sacramental power. Just think of the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints: The scientific commission is made up of specialist doctors who evaluate the alleged miracles according to rigorously clinical criteria.. No one has ever considered it necessary to replace them with ecclesiastics without clinical training, just because they are ordered. The Church has never worked like this, not even in the most delicate areas.

The risk, therefore, It is not the “feminization” of the Curia, but the clericalization of every ecclesial function, as if Holy Order were a requirement for any administrative or consultative responsibility. and this, paradoxically, precisely contradicts the criticism directed elsewhere at “clericalism”. Recent history offers eloquent examples. Saint John Paul II elected Joaquín Navarro-Valls as Director of the Press Office of the Holy See, psychiatrist and lay doctor, not because it was ordered—it wasn't—, but because of great competition, balance and communicative intelligence. He was later succeeded by Father Federico Lombardi S.J., equally chosen for personal and professional qualities. In both cases, the criterion was not the sacramental degree, but the suitability for the function.

The episcopal office it is not improvised, certainly. But neither does it improperly extend to functions that do not ontologically belong to it.. Defending the sacramentality of the episcopate does not mean transforming all ecclesial collaboration into an appendix of the Sacred Orders. Means, on the contrary, guard the distinctions that theological tradition and the law of the Church have always known how to maintain.

The debate cannot be about the “feminization” of the Curia, nor about the obsession with quotas, nor about an alleged cession to sociological modernity. The real point is another: the quality of discernment and fidelity to the theological structure of the Church. If a woman exercises an administrative position legitimately conferred by the Roman Pontiff, the sacramentality of the episcopate has not been injured. If a nun participates in a consultative process, the ontology of the gift. If a layman offers a technical opinion, the hierarchy has not been desacralized. The Sacrament of Orders is not a cover for any organizational function. It is the root of the apostolic mission. Confusing the root with each leaf of the institutional tree is not a defense of tradition: It is a superficial theological approach.

The most serious risk is not the female presence in the dicasteries. It is the ideological use of theology to transform every administrative choice into an ontological crisis. It is the habit of reading everything as subversion. It is the inability to distinguish between cooperation and substitution, between consultation and ownership, between sacramental structure and legal organization. And there is also a detail that deserves to be said with sober clarity.: You cannot thunder against the “ideology of women” while systematically remaining silent about other power dynamics that cross much more structured ecclesiastical environments., branched and influential. Selective indignation is not doctrinal rigor: It is a controversial option. And when severity is exerted only in one direction, becomes suspicious. The Church does not need fears disguised as theology, but competition, responsibility, truth and inner freedom. You need well-educated appointments and solid information. Needs men and women who serve, no identity narratives that fuel permanent conflicts.

And, well, the criterion is competition, this must be demonstrated. If the criterion is the right, This should be read in its entirety., not by fragments and extrapolations. If the criterion is theology, this cannot be reduced to a slogan. The sacramentality of ecclesial authority is not in dispute, but it is not an argument to brandish against all forms of secular cooperation either.; otherwise, hierarchy ends up being defended in such a rigid way that it is transformed into a grotesque caricature. And the Church is not a cartoonish phenomenon, although some reduce it to a parody. It is a sacramental reality that lives in history, with legal structures, personal responsibilities and specific decisions. The rest belongs more to the controversy of certain anonymous blogs than to law or theology..

In this blog there is also anonymity as a moral position, which deserves sober observation. The harshest criticism — with accusations of incompetence, of authoritarianism, of ideological management — come from subjects who systematically choose anonymity, which may even have legitimate reasons in certain circumstances. But when such serious judgments are made about people and institutions, remain structurally anonymous while demanding transparency from others, while anonymous complaints and gossip are stigmatized, creates an obvious moral asymmetry, not without seriousness. Also because Catholic theology is not built on insinuations; Canon law is not based on unverifiable impressions; and moral authority requires precise assumptions of responsibility that often require courage., sometimes even true heroism. Criticizing is legitimate; delegitimizing without exposing oneself is much less so. When, indeed, the seriousness of sacramentality is invoked, it would be coherent to also invoke the seriousness of personal responsibility, almost absent in the columns of a blog that, establishing itself as a permanent court, However, he systematically avoids assuming the responsibility of appearing as a party. Otherwise, when a theological or legal argument does not stand up to the full reading of the sources, no invective is needed to refute it: just refer it back to the sources themselves, because sometimes the contrast with them constitutes in itself the most severe of replies.

From the Island of Patmos, 15 February 2026

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